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The following dissertation is a collection of three independent essays.  The 
first two essays contribute to the literature on Organization Economics.  The third 
essay contributes to the literature on data confidentiality. 
Essay 1, “Turnover as a Gateway to Symmetric Information,” explores high-
ability turnover in highly competitive labor markets.  Why do workers who are 
successful at a given firm decide to leave?  Essay 1 asserts that such movement is 
driven by the presence of asymmetric information.  In particular, it is shown that when 
competing firms have less knowledge of a worker’s ability than his current firm, there 
exists an incentive for high-ability workers to leave their current job in pursuit of a 
higher wage.  Such an incentive generates a set of testable predictions.  The 
predictions are tested using the personnel records from the management of a medium-
size firm in the US financial services industry.  The data is consistent with the theory.   
Essay 2, “Piece-Rates, Salary, Performance and Job Level,” explores the effect 
of monitoring and hierarchy on compensation structure.  Previous work has shown 
that monitoring worker effort is more difficult at lower levels of the hierarchy, and, 
simultaneously, that compensation should rely more on salary payments than piece-
rate payments when effort is more difficult to monitor.  Essay 2 formalizes these ideas 
in a simple model of moral hazard.  The model generates a set of predictions about  
how salary, bonus and performance should vary across levels of the hierarchy.  The 
predictions are tested using the same data as Essay 1 and strong support is found.  
Essay 3, “Synthetic Data and Risk of Disclosure,” explores how well synthetic 
data protects confidential data.  Using a unique Census dataset and 4 synthetic 
implicates, the risk of disclosure is found to be quite small.  In a secondary analysis, 
the effectiveness of distance-based and probabilistic re-identification methods are also 
explored.  Contrary to previous experiments it is found that probabilistic re-
identification outperforms distance-based.  Further, it appears that the difference in 
performance is driven by the number of matching variables: as more matching 
variables are added, the success rate of probabilistic matching increases more quickly. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
TURNOVER AS A GATEWAY TO SYMMETRIC INFORMATION:  
TESTING PATTERNS OF ENTRY INTO PERSONNEL RECORDS 
 
1.1. Introduction 
In the past thirty years there has been a movement in labor economics to better 
understand phenomena associated with allocation of skill within the firm.  The firm is 
no longer a “black box,” and the complexities of the decisions made within are now 
better understood.  This movement has grown with the availability of detailed, 
personnel data that allows researchers to better understand the dynamic environment 
inside real-world firms; promotion chains, hierarchical structure, wage paths, career 
paths, etc….  In turn, a large theoretical literature aimed at explaining these dynamics 
has evolved.  Following Doeringer and Piore’s (1971) hypothesis that internal labor 
markets are “protected” from the influence of the external labor market, the literature 
examining career paths has predominantly focused on career paths within a single 
firm.  The literature has found that the typical career path starts at a low job level 
known as a “port of entry” and then proceeds upward as the firms learns about the 
workers skills.  However, the empirical literature has also found evidence that career 
paths quite often involve movement between firms, even at high levels of the 
promotion hierarchy.
1  This type of movement between firms, however, has not been 
studied as thoroughly as the upward movement within firms.  The goals of the current 
paper are to (1) develop a theoretical framework consistent with mid-career movement 
between firms at high job levels and (2) test the implications of the framework using 
personnel data.   
Starting with Akerlof (1970), economists have analyzed the consequences of 
unobservable quality in product markets.  A large literature has explored mechanisms 
                                                 
1 Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a) is representative of the literature in this regard.  They find 
significant external entry at all job levels.  
  2 
through which sellers can reveal information to buyers to avoid adverse selection 
problems.
2  In the current paper, I apply this idea to the labor market to develop a 
turnover mechanism that ties turnover to level of the hierarchy.  I consider a 3-period 
model with asymmetric learning.  Unlike the standard literature, however, I grant the 
worker self-knowledge of his ability.  With self-knowledge the worker is in a situation 
analogous to a firm in a market with unobservable quality; by revealing information 
about his ability to competing firms he can improve his sales price (i.e. wage).  In 
order to allow workers to take advantage of their self-knowledge I grant them access 
to a networking technology through which they can reveal their ability to a competing 
firm at a fixed cost.  Only high-ability workers will find such an activity profitable.  
When a match parameter is included in production high-ability networking will lead to 
high-ability turnover. 
A secondary consequence of self-knowledge is that the economy endogenously 
transitions from asymmetric to symmetric information.  Even if a worker does not find 
it profitable to network early in his career, self-knowledge allows him to credibly 
threaten turnover later in his career.  This threat of turnover forces the inside firm to 
relinquish its private information as workers age.  As such, each worker starts his 
career in a situation of asymmetric information and eventually moves to a situation of 
symmetric information.  This feature of the model is novel.
3 
When I apply the model to a labor market with multi-level firms where job 
level is observed publicly it is shown that high-ability workers at each level of the firm 
have an incentive to turnover.  This incentive arises because the public observability 
of job level attaches wages to jobs.  High-ability workers within a level must then 
threaten turnover to receive a wage in line with their ability.  Further, the transition 
                                                 
2 Nelson (1970, 1974, 1978) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986). 
3 Milgrom and Oster (1986) consider both asymmetric and symmetric environments in the same model, 
but the environments are exogenous.  Pitchick (2006) is closer in spirit to my model, as she allows 
workers to escape asymmetric information through investment in “visible” human capital.  
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from asymmetric to symmetric information implies the firm’s promotion decision 
changes for older workers.  These two features of the model lead to the following 
testable implications in personnel data: (1) the wage increase due to promotion 
decreases with experience, (2) a higher proportion of new hires than incumbents are 
promoted in the period after entry, (3) new hires enter the firm at the top and bottom 
of the wage distribution of their given job level, and (4) new hires have more variable 
future promotion paths than incumbents.   
Using the sample of white males from the Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom 
(1994a, b) (BGH, hereafter) dataset, I test the above predictions.  I first develop a 
methodology that ties the theory to the data.  The paramount issue is translating the 
stylized timing of the theory into the more complex timing of the data.  I use the data 
as a guide in this process to limit the sample to workers to whom the theory most 
likely applies.  I then use parametric and semi-parametric regression to test the 
predictions of the model on the relevant sample.  The tests demonstrate that the data is 
consistent with the model.  Further, complementary evidence for entry behavior has 
been found by Treble et. al (2001) and Acosta (2006).   Outside of the personnel 
economics literature, there is also strong evidence that within specific sectors (high 
technology, academia, etc…) high ability turnover is prevalent.
4  The model is also 
potentially consistent with such behavior.    
 Lastly I consider alternative explanations for the behavior in the data.  The 
strength of the model relative to the alternative explanations is its consistency with a 
set of empirical findings and the fact that it explicitly ties turnover to job level.   
Several other models can explain a single finding, but none seem to explain the set 
examined.   
                                                 
4 Saxenian (1994) and Shih (2004) show evidence of high skill turnover in Silicon valley. Coupe et al. 
(2006) in academia.  
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The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1.2 reviews the related literature and 
puts the model in context.  Section 1.3 introduces a simple model with a simple firm 
structure that highlights the intuition of the turnover mechanism.  In Section 1.4 I 
enrich the production environment to a multi-level firm with dynamic promotion and 
develop testable predictions for personnel data.  Section 1.5 discusses the methods for 
testing the model and presents empirical results.  Section 1.6 discusses potential 
alternative explanations.  Section 1.7 concludes. 
 
1.2. Related Literature 
The paper’s main contribution is to the literature on personnel and organization 
economics, with a particular contribution to the literature on careers in organizations.  
The seminal empirical work in this literature is BGH (1994a, 1994b).  Following their 
work, other papers have explored personnel records (Lazear (1999), Treble et al. 
(2001), Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) are examples).  These papers have revealed 
important patterns in promotion, wage, and career paths in real world firms.  Along 
with the empirical literature there is a large theoretical literature considering careers in 
organizations.  Important work in this literature includes Harris and Holmstron (1982), 
Lazear and Rosen (1981), and more recently Gibbons and Waldman (1999, 2006).  In 
general this literature has focused on career paths within a single firm.  A smaller 
literature considers movement between firms.  Chan (1996) is an example from this 
literature.  He considers the possibility of external entry in the context of a tournament 
model.  In his model, when the firm promotes a worker it can choose between external 
and internal candidates.  Chan shows that the firm will show “favoritism” towards the 
internal candidate.  As noted in the introduction, the main contribution of my paper to 
this literature is to offer a framework that is consistent with a set of facts about entry in 
personnel data.    
  5 
My paper also contributes to a smaller literature on external entry and 
asymmetric information.  Greenwald (1986) is the seminal work in this literature.  
Greenwald considers the importance of adverse selection in labor markets, arguing 
that workers who are fired and seeking work in the external, secondary market will be 
of average lower quality than internal workers.  Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) 
consider the possibility of management turnover in a situation of asymmetric 
information.  In their model, when the inside firm promotes a worker an outside firm 
can attempt to steal him by paying to observe his ability.  In similar work Banerjee 
and Gaston (2004) consider the possibility of a “raiding firm” stealing a worker away 
from the inside firm after observing a signal of the worker’s ability.  They show that if 
the signal of ability is “noisy enough” and counter-offers are costly, then the inside 
firm is forced to offer a “pooling wage” that puts their high ability workers at risk.  
Shankar (2005) and Jagdish (2006) also consider models of turnover in environments 
of asymmetric information.  Like my paper and Banerjee and Gaston, they consider 
the incentive for high-ability workers to turnover.  Both papers, however, consider this 
incentive in very specific labor market settings (Shankar considers the high-tech 
industry and Jagdish the market for CEO’s).  Acosta (2006) gives careful empirical 
consideration to the difference in outcomes between workers hired externally and 
those promoted from within.   Finally, Ghosh (2007) considers a integrated model of 
promotion dynamics similar to mine in which he considers the effect of entry and exit 
on wages.  Although he does not rely on asymmetric information his work is relevant.    
Finally, my paper contributes to the literature on learning in labor markets.  
The literature has two main branches: symmetric learning (Farber and Gibbons (1996) 
is a modern treatment) and asymmetric learning (Greenwald (1986), Waldman (1984), 
Bernhardt (1995)). A novel contribution of my model is that it endogenously links the 
two environments.  In the model, workers start in a situation of asymmetric  
  6 
information and move to a situation of symmetric information over time.  Milgrom 
and Oster (1987) consider both asymmetric and symmetric information in a single 
model, but assume the information environment is exogenous to the worker.  Pitchick 
(2006) endogenizes the choice via investment in “visible” capital.  Pitchick considers a 
labor market in which self-aware workers strategically invest in “visible” human 
capital.  The investment allows the outside firm to learn their ability with some 
probability.  She shows that such a model can explain the negative seniority wage-
premium in academia, as the investment in visible capital induces a wage jump early 
in a worker’s career, but she does not consider the transition from asymmetric to 
symmetric information more broadly.  Pinkston (2006) is closest in spirit to my model.  
He considers a model in which the inside firm has an informational advantage, but the 
outside firms observe signals every period.  In equilibrium the outside firms can bid 
away the workers, and asymmetric information goes away in the long run. 
In terms of modeling techniques, the central idea of the paper has a long 
history in the IO literature.  In response to Akerlof’s (1970) insight regarding adverse 
selection, the IO literature has considered strategies which high-quality sellers can 
implement to avoid the fate of adverse selection (Nelson (1970, 1974, 1978), Milgrom 
and Roberts (1986), Johnson and Waldman (2003)).  Jin and Leslie (2003) offer a nice 
test of this idea in the restaurant industry.  My model also contains a “search” 
component.  Starting with the seminal work by Burdett (1978) and later Mortensen, 
there is a large literature on worker search (Mortensen (2003)).  This literature tends to 
be more macro in nature, looking at flows in and out employment at an aggregate 
level.  My paper builds a very specific micro foundation for how the search process 
might work in a competitive, ability-sensitive labor market.  Workers can “search” at a 
specific outside firm and reveal their ability.   
  
  7 
Lastly, the use of “self-knowledge” is not common in the asymmetric learning 
literature.  Ricart i Costa (1988) and Pitchick (2006) are the main exceptions.  In 
Ricart i Costa, a menu of self-selecting contracts is offered by the market to risk-
averse workers as a way for them to signal their ability.  Workers, knowing there own 
ability, use the contracts to separate themselves.  Pitchick was discussed above.   
 
1.3. Asymmetric Information and Self Knowledge 
  In this section I introduce the baseline model.  I consider a model of 
asymmetric information where workers have self-knowledge and the economy lasts 
for 3 periods.  Further, I define a “networking technology” that allows the worker to 
reveal his ability to an outside firm.  Throughout this section the organizational 
structure of the firm is kept simple in order to focus on the effects of self-knowledge 
and networking.  In Section 1.4 the firm’s organizational structure is expanded to a 
multi-level hierarchy where job assignment is publicly observable.  The model then 
allows for a set empirical predictions. 
 
A) The Model 
Workers are in the economy for 3 periods.  They supply labor inelastically and 
seek to maximize their lifetime income.  There are three firms.  In any given period a 
worker’s current employer is referred to as the “inside firm”, I, while the other two 
firms are referred to as the outside firms, O1 and O2.  There is a mass one of workers 
whose “innate ability,” θi, is distributed uniformly over [θL, θH].  A worker’s 
“effective ability” is ηit = θif(t) where f(0)=1, f’(t) > 0 and f’’(t) ≤ 0.  This formulation 
of effective ability captures the fact that a worker’s ability grows over time in the labor 
market at a speed determined by his innate ability.  f(t) can be interpreted as general 
human capital.  A simpler function of ability would suffice, but when I enrich the  
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model in Section 1.4 to consider a multi-level firm this formulation of effective ability 
is necessary to generate promotion dynamics.  
Output for firm j in period t equals Yjt = ∑i ηit(1 + s) + σij where σij is a match 
parameter, s is specific capital that equals 0 if a worker is in his first period with the 
firm, and S > 0 otherwise.  σij follows a two point distribution; with probability p it is 
σH, a good match, and with probability 1-p it is σL, a bad match.  I normalize σL to 0.  
The match parameter is included in the model to allow for the possibility of turnover.  
It is assumed that 2σH > θHf(2)S and that θLf(1)S > pσH.  The first assumption ensures 
that a worker with a good match at an outside firm and a bad match at the inside firm 
is more valuable to the outside firm.  The second assumption ensures that a worker 
with a bad match at the inside firm is worth more than a worker with an unknown 
match (pσH) at an outside firm.  Further it is assumed θi is independent of σij, σij and 
σik for j ≠ k are independent, and that σij is re-drawn by the firm if a worker leaves.
5   
For the cost C a worker can “network” with an outside firm k, which allows 
the outside firm to learn θi and σik and the worker to learn σik
 6  This captures the idea 
that a worker can meet with an outside firm and demonstrate his ability through 
interviews, tests, consulting.  Once contacted by the worker, the outside firm could 
also contact workers inside the inside firm to learn θi.  Formally workers who choose 
to network have ni =1, otherwise ni =0.  It is assumed that ni is only observed by the 
outside firm at which the worker networks and the inside firm.  It is also assumed that 
workers randomize between the two outside firms when networking.      
                                                 
5 The fact that σij is re-drawn ensures that a worker’s outside option does not depend on σiI, which 
allows the period 2 wage for workers with ni =0 to be perfectly revealing.  One interpretation of the 
assumption is that σij represents an idiosyncratic match between worker i and his co-workers, or his 
particular job duties, at firm j.  If a worker leaves firm j then this match will have to be re-established 
upon re-entry. 
6 Appendix A shows that workers can not profit from networking in period 1.  ni =1 in period 1 will 
raise the worker’s expected wage in period 2, but due to competition in period 1 the increase in 
expected wage in period 2 will be exactly offset by a lower period 1 wage.  Thus, his lifetime income is 
identical whether ni =1 or ni =0.  This result is driven by the fact that the worker does not know θi in 
period 1.   
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In period 1, firms do not observe θi or σij and compete via wage offers for the 
workers.  After period 1, the worker’s current firm and the worker learn σij.  Further 
they observe output and perfectly infer θi.  Note that the fact that the worker learns θi 
after period 1 is the assumption of “self knowledge.” All firms remember θi if a 
worker leaves.  It is assumed that f(t) is known by all market participants.  Finally, the 
period 2 wage is used as signal of ability by outside firms in period 3.  This arises 
because the nature of the period 2 auction is such that the outside firms can observe 
the winning offer.
7   
After production in period 1, the following wage setting game is played 
between the inside firm, the outside firms, and the worker, who all seek to maximize 
expected profit/wages: 
 
Period 2 
(1) The worker learns σij and θi, and chooses ni in {0,1}. 
(2)  If ni =0 only the inside firm learns θi and σiI.  If ni =1 the networked firm also 
learns θi and σiO.  
(3) The inside firm and the outside firms engage in an ascending value auction for 
the worker.
8 
(4)  The worker chooses the offer that will generate the highest total expected 
wage for periods 2 and 3, conditional on θi and σij. 
 
 
                                                 
7 By similar reasoning, networking choices in period 2 are observed by all firms at the beginning of 
period 3. 
8 The literature on asymmetric information in labor markets has a standard “winner’s curse” result in 
which the informed firm always wins the worker at a wage equal to the productivity of the lowest 
ability worker of a given signal (Milgrom and Oster (1987)).  We model the bidding as an ascending 
auction because it not only generates the winner’s curse, but also a wage equal to marginal product for 
workers in symmetric information.  Because both situations are considered in the model, the ascending 
auction is a good fit.  Further it is realistic.  
  10 
Period 3 
(1) The worker chooses ni in {0,1}. 
(2) The inside firm learns σij and θi for all workers new to the firm in Period 2 who 
did not network.  The outside firms observe the period 2 wage offers and 
period 2 ni for all workers.   
(3) The inside firm and the outside firms engage in an ascending value auction for 
the worker. 
(4) The worker chooses the highest offer. 
   
The ascending value auction is conceptualized as follows: all participating 
firms make increasing counter offers until only one firm remains (Lazear (1986) uses a 
similar wage setting process).
9  Once a firm drops out it can not re-enter.  The 
equilibrium concept of the game is a special case of the proper equilibrium (Myerson 
1978).  A proper equilibrium refines the trembling hand perfect equilibrium in which 
players make “smaller” mistakes on actions with higher payoffs.  In the context of the 
auction game a “mistake” is when a firm makes a wage offer other than that which is 
optimal.  I consider the special case in which the firms only make mistakes on θL 
workers, as they are the least costly workers to lose.  I use this refinement to eliminate 
equilibria in which the outside firm bids a wage higher than it would be willing to pay 
if there was a positive probability the worker would accept.  See Appendix 1 for a 
formal definition of the equilibrium.  Once this refinement is imposed there is a 
unique equilibrium.  Finally, note that because the period 2 wage is observed with a 
lag, there is also a signaling game embedded in the larger bidding game. 
                                                 
9 Unlike standard ascending auctions, the last firm remaining may have an incentive to raise the wage 
offer because of the “threat” of turnover.  If the period 2 wage offer of the inside firm generates less 
lifetime income than that from turnover, the worker will leave.  Bernhardt and Scoones’ (1993) idea of 
pre-emptive wage offers is similar in spirit.  Also, it is assumed that once a firm drops out it can observe 
the winning offer, but can not re-enter.  Thus, the period 2 wage can be used in period 3 to refine beliefs 
about ability  
  11 
 
B) Equilibrium with High-Ability Networking and No Turnover: p=0 
In order to focus on the basic logic of the model, I first consider the case when 
p=0, i.e. when there is no match parameter in the production function.  In this case, 
workers have the incentive to reveal information to the market but there is no turnover 
in equilibrium.  Proposition 3.1 formalizes the main features of the equilibrium in this 
case:     
 
Proposition 3.1: When p=0 the unique equilibrium is characterized by: 
(i)  In period 2 all workers with θi> θ
N = θL + C/f(1) choose ni =1, stay with the 
current firm, and receive a wage of  θif(1) + Sθif(2)  
(ii) In period 2 all workers with θi ≤ θ
N = θL + C/f(1) choose ni =0, stay with 
the original firm, and receive a wage of θLf(1) + Sθif(2)  
(iii) In period 3 all firms learn θi from the period 2 wage and workers receive a 
wage of θif(2). 
Proof:  In Appendix 1. 
 
Consider first workers who do not network.   Result (ii) states that they will 
receive a wage associated with a θL worker plus a premium of Sθif(2).  The wage is 
associated with a θL worker because of the winner’s curse.  This is a standard result in 
the asymmetric information literature.   The premium of Sθif(2) captures the signaling 
aspect of the period 2 wage.  The inside firm knows that a worker who does not 
network can leave the firm in period 2, reveal his ability to an outside firm, and ensure 
a high wage in period 3.  Because the period 2 wage is observable, by offering the 
premium Sθif(2) the inside firm reveals the worker’s ability to the outside firms and 
pre-empts the worker’s decision to turnover.  That is, the inside firm intentionally  
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abandons its informational advantage in order to eliminate the worker’s incentive to 
leave.  An immediate consequence of this is that the economy endogenously moves to 
a situation of symmetric information in period 3.  Result (iii) captures this transition.     
A second implication of the premium Sθif(2) is that workers who the market 
believes to be identical receive different wages.  This result differs from standard 
models of asymmetric information which predict that a worker’s wage will be 
determined entirely by the market’s belief (Ricart i Costa (1988) is an exception).  The 
fact that there is variation in wages across seemingly identical workers is consistent 
with empirical observation.
10  
Next consider workers who network.  Result (i) states that only high ability 
workers will find it profitable to network in period 2.  In a situation analogous to 
markets with unobservable quality, networking allows the worker (the seller) to reveal 
information to competing firms (potential buyers).  If a worker does not network the 
outside firms will not be able to distinguish him from other workers in period 2 and he 
will receive the low wage from result (ii).  Because networking is costly, only 
relatively high-ability workers will find it profitable.
11  
A final point regarding Proposition 3.1 is that the amount of networking will 
depend on the magnitude of C.  As C gets large, no one will network (full asymmetric 
information in period 2), and as C approaches 0 all workers will network (full 
symmetric information in period 2).  For the purposes of understanding high ability 
turnover, it is assumed in the rest of the paper that C satisfies the conditions for high-
ability networking.  In the baseline model this requires 0 < C < θHf(1). 
 
                                                 
10 For example, in BGH (1994a) it is clear that there is variation in wages within job levels and 
observable skill groups.  Simple models of asymmetric information predict that this should not occur.  
11 Note that there are no efficiency differences between the period 2 and 3 equilibria.  The turnover 
threat only has distributional effects; it redistributes rents across workers.  Later, when we consider a 
multi-level firm with promotion, the 3
rd period equilibrium will be more efficient than the 2
nd period 
equilibrium.   
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C) Equilibrium With High Ability Networking and Turnover: 0 < p < 1 
In order to generate turnover in the above model some amount of randomness, 
or firm heterogeneity, needs to be introduced.  In this subsection I consider the case of 
0 < p < 1.  Under this parameterization it is possible that the outside firm will outbid 
the inside firm on workers who network. A technical difference is that there will be 
two networking cut-offs rather than one, conditional on the realization of σiI.  Workers 
with high match values at the inside firm will have a lower networking cut-off as the 
return to revealing their ability is slightly higher.  Proposition 3.2 formalizes the 
equilibrium: 
 
Proposition 3.2: When 0 < p < 1 the unique equilibrium is as follows:   
(i)   In period 2 workers with θi > θN(σij) choose ni =1.  If σiI= 0 and σiO = σH 
they turnover and receive W2 = θif(1)(1+S).  Otherwise they stay with the 
inside firm and receive W2 = θif(1) + Sθif(2) +  2σiO - pσH. 
(ii)   In period 2 workers with θi ≤ θN(σij) choose ni =0, stay with the inside firm, 
and receive W2 = θLf(1) + Sθif(2) + pσH. 
(iii) In period 3, all firms learn θi .  Workers who turned over in period 2 
receive W3 = θif(2)(1+S) + pσH.  All other workers receive W3 = θif(2) + 
pσH. 
Proof:  In Appendix 1. 
  
  Proposition 3.2 is analogous to Proposition 3.1.  Results (i) and (ii) state that 
relatively high ability workers choose to network, while relatively low-ability workers 
do not.
 12  Result (iii) states that the economy transitions from asymmetric to  
                                                 
12 The period 2 wages in Proposition 3.2 differ from the wages in Proposition 3.1 because of the 
presence of the match parameter in production and the possibility of turnover.  
12 The period 2 wages in Proposition 3.2 differ from the wages in Proposition 3.1 because of the presence of the  
match parameter in production and the possibility of turnover.  
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symmetric information by period 3.  The major difference with Proposition 3.2 is that 
workers who network and have a bad match at the inside firm will now turnover if 
they find a good match at the outside firm.  Thus, a proportion p(1-p) of workers who 
network  will turn over in equilibrium.    
Finally, Corollary 3.1.1 formalizes the result of high-ability turnover: 
 
Corollary 3.3.1:  The average ability of those who turnover is greater than those who 
do not.    
Proof:  Note that E(θi) = E(θi | t*=1)P(t*=1) + E(θi | t*=0)P(t*=0). Workers who 
turnover have ability uniformly distributed (σij is independent of θi) on (θN(0), θH].  
θN(0) > θL then implies E(θi | t*=1) > E(θi), which then implies, by the first 
expression, E(θi | t*=1) > E(θi | t*=0).   
 
The goal of this section was to introduce the logic of the model in a simple 
production environment.  The model builds a micro foundation for why high ability 
workers may turnover; they do so as a strategic response to the informational 
advantage their current employer has over competing employers.  In the next section I 
embed the baseline model into a production environment with dynamic promotion.  I 
then show that the model generates a set of predictions for personnel records regarding 
entry and promotion.     
 
1.4. Asymmetric Information, Self Knowledge and Dynamic Promotion 
In this section I embed the baseline model in a richer production environment 
which will allow for testable predictions in personnel data.  I look at a multi-level firm 
with a dynamic promotion process.  I continue to assume that ability is not publicly  
  15 
observable.  However, it is now assumed that job level is observable.  In such an 
environment the wage for a worker who does not network will be a function of the 
lowest ability worker within his job level.  As a consequence the promotion decision 
of the firm is tied to the turnover decision of the worker.  I show that the model 
produces a series of testable predictions about entry and promotion in personnel data.   
 
A) The Model 
The model is identical to the baseline model with two enrichments.  First, 
firms now consist of two job levels rather than just one, where job j has a lower return 
to effective ability than job j +1.  Formally, production at job j in time t equals yijt(ηit) 
= (1+s)(aj + bjηit) + σij where s and σij are defined the same as in the baseline model.  
It is assumed that aj > aj+1 and that bj < bj+1, which implies a unique cutoff level, η’, 
above which workers are more productive at job 2.  It is assumed that θL(f(2)) < η’ 
<θH(f(1)) which implies that some workers are more productive in job 2 in each period 
t.  Second, job assignment, j, is publicly observable.  This enriches the information 
environment as job assignment now serves as a signal of ability to the outside firm.   
This production function is used in Gibbons and Waldman (1999, 2006). They 
show that in a world of symmetric learning it captures a wide set of empirical findings 
about intra-firm promotion and wage dynamics.  Thus I believe it is a good starting 
point for linking internal promotion and external entry.  
Finally, I restrict the parameters as above:  (a2 + b2θHf(2))S < 2σH and (a2 + 
b2θLf(1))S > pσH.  These assumptions are analogous to assumptions in the baseline 
model.  The first ensures a worker with a good match at an outside firm and a bad 
match at the inside firm is more valuable to the outside firm.  The second ensures that 
a worker with an unknown match at an outside firm and a bad match at the inside firm 
is more valuable to the inside firm.  Further, I assume E(θi) < η’ to insure that all  
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workers start their careers in job 1.  In words, this assumption implies that a worker 
who just entered the market is more productive at job 1 than job 2.     
After production in period 1, a 2-period wage setting game analogous to the 
baseline model is played.  The only difference is the addition of the promotion 
decision.  Each period after the worker chooses ni in stage (1), there is an extra stage 
before the wage bidding in which the inside firm publicly announces job assignment, 
conditional on ni.   
 
B) Equilibrium 
   As in the baseline model the equilibrium specifies optimal networking 
decisions and equilibrium turnover results for the workers.  Further it also specifies 
optimal promotion decisions of the firm.  For notational purposes define θ* as the 
equilibrium promotion cut-off for a worker with ni =0:  
 
Proposition 4.1: The unique equilibrium is as follows:   
(i)  In period 2, all workers with ni =1 and θif(1) ≥ η’ are promoted.  For 
workers with ni =0, there exists a cut-off, θ*, such that θ*f(1) > η’ and all 
workers with θi ≥ θ* are promoted. 
(ii)   In period 2 all workers in job 1 with θi > θ
N1(σij) choose ni =1.  If σiI = 0 
and σij = σH they turnover.  All other workers choose ni =0 and remain with 
the inside firm.    
(iii) In period 2 all workers in job 2 with θi < θ
*or θi > θ
N2(σij) choose ni =1.  If 
σiI = 0 and σij = σH they turnover.  All other workers choose ni =0 and 
remain with the inside firm. 
(iv) In period 3 all firms learn θi and all workers with θif(2) ≥ η’ are promoted 
Proof:  See Appendix 1.  
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Result (i) addresses the promotion decision of the firm.  It states that workers 
who choose ni =0 are promoted inefficiently (θif(1) ≥ θ*f(1) > η’), while workers who 
choose ni =1 are promoted efficiently (θif(1) ≥ η’).  Both results are standard in their 
respective literatures.  Workers in asymmetric information are under-promoted 
because the act of promotion sends a positive signal of ability to outside firms which 
drive up their wage offers, while workers in symmetric information are promoted 
efficiently because the act of promotion does not reveal any new information.
13  The 
fact that the worker endogenously chooses between the two outcomes in the model, 
however, is novel. Finally, note that in period 3 all workers are promoted efficiently.  
This result is also analogous to the baseline model; in the long run, asymmetric 
information disappears from the economy because the inside firm is forced to abandon 
its information advantage.  
Results (ii) and (iii) address optimal networking decisions and subsequent 
turnover.  Result (ii) states that there is high-ability turnover in job 1.  This result is 
analogous to the prediction of high-ability turnover from the baseline model.  Result 
(iii) states that there is “two-sided” turnover from job 2.  This result is unique to the 
enriched model.  The turnover at the “top” of job 2 (θi > θ
N2(σij)) is analogous to the 
turnover in the baseline model; such workers network to avoid the low wage in job 2.  
The bottom end of the two-sided turnover [η’/f(1), θ*) is made up of workers who 
face the prospect of being inefficiently assigned to job 1.  Intuitively, these workers 
can be thought of as high-ability workers from job 1 who network to avoid the low 
wage of job 1.  However, because θif(1) > η’, such workers are efficiently assigned to 
the low end of job 2 when they network.  Figure 1.1 captures this dynamic graphically.   
                                                 
13 Waldman (1984a) shows that promotion is inefficient in the asymmetric case.  The symmetric case is 
straight forward.  
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Figure 1.1:  Networking Cutoffs, Job 2 
 
As a technical note, the distance between η'/f(1) and θ* in Figure 1.1 will be a 
function of S, and the distance between θ* and θ
N2(0) will be a function of C.  Thus, 
as I vary the parameters C and S of the model, I can vary the cut-points θ
* and θ
N2(σΗ).  
For the purpose of two-sided turnover, it is sufficient to assume that S and C are such 
that θΜ2, the median ability in job 2, is in [θ
*, θ
N2(0)] (See Appendix 1). 
 
C) Testable Predictions   
The equilibrium has three main features: (1) transition from asymmetric 
information to symmetric information between periods 2 and 3, (2) high-end turnover 
on θi in job 1, and (3) two-sided turnover on θi in job 2.  In this section I derive 
testable predictions of the model regarding variables that are observable in personnel 
records.  In the following discussion I will use the term “new hire” to refer to a worker 
who enters a given job from an outside firm in a given period, and “incumbent” as a 
worker internally assigned to a given job in a given period. 
I start by deriving a testable prediction for the transition from asymmetric to 
symmetric information.  As noted earlier, the wage premium upon promotion for 
workers in asymmetric information is larger than that for workers in symmetric 
information because promotion serves as a positive signal of ability to the outside 
η'/f(1)             θ
*                                                                                         θ
N2(0)             θ
H  
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firms.  To formalize the discussion, define the wage premium at promotion as the 
wage a worker receives if promoted minus the wage he would receive if not 
promoted.
14  Denote this premium for worker i in Period t as Wit(P).  Proposition 4.1 
then implies the following corollary:  
 
Corollary 4.1:  The average wage premium upon promotion for workers in period 2 is 
larger than the average wage premium upon promotion for workers in period 3.  
Formally, E(Wi2(P)) > E(Wi3(P)). 
Proof:  See Appendix 1.   
 
The intuition for Corollary 4.1 is as follows.  In period 2 there will be a subset 
of workers in asymmetric information who have a large wage premium for promotion 
due to signaling.  In period 3, however, all workers are in symmetric information and 
have a relatively small wage premium for promotion.  As a consequence, the average 
wage premium upon promotion will be larger in period 2.  Corollary 4.1 thus offers a 
testable implication of the transition from asymmetric to symmetric information.  In 
the data older workers should have smaller wage increases due to promotion than 
younger workers. 
  The second feature of the equilibrium is high end turnover on θi into job 1.  
Because θi is unobservable we can not directly test this feature.  However, because θi 
determines promotion, high end turnover on θi implies a testable prediction regarding 
promotion rates in period 3 for new hires and incumbents.  Corollary 4.2 formalizes 
this prediction: 
 
                                                 
14 To be precise, Wit(P) is defined using an off-equilibrium-path comparison.  In equilibrium a worker is 
either promoted or not promoted.  Wit(P) is the equilibrium wage increase for a given worker at 
promotion minus the off-equilibrium wage increase if the given worker were not being promoted.     
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Corollary 4.2:  In period 3, a randomly chosen new hire from period 2 is more likely 
to be promoted into Level 2 than a randomly chosen incumbent from period 2.  
Formally, P(Promotion in Period 3 | t2*=1) > P(Promotion in Period 3 | t2*=0). 
Proof: In Appendix 1. 
 
The logic of Corollary 4.2 is as follows.  As noted above, period 3 promotion is a 
function of θi.  Specifically, all workers above the efficient promotion cut-off η’/f(2) 
will be promoted in period 3.  High-end turnover on θi in job 1 implies that new hires 
will have a range of θi to the right of incumbents, which then implies the proportion of 
new hires above the promotion cut-off, η’/f(2), will be larger than that of incumbents.  
In the data in the period after entry we should see a higher proportion of new hires 
than incumbents promoted.   
  The third feature of the equilibrium is two-sided entry on θi into job 2.  Two-
sided entry on θi into job 2 translates into two testable predictions.  The first of these 
predictions is two-sided entry into the wage distribution of a given job level: 
   
Corollary 4.3:  Define W = W(θi, t*) as the function that maps θi and turnover 
outcomes, t*, into wages for job 2.  Let W
M be the median wage in job 2.  For an 
arbitrary ε, there exists a range of the wage distribution, (W
M – ε, W
M + ε), where new 
hires will no enter into job 2  
Proof:  See Appendix 1. 
 
In words, Corollary 4.3 states that new hires will enter job 3 only at the relatively high 
end or the relatively low end of the wage distribution.  This prediction follows 
immediately from two-sided entry on θi into job 2 and the fact that wages are an 
increasing function of θi.  Together these two facts imply that there will be a range in  
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the middle of the wage distribution where new hires do not enter.  This range 
corresponds to the range in the middle of the ability distribution where workers do not 
turnover, θi
 in (θ*, θ
N2(0)), which, as noted earlier in the paper, contains the median 
ability of job 2.  Importantly, Corollary 4.3 is directly testable because we can observe 
both the worker’s starting wage and the wage distribution of a given level in the 
dataset. 
The second prediction related to two-sided entry on θi into job 2 is that new 
hires should have more variance in θi relative to incumbents.  Because new hires are 
of either high or low ability for job 2, their variance in ability is higher than 
incumbents who occupy the whole range of ability in job 2.  Corollary 4.4 formalizes 
this statement:   
 
Corollary 4.4:  Relative to the average worker in job 2, new hires into job 2 will have 
higher variance in θi compared to incumbents promoted into job 2 from within.  
Formally, E((θi- θ2M)
2 | t*=1, j=2) >  E((θi- θ2M)
2 |t*=0, j=2), where θ2M represents the 
mean of innate ability on job 2.  
Proof:  See Appendix 1. 
 
Corollary 4.4, however, is not directly testable because θi is not observable in the data.  
Further, because the model contains only 2 job levels Corollary 4.4 can not be 
translated into a statement about future promotion for new hires in job 2.   
To translate Corollary 4.4 into a testable implication I consider an extended 
version of the model in which T > 3 periods and J > 2 levels.  In such a model the 
larger variance in θi for new hires in job 2 translates into larger variance in future 
promotion outcomes at levels j >2.  In particular, at a given future period t +n, new 
hires will be more likely to have reached higher levels of the firm but also more likely  
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to be stuck in the level of entry.
15  Such a prediction is testable as promotion outcomes 
in the data are observable.  Though it should be noted this is not a direct test of 
Corollary 4.4.  Rather it is a suggestive implication consistent with two-sided entry 
that would hold in an extended model with more periods and more levels.  
 
1.5. Empirical Analysis 
The goal of this section is to test the 4 corollaries above using personnel data.  
An important issue in testing the corollaries is translating the simple environment of 
the theoretical model into the more complex environment of a real world firm.  A 
major focus of this section is developing an empirical strategy that properly links the 
theory to the data.  
It should be noted that previous empirical work by BGH and Treble et., al. 
(1999) found suggestive evidence supporting 3 of the above findings (promotion of 
new hires in period after entry, two-sided entry, and more variable future promotion 
patterns of new hires).  However, these papers are predominantly descriptive.  They do 
not formally test the patterns in the data, nor do they offer a theoretical framework.  
Acosta (2006), on the other hand, does conduct formal statistical tests regarding 
different promotion outcomes for new hires and incumbents.  He does not, however, 
use a formal theoretical framework to guide his tests.   Thus, I am not the first to 
examine entry behavior empirically, but my analysis is novel in that it is guided by a 
theoretical framework and implements formal statistical tests of the framework’s 
predictions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 I have shown that this result holds in the extended model.  
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A) The Data   
  I test the above predictions on the sample of white, male employees from the 
same dataset analyzed in BGH (1994 a,b).  The data include yearly personnel records 
from 1969 to 1988 for all such managerial employees of a US firm in the financial 
services industry.  The original sample analyzed by BGH included females and 
nonwhite males, for a total of 68,437 employee-years of data. The sample of white 
males has 50,556 employee-years.  The dataset was originally constructed using raw 
data from the firm’s personnel records.  The key feature of the data is that it allows 
researchers to identify the hierarchical structure of the firm and observe how workers 
move through it over time.  The 8-level hierarchy was constructed by BGH by 
analyzing transitions between job titles. 
    The key variables in my analysis are promotion, salary, education, potential 
labor market experience, job level and entry.  All variables in the data set are 
measured at the end of the year (December 31) for each employee in that year.  As 
such, the exact date of a change in job title, salary, or entry is not observed.  Most of 
the variables are observed for each employee for each of the sample years.  I discuss 
the issue of missing values in detail in the appendix.   
   I define a promotion as a transition from a lower job level to a higher job level 
across two periods.  I do not distinguish between one and two-step promotions as 
almost all promotions are one step (over 96 percent).  Salary is measured in 1988 
dollars, deflated by the CPI.  The salary variable does not include bonuses.  
Information on bonuses is only available for 1981 to 1988.  Following BGH, I do not 
use this information.
16  Education categories are constructed from an underlying 
“years of education” variable.  Specifically, I construct dummy variables for high 
                                                 
16 Using the full sample, BGH found that only twenty-five percent of employees received bonuses in the 
1981 through 1988 time period.  Further these workers were heavily concentrated in the highest levels 
of the job ladder, which will be dropped from all of my analyses below.    
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school graduate, bachelors, masters, and Ph.D. degree.
17  Following BGH, I construct 
potential labor market experience as: experience = age – education years – 6.  Lastly, 
entry refers to entry into the dataset.  Such entry could in principle be entry from non-
managerial levels of the same firm.  Given the distinct change in job tasks this entry is 
considered equivalent to external entry.  Thus, all entry is interpreted as external entry. 
I restrict the sample in a few basic ways.  First, I focus only on levels 1-4 of 
the hierarchy.  In their original paper BGH note that promotion and entry dynamics at 
levels 5-8 may be different than at levels 1-4.  Further 97% of the employees in my 
sample are in levels 1-4 and issues such as slot constraints (which I abstract away 
from) become more important at levels 5-8.  See Appendix 1 for a further discussion 
of this issue.   
I also restrict the time frame of the data.  I drop the first year, 1969, from all 
analyses.  I have no information on a worker’s history before 1969 so it is not possible 
to distinguish new hires from other workers in 1969.  I also drop the final two years, 
1987 and 1988.  As BGH note these two years have large data errors in the level 
classification.  In particular half of new hires have missing level information.  These 
are both obvious problems for my analysis of entry.     
I use these data because I am looking at turnover decisions that are 
strategically tied to a worker’s position in the firm hierarchy.  The BGH data was built 
specifically to address phenomena such as these.  Second, the theoretical model is best 
suited for labor markets in which production is sensitive to ability and in which many 
firms are competing for ability.  The BGH data looks at workers in management 
positions in the service sector.  I believe such work is highly sensitive to ability and 
highly competitive across similar firms.  
                                                 
17  A high school graduate is defined as a worker with 12-15 years of education, a bachelor’s, 16-17 
years of education., an MBA or other master’s degree holder, 18-19 years of education, a Ph.D., 20 or 
more years of education.  Because education is interpreted as a signal in my analysis, categorizing 
workers by degree status is more appropriate than total years of education.  
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B) Methodology: Linking the Theory to the Data 
A strength of the model is that the theoretical firm structure translates easily 
into the structure in personnel records.  Workers are assigned to job levels and are 
easily identified as new hires or incumbents.  As such, the predictions of the model 
apply nicely to the variables in the data.  On the other hand, the information structure 
on worker ability and the stylized, 3-period timing in the theoretical model do not 
translate directly into the data.  In this subsection I outline a strategy for properly 
translating these features.   
In the theoretical model it is assumed that θi is not known by outside firms at 
the beginning of period 2.  In the data, however, there are variables such as experience 
and education that vary across workers, are correlated with ability, and are publicly 
observable.  It is almost certain that the firm and workers in the data set use this 
information when making decisions.  The theoretical model does not contain such 
variables.  To address this issue I consider the logic of the model under the assumption 
that it does.  The logic offers a natural way to interpret the empirical tests. 
Suppose the theoretical model included publicly observable variables that vary 
across workers and are correlated with θi.   Outside firms would use such variables to 
refine their beliefs about θi.  In particular, each combination of the observable skills 
would act as a signal of ability.  The market’s belief about θi would be the same for all 
workers with the same values of observable skills.  Workers within a signal would 
then make their networking choice based on the wage of the lowest ability workers 
within their signal.  The model’s dynamics would then exist within each signal and the 
predictions of the model would hold even after controlling for observable skills.  
Below, I implement all of my tests with and without controls for observable skill as a 
way to address this issue.    
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The second main empirical issue is translating the simplified, stylized timing 
of the model into the more complex timing of the data.  All of the testable predictions 
apply directly to period 2 of the theoretical model; all turnover occurs in period 2 and 
the transition from asymmetric to symmetric information occurs between periods 2 
and 3.  Thus, the tests of Corollaries 4.1 - 4.4 should focus on the real world analogue 
of period 2.     
In the theoretical model it takes exactly 1 period for all workers to learn their 
ability and prepare to network.  In the real world this process is likely more complex.  
There is likely variation across workers in their ability and/or preferences to 
communicate with outside firms in order to break asymmetric information.  It may 
take some workers 3 years, while it may take other workers 10 years, or a whole 
career.  An immediate consequence is that the timing of period 2 will vary across 
workers in the data.  To formalize this idea, define Σi
2 as the potential labor market 
experience of worker i when “period 2” begins.  The fact that Σi
2 varies across workers 
implies a range of Σi
2, [ΣL
2, ΣH
2].  My empirical strategy is to use the data to estimate 
[ΣL
2, ΣH
2], and run my tests only on observations that fall in this “period 2” window.  
To take advantage of the information I have in the data, I will let Σi
2 depend on 
education categories.  That is, for a given education category I will define the window 
[ΣL
2, ΣH
2] and include only workers in the window in my tests.  To identify the 
window [ΣL
2, ΣH
2] for each education category I examine the distributions of entry and 
experience by level and education.  The window should be characterized by active 
entry rates, and should occur in early/mid career.  As such, I drop relatively young 
workers and relatively old workers who are “stable” in a turnover sense.  
I first consider workers in levels 2-4.  Table 1.1 presents the distributions of 
potential experience by education category for (a) the basic sample, (b) new hires into 
level 1, and (c) new hires into levels 2-4.  Further, Figures A1.1 – A1.4 in Appendix 1  
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plot entry rates by labor market experience for each education category.  A clear 
pattern emerges when examining panel (a) and the plots of entry rates.  For each 
education category the point at which entry rates stabilize coincides well with the 
median of the experience distribution.  That is, entry is most common when workers 
are relatively “young.”  Such behavior is exactly what characterizes “period 2” in the 
model.  As such, I conclude that good estimates for ΣH
2 for workers in levels 2-4 are 
 
Table 1.1: Distribution of Potential Experience by Education 
 
Education  Mean   Median  Min  Max  Count 
Basic Sample, Levels 1-4 
High School  25.07  24  4  50  12,260 
Bachelors  15.86  14  0  45  13,351 
Masters  13.42  12  -1  43  7,323 
PhD  11.19  9  -4  37  1,074 
Total          34,008 
New Hires into Levels 1 
High School  16.88  15  4  46  918 
Bachelors  7.36  6  0  41  1,343 
Masters  6.23  5  -1  39  595 
PhD  3.56  2  -4  28  59 
Total          2,915 
New Hires into Levels 2-4 
High School  19.01  18  5  45  918 
Bachelors  12.71  11  1  41  540 
Masters  10.27  9  1  34  473 
PhD  7.02  6  -3  27  77 
Total          2,008 
 
the points in Figures A1.1 – A1.4 at which entry rates stabilize.  For workers with a 
high school diploma, bachelor’s, master’s, and PhD these points occur at, respectively, 
25 years, 18 years, 15 years and 10 years of experience.  All workers above these cut-
offs are interpreted as “period 3” workers and dropped from the analysis.  As with all  
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cut-offs discussed in this section, I vary these cut-offs in analyses not reported in the 
paper to ensure that the results are robust.  They are.  
I next identify ΣL
2 for workers in levels 2-4.  Although most workers in levels 
2-4 are likely in at least “period 2” of the model, it is possible that the firm may assign 
very talented workers directly into higher levels upon first entering the labor market.  
Such workers should be considered “period 1” workers and dropped from the analysis.  
The last panel of Table 1.1 addresses this issue.  As is clear, there is a small set of 
workers in each education class that enter levels 2-4 with very little experience.  I drop 
workers below the 1
st percentile of the experience distribution for each education 
category.  Again, I vary this cut-off in analyses not reported here.  
Lastly I identify ΣL
2 and ΣH
2 for workers in level 1.  Level 1 is quite different 
from levels 2-4 because, as BGH note in their analysis, it is a “port of entry” into the 
hierarchy.  The entry rate is greater than .40 in level 1, while it is between .06 and .10 
in levels 2-4.  As such, it is likely that most workers in level 1 are “period 1” workers 
from the theoretical model, i.e. workers new to the labor market for management.  
However, it is possible that some older workers in level 1 are better interpreted as 
“period 2” workers.  The middle panel of Table 1.1 presents the distribution of 
potential experience by education category for new hires into level 1.  I look for 
workers who are relatively “young” for the overall sample, but relatively “old” for the 
sample of new hires into level 1.  Noting that the 90
th percentile of the experience 
distribution of new hires into level 1 coincides well with the median of the experience 
distribution for the whole sample, I believe workers in level 1 between the 75
th and 
90
th percentile are old enough to be out of “period 1” but young enough to still be in 
“period 2.”  As such I keep them in the analysis. 
  In all of the tests below I impose the restrictions described above.  Again, in 
analyses not reported in the paper I vary all of the cut-offs.  The findings presented are  
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not sensitive to the cut-offs.  For information about how the restrictions affect the 
sample size see Appendix 1, Table A1.2.   
 
C) Testing the Predictions 
  In all of the regressions presented below, I define a vector of controls, Xit.  For 
each test I fit the model with several different specifications of Xit.  In the first 
specification I leave Xit empty.  In the second I include year dummies (an indicator 
variable for each year in the time frame).  The year dummies control for things that 
vary over time and influence outcomes of interest (i.e. conditions in the macro 
economy (Oyer (2006)).
18  In the last specification I include dummies for education 
categories and a quadratic in years of potential experience along with the year 
dummies.  The quadratic in experience is consistent with the assumption that f’’(t) < 0.  
The fullest specification is interpreted as discussed above; the dynamics of the model 
should hold even after controlling for observable skills that vary across workers.  For 
Corollary 4.1 the fullest specification of Xit is slightly different because the outcome 
of interest (wage change) is first-differenced.  I discuss this below.  Lastly, I pool the 
observations across level and control for level rather than run regressions by level.  If 
the regressions by level differ from the pooled regressions it will be noted in the text.   
I begin with Corollary 4.1.  The testable implication of Corollary 4.1 is that the 
average wage premium associated with promotion should decrease with worker 
experience.  As noted in Section 1.4, the wage premium is defined as the wage 
increase upon promotion minus the wage increase the worker would have received if 
he were not promoted.  In order to make the proper comparison I implement a 3-step 
method.  I first estimate the wage increase a worker would have received had he not 
been promoted.  I then take the actual wage increase a worker received at promotion 
                                                 
18 The data includes large macro cycles in exit, entry and average salary.  
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and subtract the estimated wage increase had he not been promoted to get the 
predicted wage premium due to promotion, as defined in the theoretical model.  
Finally, I use the predicted wage premium as the dependent variable to test how it 
varies with experience.
19   
To estimate the wage increase a worker would have received had he not been 
promoted, I run the following regression on the sample of workers who were not 
promoted.  Let ∆Zit+1 = Ζit+1 -  Zit: 
 
(1a) ∆ln wit+1 = α1 +β1∆Exp
2
it +β2Bachelorit +β2Masterit +β3PhDit +β4Levelit + 
β5Yit + εit  
 
Equation (1a) includes a difference in experience squared to capture f’’(t) < 0, controls 
for education, level of the firm and  a vector of year dummies, Yit.  I use the parameter 
estimates from (1a) to predict the wage increase of each worker who was promoted 
had he not been promoted.  That is, for each observation of a promoted worker I plug 
the values for Exp, Bachelor, Master, PhD, Level and, Yit into (1a) with the estimates 
of β1 - β5.  Define this predicted wage increase as ∆ln w
p
it.  The theoretical concept of 
wage premium at promotion is then captured by ∆ln wit - ∆ln w
p
it.
 20   
Given this representation of the wage premium at promotion, I run the 
following regression on the sample of promoted workers:    
   
 
                                                 
19 This method is equivalent to the method in Devaro and Waldman (2006). 
20 In the context of the theoretical model, workers who are not promoted are of systematically lower 
ability than those promoted.  Because the wage increase depends on ability, using such workers to 
predict the wage increase of promoted workers if not promoted is biased.  I control for this problem by 
transforming wages to logs.  Given that the log wage is linear in the log of ability, and that I am 
analyzing differences in wages, the ability bias is “differenced” out at the log level.  See Proof of 
Corollary 4.1 for more discussion       
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(1b) ∆ln wit - ∆ln w
p
it = α1 +β1Expit + β2Tit + β2Xit + εit  
 
Corollary 4.1 then implies that β1 < 0.  That is, the wage premium associated with 
promotion should decrease with experience.  Tit is a vector of job transition dummies.  
These dummies control for the exact transition between levels associated with the 
promotion.  Xit represents a set of controls that I vary across specifications.  In the first 
specification Xit is empty, in the second it includes year dummies, and in the third it 
includes year dummies as well as controls for education.  The results are reported in 
Table 1.2.  It is clear that β1 < 0 in all 3 specifications.  Model 3 is the fullest 
 
Table 1.2: OLS Estimates for Equation (1b) 
21 
 
 
specification, controlling for observable skills and year dummies.  The interpretation 
is that the prediction holds within observable subgroups of the data.
22   
For extra perspective, Figure 1.2 offers a graphical interpretation of the 
relationship between wage premium at promotion and experience.  The plotted line is 
                                                 
21 In all tables *** implies significance at the 1% level; ** implies significance at the 5% level; * 
implies significance at the 10% level. 
22 Note that the coefficients on the education dummies in Model 3 of Table 1.2 are consistent with 
results reported in Devaro and Waldman (2006) analyzing the same data. 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Experience (β1) 
-.0016 *** 
(.00017) 
-.0016 *** 
(.00017) 
 -.0033 *** 
(.0002) 
Bachelors  -  -  -.0207 *** 
(.0031) 
Masters  -  -  -.0352 *** 
(.0037) 
PhD  -  -  -.0473 *** 
(.0065) 
Year Dummies  -  X  X 
Obs  3,790  3,790  3,790  
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the difference between the true wage increase due to promotion in the data and the 
predicted wage increase if a promoted worker had not been promoted.  Corollary 4.1 
suggests that this difference should be largest early in a worker’s career and decrease 
with experience.  This is clearly the case in Figure 1.2.  Early in a worker’s career 
promotion leads to large wage increase relative to no promotion.  As time passes, this 
difference shrinks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Wage Premium at Promotion as Function of Experience 
 
I next test the implication of Corollary 4.2.  Corollary 4.2 predicts that the 
promotion rate should be higher for new hires than incumbents in the period after 
turnover.  Formally, P(Promotion in Period 3 | t2*=1) > P(Promotion in Period 3 | 
t2*=0).  Such a test is easy to translate into a regression framework.  Consider the  
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following OLS regression model for the sample of new hires and incumbents into a 
given level in period t:
 23 
 
  (2) Promotionit+1 = α1 + β1NewHireit + β2Levelit + β3Xit + εit 
 
In the simplest case, when Xit is empty, α1 is the promotion rate of incumbents and β1 
is the difference in promotion rates between new hires and incumbents.  More 
precisely, β1 is P(Promotion in Period 3 | t2*=1) - P(Promotion in Period 3 | t2*=0).  In 
this framework, β1 > 0 is a direct test of Corollary 4.2.   
 
Table 1.3: Effect of New Hire on Promotion in Subsequent Period, Levels 2-4 
 
 
Table 1.3 presents OLS results for this regression for all three specifications of 
the Xit vector described above.  β1 is strongly positive in all 3 specifications, with new 
                                                 
23 I use OLS here because the independent variable of interest is discrete.  Thus, we are simply 
comparing average promotion rates of new hires and incumbents.  OLS suffices for such an exercise.  
Also, I drop level 1 from the analysis, as I can not identify “incumbents” into level 1. 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Promotion Rate for Incumbents (α1)  .1800  .1698  .1978 
Effect of being New Hire (β1) 
.0478 *** 
(.0110) 
.0529 *** 
(.0116) 
.0637 *** 
(.0138) 
Bachelors  -  -  .0304 * 
(.0180) 
Masters  -  -  .0671 *** 
(.0208) 
PhD  -  -  .0434 
(.0383) 
Potential Experience  -  -  -.0080 ** 
(.0040) 
Potential Experience Squared  -  -  -.0078 
(.0157) 
Year Dummies  -  X  X 
Obs  4,637  4,637  3,854  
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hires having roughly a 33% greater chance of promotion in the full specification.  
Again, I interpret the full specification as implying the model holds within observable 
subgroups.   
We now consider Corollary 4.3, which predicts that entry into a given job level 
should occur at the top and bottom of the wage distribution.
24  As a first pass, I 
examine starting wages for new hires without any controls.  Figure 1.3 presents the 
average entry rate across Levels 2 - 4 at each decile of the wage distribution for the 
period 2 sample.  The starkest pattern in Figure 1.3 is that entry rates spike at the 1
st 
and 10
th deciles.  That is, workers are much more likely to enter a given level at either 
the highest decile or the lowest decile.  Such a pattern is consistent with the two-sided 
entry implied by Corollary 4.3.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Histogram of Average Entry Rates by Wage Decile, Levels 2-4 
                                                 
24 Note that for tests of Corollaries 4.3 and 4.4 I drop level 1 from the analysis.  This is consistent with 
the theory where two-sided entry only applies to higher levels of the firm. 
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To test whether the pattern in Figure 1.3 is significant and robust to controls I 
use a semi-parametric regression to fit the relationship between starting wage and 
entry.  I use the semi-parametric method because the relationship between wage and 
entry is non-linear.  Standard linear regression and probit regression are not suited for 
such relationships.  Further the semi-parametric regression allows me to control for Xit 
using standard parametric methods.  Thus the control exercise is comparable to the  
other tests.  Formally I estimate the following semi-parametric regression for each 
level: 
 
(3) Enterit = α1 + β1Levelit + G(ln wit) + β2Xit  + εit 
 
In equation (3), rather than estimate a specific functional relationship between entry 
and wage (i.e. linear, quadratic, etc…) as is done in parametric analysis, I estimate a 
smooth, flexible non-linear function G(ln wit).  That is, the semi-parametric estimation 
does not impose a functional relationship on wage and entry.  Rather it lets the data 
reveal the relationship G(ln wit).  The function is estimated using local spline 
estimation.
25   
Figure 1.4 presents the results of the semi-parametric estimation for job level 
3.  The horizontal axis captures the effect of entry.  The bold line captures the 
estimated relationship between entry and the log of starting wage controlling for the 
full Xit defined above.  The U-shape implies that there is a large entry effect at the low 
end of the wage distribution in level 3, a small effect in the middle of the distribution, 
and a large effect at the top.  The shaded area captures the confidence interval of the 
                                                 
25 For a given value of ln wit, W, spline estimation predicts the probability of entry using the values of 
entry corresponding to the values of ln wit in a local neighborhood of W.  Intuitively, just like 
parametric regression semi-parametric minimizes the sum of squared residuals.  However it searches 
over a wider range of functions by doing so in a localized neighborhood of each point.  This process 
allows for a flexible, non-linear relationship between the two variables.  See Yatchew (1998).  
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curve.  Note that even when accounting for the variability in the confidence intervals 
the U-shape relationship holds.  Lastly, the p-value of <.0001 on the reported Chi-
Square statistic implies the U-shape relationship is strongly significant.  All of these 
facts together suggest that the data is strongly consistent with two-sided entry.  
Further, I note that the relationship for levels 2 and 4 are qualitatively similar to level 
3 (though weaker in level 4).  See Appendix 1 for relevant figures.  I also note that in 
an analysis not reported in the paper, I estimate a probit regression, regressing entry on 
a quartic in wage.  The same U-shape relationship holds.  
 
 
Figure 1.4: Estimated Non-Parametric Relationship Between Entry  
and Starting Wage: Level 3 
Note: A few extreme observations from the tails were dropped to ensure smooth estimation. 
 
  Lastly, I consider the implications of Corollary 4.4.  As discussed in the 
previous section, if we consider a simple extension of the model where T > 3 and j >2, 
Corollary 4.4 implies that new hires in a given year into a given level are more likely  
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(relative to incumbents) to reach high levels of the firm but also more likely to get 
stuck in low levels in their future progression up the hierarchy.  
To measure a worker’s future progression up the hierarchy I examine his job 
level in period t+n relative to the reference period t.  For example, starting from 1972 I 
track a worker’s job level in each year from, say, 1975-1979.  When I do this for all 
workers in 1972 I have frequencies for future job level for each year in 1975-1979.   
As a first pass, Table 1.4 presents the distribution of future level for new hires 
and incumbents in level 2 without controls.
26  I start at the 3 year horizon, as the two-
sided pattern has not emerged at the 1 and 2 year horizon.  The fact that the two-sided 
pattern does not immediately emerge is consistent with the extended version of the 
model discussed above.  In such a model the two-sided pattern will not emerge until 
the enough entrants have been at the firm long enough to be promoted. 
 
Table 1.4: Distribution of Future Level for New Hires and Incumbents  
Who Entered Level 2 at 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 year Horizons 
Notes: "N.H" stands for New Hire, "Inc" for Incumbent.  The numbers in the table are calculated using 
all new hires and incumbents from the “period 2” sample over the years 1970-1979. 
 
  T+3   t+4  t+5  t+6  t+7 
Job  N.H.  Inc  N.H.  Inc  N.H.  Inc  N.H.  Inc  N.H.  Inc 
2  39.2  33.6  34.0  24.8  31.3  19.9  25.8  14.3  24.4  11.5 
3  49.1  57.6  36.9  53.0  31.7  48.0  29.2  47.0  26.9  43.6 
4  11.7  8.7  29.2  22.2  36.6  31.7  44.0  38.1  47.2  44.1 
5          0.4  0.3  1.0  0.5  1.5  0.7 
6                0.2    0.2 
                     
Avg  2.7  2.8  3.0  3.0  3.1  3.1  3.2  3.2  3.3  3.3 
 
                                                 
26 In the tests in this section I concentrate on new hires and incumbents in only level 2.  I do this 
because the future promotion patterns of new hires into levels 3 and 4 spill over more heavily into 
levels 5-8, levels which have different dynamics. The distributions are conditional on not being 
demoted, as demotions do not occur in the theoretical model.  Because demotions are so rare in the data, 
this is a very minor adjustment    
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To help interpret the table consider the “t+3” column.  The 39.2 at the intersection of 
the “N.H.” sub-column and the “Level 2” row states that 39.2 percent of new hires 
into level 2 remain in level 2 three periods after entering the firm.  The 33.6 in the 
“Inc” sub-column states that only 33.6 percent of incumbents into level 2 remain in 
level 2 three periods after being promoted into level 2.  The relevant pattern in Table 
1.4 is that at each point in time there is a higher proportion of new hires achieving 
extreme outcomes; more have been promoted to levels 4 and above, while, at the same 
time, more are stuck in level 2.  For example, at the 7 year horizon roughly 24 percent 
of new hires are stuck in job 2, while only 12 percent of incumbents are.  At the same 
time, roughly 49 percent of new hires have been promoted above level 4 while only 45 
percent of incumbents have.  This pattern is consistent with the two-sided entry 
predicted by the theory. 
    Although Table 1.4 offers strong evidence it does not offer a formal test.  To 
test the results from Table 1.4, I use multinomial logit regression.  I construct a 3-level 
categorical variable.  The worker is in category 1 if he is in level 2 in period t+n, 
category 2 if he is in level 3 in period t+n, and category 3 if he is in level 4 or higher 
in period t+n.   Denote the probability of being in category 1 in period t+n as δ1,t+n, and 
δ2, t+n and δ3, t+n for categories 2 and 3 respectively.  I define category 2 as the 
reference category for the multinomial logit and estimate the following two equations. 
 
(5a) log(δ1, t+n / δ2, t+n) = α1a + β1aNew_Hireit  + β3aXit + εit 
(5b) log(δ3, t+n / δ2, t+n)= α1 b+ β1bNew_Hireit  + β3bXit + εit 
 
β1a is the “new hire effect” on the odds of being in level 2 rather than level 3 in period 
t+n.  β1b is the “new hire effect” on the odds of being in level 4 or higher rather than 
level 3 in period t +n.  In this context, the prediction of the theory is β1a and β1b > 0.   
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Table 1.5 presents the estimates of β1a and β1b for n=3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.  The 
number in parenthesis is the p-value of the chi-square test for the significance of each 
parameter.  To control for attrition, the results are presented for only the sample of 
workers who survive until t+7. 
 
Table 1.5: Multinomial Logit Parameter Estimates for Equations (5a) and (5b) 
Note: The table start with n=3 because at n=1 and 2 the two-sided pattern has not emerged 
 
Effect of Interest  t +3  T +4  t +5  t +6  t +7 
Model 1: No Controls 
New Hire Effect of being 
in Level 2 in t+n (β1a) 
.1274 
(.1226) 
.3246 *** 
(.0004) 
.4225 *** 
(<.0001) 
.5142 *** 
(<.0001) 
.5763 *** 
(<.0001) 
New Hire Effect of being  
in Level 4+ in t+n (β1b) 
.3245 ** 
(.0114) 
.3311 *** 
(.0005) 
.2769 *** 
(.0023) 
.2976 *** 
(.0013) 
.2786 *** 
(.0036) 
Obs  807  807  807  807  807 
Model 2: Controls for Education and Experience 
New Hire Effect of being 
in Level 2 in t+n (β1a) 
.0260 
(.8293) 
.1542 
(.2466) 
.2535 * 
(.0811) 
.4707 *** 
(.0033) 
.5427 *** 
(.0040) 
New Hire Effect of being  
in Level 4+ in t+n (β1b) 
.3036 ** 
(.0332) 
.3173 *** 
(.0038) 
.2722 ** 
(.0159) 
.2840 ** 
(.0188) 
.2904 ** 
(.0260) 
Obs  682  682  682  682  682 
 
In the model with no controls we see the two-sided pattern emerge in t+3 and 
strengthen as we get to t+7.  When I control for observable skills the two-sided pattern 
does not emerge significantly until t+5.  However by t+4 it is relatively meaningful, 
and by t+7 it is very strong.  I interpret the parameters as evidence that in the long-run 
new hires are more likely than incumbents to achieve relatively “high” or “low” 
promotion outcomes.  Such a pattern is consistent with the two-sided entry in the 
theoretical model.   
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The consistency of the model with a broad set of facts from the data suggests 
the existence of an underlying mechanism that gives rise to high ability workers 
entering the firm from the outside.  In the data, new hires get promoted more quickly, 
enter at the top of the wage distribution, and climb to higher levels of the firm in the 
long run more frequently than incumbents.  I believe the model offers a natural 
mechanism for such turnover; the incentive of high-ability workers to reveal their 
ability publicly.  Further, the mechanism gives rise to other predictions that, a priori, 
would not necessarily seem consistent with high-ability turnover; two-sided entry and 
smaller wage premiums at promotion for older workers.  I believe that bringing 
together all 4 disparate empirical findings under one framework is an important 
contribution to the literature on promotion dynamics.  
 
1.6. Alternative Explanations 
In this section I briefly consider potential alternative explanations for the 
empirical findings presented above.  I focus on models that can potentially tie 
turnover, or entry, to level of the hierarchy.  
  Chan (1996) considers a tournament model of promotion in which the inside 
firm fills vacancies with internal and external candidates.  To ensure that internal 
workers have the proper incentive to choose high effort, Chan shows that the optimal 
promotion rule “favors” internal workers.  As such, external hires must have higher 
general ability than workers internally assigned.  Such a model could be consistent 
with the findings that new hires are more likely to be promoted in the period after 
entry, enter at a high wage and achieve more positive promotion outcomes in the long 
run.  However, in Chan’s framework such predictions should weaken after controlling 
for observable skills.  This is not the case in the data.  Further, his framework can not 
accommodate two-sided entry.  Waldman (2003) makes a similar argument to Chan.  
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  Banerjee and Gaston (2004) consider a model of asymmetric information 
similar in spirit to my model.  In their model a “raiding” firm receives a signal of 
ability from a worker at a competing firm and then attempts to bid the worker away.   
The inside firm can make a counter-offer to retain the worker, but counter-offers are 
costly.  Banerjee and Gaston show that if the signal is sufficiently noisy and counter-
offers sufficiently costly, then the inside firm will adopt a pooling wage policy in 
which it pays both high-ability workers and low-ability workers the same wage.  As 
such, it will lose some of its high-ability workers to the “raiding” firm.  Like Chan’s 
model, if such a model were embedded in a multi-level firm it could potentially 
explain the “high-end” of the turnover seen in the data, but it can not accommodate the 
two-sided entry. 
  While Chan’s model and the work by Banerjee and Gaston offer mechanisms 
that could induce “high end” turnover, Greenwald (1986) offers a natural explanation 
for “low-end” turnover.  Greenwald argues that the act of firing a worker signals a 
worker as “low-ability” to the market.  Thus, if the worker is to re-enter the market he 
must accept a low wage.  Gibbons and Katz (1991) find evidence for this dynamic in 
the real world by comparing the starting wages for workers who are fired with workers 
who are exogenously laid off.  This dynamic, however, can not account for the results 
associated with high-ability turnover seen in my data.  Reality may in fact be some 
mix of the positive selection seen in my model and the adverse selection in 
Greenwald’s.   
  Finally, BGH (1994a) hypothesize that a screening-type model could explain 
the higher variance in future promotion outcomes of new hires compared to 
incumbents.  If we consider a model in which the firm fills an open position by 
choosing between an external candidate and an internal candidate based on its beliefs 
about an unobserved ability parameter, it is reasonable to assume the firm will have  
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more precise beliefs about the ability of the internal candidate than the external 
candidate.  Such precision would lead to less “mistakes” in job assignments and less 
variation in future promotion for the internal candidate compared to the external 
candidate.  It is unclear, however, why such a model would have two-sided entry into 
the wage distribution for the external candidates.  At the point of hiring, the firm’s 
beliefs should be the same for all new hires.  As such they should receive similar 
wages.  The model presented above has the nice feature of linking the larger variance 
in future promotion of new hires to two-sided entry into the wage distribution.  
Explanations that rely on more uncertain beliefs regarding new hires ability can not 
reconcile both.  
Lastly I note that the literature offers a couple of alternative explanations for 
the finding that the wage premium due to promotion decreases with labor market 
experience.  Bernhardt (1995) builds a T period model with asymmetric information in 
which job assignment is observed publicly.  In equilibrium, if two ex-ante identical 
workers enter the market in the same period, the market believes the worker who is 
promoted at a younger age is of higher ability.  It then follows that the wage jump 
upon promotion will be larger for young workers.  Gibbons and Waldman’s (1999) 
model of symmetric learning could also be consistent with a shrinking wage premium 
at promotion.  In such a model all firms in the market update their beliefs about a 
worker’s ability after observing each period’s production.  As time passes, the 
variance of each firm’s posterior beliefs shrink which, in turn, causes the wage 
increase to decrease with experience.  Neither model, however, offers a mechanism 
that both generates turnover and explains the decreasing wage increase at promotion. 
In summary, there are several other models in the literature that can explain 
some of the findings in the data, but there is not a single model that can explain them 
all.  A strength of my model, then, is that it can explain all four empirical findings.  
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1.7. Conclusion 
  The paper builds a model of turnover in which high ability workers leave their 
original firm to avoid the low wage of asymmetric information.  When such a model is 
embedded in an environment of dynamic promotion, where job assignment is a signal 
to outside firms, the turnover decision of the worker becomes linked to his position in 
the promotion hierarchy, and generates movement between firms consistent with that 
from the personnel records of management in a US firm in the financial service 
industry.  The paper’s main contribution is that it offers a single explanation for a set 
of empirical findings about entry into the promotion hierarchy.  Other potential 
explanations either fail to tie turnover to specific job levels within the firm, or only 
explain an isolated fact.   
Along with explaining a set of empirical findings, I believe the paper makes an 
important theoretical contribution.  In competitive labor markets where productivity is 
sensitive to unobservable skills, understanding how information is spread across firms 
is essential to understanding behavior.  Clearly, firms and workers face very different 
incentives when it comes to the revealing of private information about ability.  Firms 
can profit from keeping high-ability workers “hidden” from the market, while workers 
(especially high-ability workers) can profit from revealing their ability.  I believe this 
paper offers a framework to think about this dynamic.    
 In particular, it offers an endogenous link between asymmetric information 
and symmetric information in the labor market.  In most models of turnover a worker 
leaves his firm when a new piece of information enters the economy.  Usually such 
information is modeled as a better wage offer from an outside firm; information 
exogenous to the worker.  In the current model, the information is in possession of the 
worker and turnover arises from his incentive to share that information with other  
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firms.  This then makes the market’s ability to learn endogenous to the worker, and 
links asymmetric and symmetric information. Allowing the worker to partake in labor 
market “games,” especially when analyzing high-ability labor markets, is realistic and 
potentially important to understanding micro level turnover behavior. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
I. Proof of Proposition 3.1: 
 
The equilibrium concept I employ is a special case of the proper equilibrium.  I start 
by defining this concept.  The proper equilibrium refines the concept of trembling 
hand equilibrium by demanding that, when a player’s hand trembles, he puts more 
weight on “mistakes” that have higher payoffs.  I consider a specific case of the proper 
equilibrium in which the players only makes mistakes on θL workers, the least costly 
mistake. 
 
To formalize this idea, consider firm k which believes a given worker i has ability Θi.  
Define ΘL as the minimum of the beliefs across all workers i on which it bids, and ΘH 
as the maximum.  Denote the following mixed strategy as SI’: Firm k bids Sk* for all 
workers in (ΘL, ΘH], and for workers with Θi = ΘL bids Sk = Sk* with probability [1 -
ε ∫ g(S) dS)], where g(S) is the distribution over possible actions in his action space, 
and puts ε probability on all other actions, where ε is arbitrarily small.  Note that as ε 
goes to 0 SI’ converges to SI*.  Define an analogous concept for all firms j ≠ k, Sj*.  
The tuple [Sk*, S-k*] is an equilibrium if for all firm j ≠ k  Sj* is a best response to Sk’, 
and Sk* is a best response to S-k’.  
 
I start at the end of the third period define the wages, and move backward. 
  
Claim 3.1.1:  The equilibrium wage in period 3 for workers with t*=1 is W3 = 
θif(2)(1+S). 
Proof:  It is a standard result of a 2-bidder, ascending, private-value auction that it is 
weakly dominant for players to set their reservation equal to their private value.  
Define RI as the reservation of the inside firm, and RO1 and RO2 as the reservations of 
the two outside firms. It then follows that the triplet where each firm plays its 
valuation, [θif(2)(1+S), θif(2)(1+S), θif(2)], is a Nash equilibrium. Because the 
strategies are weakly dominant, they are best responses to any other possible strategy 
profile.  It follows immediately that the Nash equilibrium is also proper.  Further, the 
proper equilibrium is unique because any other set of strategies must involve a weakly 
dominated strategy, and a proper equilibrium can not contain a weakly dominated 
strategy.  Thus the inside firm wins the auction at W3 = θif(2)(1+S).  QED 
 
Claim 3.1.2:  The equilibrium outcome of the auction in period 3 for workers with 
t*=0 is W3 = θif(2). 
Proof:  As shown below, in the unique equilibrium the period 2 wage perfectly reveals 
θi.  Thus information is perfect and symmetric for workers with t*=0.  By analogous 
logic it is then identical to Claim 3.1.1, the unique proper equilibrium involves all 
firms playing a reservation equal to their valuation.  Thus the triplet 
[θif(2)(1+S), θif(2), θif(2)] is the unique equilibrium and the inside firm wins at θif(2).  
QED 
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I now consider the equilibrium in period 2, given the wages in period 3.  I start with 
workers who choose ni = 0.  I first solve for the reservations wages for all 3 firms, and 
then show that the inside firm will make a final offer greater than the reservation wage 
of the losing firm that maximizes profits.  
 
Claim  3.1.3:  In any proper equilibrium the inside firm is willing to stay in the auction 
until RI* = θif(1)(1+S) + Sθif(2) for all workers. 
Proof:  First note that the inside firm values each worker at θif(1)(1+S) +θif(2) (1+S).  
Given the period 3 wages above, his valuation in Period 2 is θif(1)(1+S) + Sθif(2).  To 
show this strategy is weakly dominant,  I proceed by contradiction.  Let RI  denote any 
deviation from RI*.  WLOG suppose RO1 = max[RO1, RO2]. 
 
Case 1: Suppose RI > RI*.  Suppose further RO1 < RI* < RI.  In this case, deviating to 
θif(1)(1+S) + Sθif(2) changes nothing.  Next suppose RI* < RO1 ≤ RI.  In this case, I 
wins the worker at negative profit.  Thus, it can profitably deviate to θif(1)(1+S) + 
Sθif(2) and guarantee 0-profit.  Finally suppose RI < RO1.   Deviating to RI* changes 
nothing.   
 
Case 2: Suppose RI < RI*.  Suppose further that RI* ≥ RO1 > RI.  In this case, I loses 
the worker. By deviating to RI* it can win the worker at a (weakly) positive profit.  
Next suppose RO1 > RI* > RI.  Again I loses the worker and earns zero profit.  By 
deviating to RI* it maintains 0-profit and is no worse off.   Lastly suppose RI > RO1.  
Then I wins and earns positive profit.  By deviating to RI* it maintains the profit, as 
the winning price, RO1, is unchanged.      
 
We conclude that RI* = θif(1)(1+S) + Sθif(2) is a weakly dominant strategy.  Thus any 
proper equilibrium must include RI*, as proper equilibria can not include weakly 
dominated strategies.  QED 
 
Claim 3.1.4:  The unique proper equilibrium is [RI, RO1, RO2] = [θif(1)(1+S) + Sθif(2), 
θLf(1),θLf(1)] for all workers with ni = 0.  
Proof:   Consider the mixed strategy in which the inside firm plays RI* = θif(1)(1+S) + 
Sθif(2) for all workers in (θL, θH], and for workers with θi = θL plays RI = RI* = 
θif(1)(1+S) + Sθif(2) with probability [1 -ε ∫ g(W2) dW2)], where g(W2) is the 
distribution over possible wage offers and puts ε probability on all other offers, where 
ε is arbitrarily small.
27  Denote this strategy RI’ and note that as ε goes to 0 it 
converges to RI*.  RI’ captures the idea that the inside firm will only make mistakes on 
the least costly worker.  Further consider the mixed strategy in which the outside firm 
O1 plays RO1* = θLf(1) with probability [1 -ε ∫ g(W2) dW2)], where g(W2) is the 
distribution over possible wage offers and puts ε probability on all other offers, where 
ε is arbitrarily small.  Denote this strategy as RO1’and define an analogous strategy 
RO2’ for firm O2.  To show [RI, RO1, RO2] = [θif(1)(1+S) + Sθif(2), θLf(1),θLf(1)] is the 
unique proper equilibrium I will show that RO1* is the only best response to RI’ and 
                                                 
27 We limit the support to (0, (a2 + b2θHf(2))(1+S)] , i.e. no firm would offer a negative wage, or a wage 
higher than the best worker’s productivity.  
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RO2’, RO2* is the only best response to RI’ and RO1’, and RI* is the only best response 
to RO1’ and RO2’.   
 
First I show [θif(1)(1+S) + Sθif(2), θLf(1),θLf(1)] are best responses to each other.  
Consider first RO1*, given RO2’ and RI’.  Suppose O1 deviates to some RO1 > RO1*.  It 
will still win all θL workers at a positive profit when the inside firm and firm O2 
“mistakenly” offer a wage in [0, θLf(1)].   However, it will also win θL workers at a 
negative profit when the inside firm and firm O2 “mistakenly” offer θL workers a 
wage in (θLf(1) + pσH, RO1].  By staying at RO1* it is thus better off.  Suppose O1 
deviates to some RO1 < RO1*.  It will lose all θL workers on which it was earning 
positive profits when the inside firm and firm O2 “mistakenly” offers wages in (RO1, 
θLf(1)].  By staying at RO1* it is thus better off.  We conclude that RO1* is a best 
response to RO2’ and RI’.  Because the problem is symmetric for O1 and O2, we also 
conclude that RO2* is a best response to RO1’ and RI’.  Finally, because RI* is a weakly 
dominant strategy it is a best response to RO1* and RO2*.  We conclude that the triplet 
[RI*,RO1*, RO2*] is a proper equilibrium.        
 
Now I show that no other set of strategies are part of a proper equilibrium.  I first note 
that by Claim 3.1.3 we know that any proper equilibrium must have RI = θif(1)(1+S) + 
Sθif(2).  Thus I only need to show that any proper equilibrium must have RO1= RO2 = 
θLf(1) to conclude that [RI, RO1, RO2] = [θif(1)(1+S) + Sθif(2), θLf(1),θLf(1)] is unique. 
 
I proceed by contradiction.  WLOG, suppose the equilibrium is such that RO1 > RO2 ≥ 
θLf(1).  Firm O1 will win all θL workers at a negative profit when the inside firm 
“mistakenly” offers θL workers a wage in (RO2, RO1].  By deviating to some RO1 < RO2 
it can be better off.  Suppose the equilibrium is such that RO1 = RO2 > θLf(1).  Each 
firm will win some proportion of θL workers at a negative profit when the inside firm 
“mistakenly” offers θL workers a wage in (θLf(1), RO1].  By deviating to θLf(1) it will 
eliminate this possibility and be better off.  WLOG, next suppose RO1 < RO2 ≤ θLf(1).  
By deviating to θLf(1) firm O1 will win all θL workers at a positive profit when the 
inside firm “mistakenly” offers θL workers a wage in (RO2,θLf(1)], and be better off.  
Finally, suppose RO1 = RO2 < θLf(1).  Either firm can deviate to θLf(1) and win a 
proportion of θL workers at a positive profit when the inside firm “mistakenly” offers 
θL workers a wage in (RO2,θLf(1)].  Thus, RO1 = RO2 < θLf(1) can not be part of an 
equilibrium       
 
I conclude that the unique proper equilibrium is [RI, RO1, RO2] = [θif(1)(1+S) + 
Sθif(2), θLf(1),θLf(1)].  QED 
 
We know that the unique equilibrium is [RI, RO1, RO2] = [θif(1)(1+S) + Sθif(2), 
θLf(1),θLf(1)].  However, as noted in the text, the winning firm in the auction may 
have an incentive to continue to raise the wage even after all other firms drop out. 
Claim 3.1.5 shows that the inside firm will find it optimal to raise the wage to W2 = 
θLf(1) + Sθif(2) even though the two outside firms drop out at θLf(1).  
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Claim 3.1.5: In the unique proper equilibrium, the inside firm will win all workers 
with ni =0 in Period 2 at a wage W2 = θLf(1) + Sθif(2). 
Proof:  Consider the inside firm’s objective when choosing W2.  From Claim 3.1.3 the 
inside firm is willing to pay a total over Period 2 and 3 of θif(1)(1+S) + (1+S)θif(2) to 
retain a worker.  Further it knows from Claims 3.1.1 and 3.1.4 that a worker who 
decides to turnover will earn W2 + W3 = θLf(1) + θif(2)(1+S).  Because θif(1)(1+S) + 
(1+S)θif(2) > θLf(1) + θif(2)(1+S), the W2 that maximizes profits is such that W2 + W3 
= θLf(1) + θif(2)(1+S).  From Claim 3.1.2, W3 = θif(2) for workers with ni =0.  Thus 
the optimal Period 2 wage is exactly W2 = θLf(1) + θif(2)(1+S) - θif(2) = θLf(1) + 
Sθif(2).  Note that this wage perfectly reveals θi for all workers.  I conclude that in any 
separating equilibrium the inside firm retains the worker at W2 = θLf(1) + Sθif(2), and 
that W2 reveals each worker’s ability to the outside firms in period 3.  QED 
 
Claim 3.1.6:  The period 2 wage in the unique proper equilibrium must be perfectly 
revealing. 
Proof:  I proceed by contradiction.  Suppose there is an equilibrium that is not 
perfectly revealing.  Then there will be workers i and k such that θi ≠ θk (WLOG 
assume θi < θk) and period 2 wages W2(θi) = W2(θk).  In turn, the outside wage offer in 
Period 3, W3O, will be the same for θi and θk.  We know that in order to maximize 
profits the firm must offer each worker a period 2 wage θLf(1) + θif(2)(1+S) - W3O.  
But doing this implies W2(θi) ≠ W2(θk).  This is a contradiction. QED 
 
I now consider workers with ni =1 in period 2: 
 
Claim 3.1.7:  For workers with ni =1, in the proper equilibrium, the networked firm 
will drop out of the bidding at θif(1) and the non-networked firm will drop out at 
θLf(1). 
Proof:  The logic for the non-networked firm is identical to Claims 3.1.4.  For the 
networked firm, the logic is identical to 3.1.3.  Because it has perfect information it is 
weakly dominant for him to play his valuation, which is θif(1) given the Period 3 
wages.  QED 
 
Claim 3.1.8:  For workers with ni =1, in the proper equilibrium, the inside firm will 
offer a wage of W2 = θif(1) + Sθif(2).    
Proof:  The logic is identical to Claim 3.1.5.  Given, Claim 3.1.7 and 3.1.1 the inside 
firm has to pay all workers with ni =1 at least W2 = θif(1) + Sθif(2) to ensure they 
don’t turnover.  Thus it pays exactly that to maximize profits.  QED 
 
Given the Period 2 and 3 wages, I now consider the workers’ networking decisions. 
 
Claim 3.1.9:  All workers with θi ≥ θN = θL + C/f(1) will choose ni =1. 
Proof:  If a worker networks he receives θif(1) + θif(2)(1+S) – C.  If he does not 
network he receives θLf(1) + θif(2)(1+S).  Thus, all workers with θi ≥ θN = θL + C/f(1) 
will network.  QED  
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In summary, in the unique proper equilibrium in which the firm makes almost all 
mistakes on low-types: 
(1) All workers with θi ≥ θN will choose ni =1 and receive [W2, W3]= [θif(1) + 
Sθif(2), θif(2)].   
(2) All other workers choose ni =0 and earn [W2, W3]= [θLf(1) + Sθif(2), θif(2)] 
 
II. Proof that no worker networks in period 1 
I first calculate a worker’s expected lifetime income if he chooses ni =1 in period 1. 
 
In period 3, such a worker will receive (1+S)E[θif(2)] if he had turned over in period 
2, and E[θif(2)] if he had not.  In period 2, the inside firm, knowing that the worker 
can earn (1+S)E[θif(2)] if he turns over, will offer a wage of E[θif(1)] + Sθif(2).  The 
outside firm at which he networked in period 1 will offer E[θif(1)] knowing it has to 
pay (1+S)E[θif(2)] in period 3 if it wins the worker.  Given these wage offers, the 
worker will stay with the inside firm and earn E[θif(1)] + Sθif(2)] in period 2 and 
E[θif(2)] in period 3.       
 
In period 1 the worker will produce E[θif(0)].  Given the period 2 and 3 wage 
outcomes above, the two competing firms at which he has networked know they can 
make θif(1)S in profits if they win the worker.  Thus the wage in period 1 will be bid 
up to θif(0)+Sθif(1).  The worker will randomize between the firms and earn a total 
expected lifetime income is equal to: 
 
(1) E[θif(0) + θif(2)(1+S) + θif(2)(1+S)] – 2C 
 
Now suppose he chooses ni =0 in period 1, and chooses ni optimally in period 2: 
 
Given the wages solved for above, the worker earns an expected wage of E[θLf(1)| θi 
<θN]P(θi <θN) + E[θif(1)| θi > θN]P(θi > θN) + (1+S)θif(2) over periods 2 and 3.  
 
In period 1, all firms are completely ignorant of the worker’s ability.  They will expect 
him to produce E[θif(0)].  If they win him, however, they know they will earn 
E[θif(1)S] + P(θi <θN)[E[θif(1)| θi <θN] − θLf(1)]  in profits over periods 2 and 3.  Thus 
they bid the wage up to E[θif(0)+Sθif(1)] + P(θi <θN)[E[θif(1)| θi <θN] − θLf(1)].  As a 
result his total lifetime income is:   
 
(2) E[θif(0)] + P(θi <θN)[E[θif(1)| θi <θN] − θLf(1)] + θLf(1)P(θi <θN) + E[θif(1)| θi > 
θN]P(θi > θN) + Sθif(1) + E[θif(2)(1+S)]  
 
= E[θif(0)] + E[(1+S)θif(1) + E[θif(2)(1+S)] > E[θif(0) + θif(2)(1+S) + θif(2)(1+S)] – 
2C  
 
The last line states that (2) > (1). We conclude no worker will network in period 1.  
QED  
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III. Proof of Proposition 3.2:  
 
The model analyzed is identical to that from Proposition 3.2 with the exception of the 
additive matching parameter.  The logic of the equilibrium is identical, but the payoffs 
will change slightly, and some workers will turnover in Period 2.   
 
Claim 3.2.1:  The outcome of the auction in period 3 for workers with ni =1 in period 
2 is W3 = θif(2)(1+S) + pσiI  if t*=1 and W3 = θif(2) + pσH if t*=0. 
Proof:  The strategy of the inside firm and the networked firm is identical to Claim 
3.1.1 with the addition of the match parameter.  Each firm plays their valuation of the 
worker for period 3.  The third firm, however, will form beliefs about θi based on W2.  
As will be shown below W2 = θif(1) + Sθif(2) +  2σiO - pσH for workers with ni =1 and 
t*=0.  Because the third firm does not observe σiO, W2 does not perfectly reveal θi.  
Thus, or a given value of W2 the third firm has the following beliefs: 
 
θi = (W2 – (2σH - pσH ))/(f(1) + Sf(2)) = θi(W2, σH)  with probability p  
θi = (W2 + pσH ))/(f(1) + Sf(2))            = θi(W2, 0)    with probability 1-p 
 
Consider first workers with ni =1 and t*=0.  Given that the minimum of the inside 
firm’s and the networked firm’s bids is at least θif(1)(1+S) + pσH, the third firm’s 
valuation, there is no way that the third firm can win the worker at a profit.  Thus the 
best it can do is earn 0-profit.  Given the demands of the proper equilibrium, it must 
play a strategy as a function of W2, RO2(W2), that earns 0-profit when the two 
informed firms make mistakes on θN(σH) workers, the lowest ability worker with ni=1.  
The strategy that achieves this is RO2(W2) = θi(W2, σH)f(1) + pσH because θi(W2, 
σH)f(1) ≤ θi ensures it can not win a worker at a negative profit. 
 
For workers with ni =1 and t*=1, W2 = (1+S)θif(1) - pσH.  Thus the third firm can 
perfectly infer θi for such workers and will play RO2(W2) = θif(1) + pσH.     
 
Combining the strategies, the equilibrium strategy triplet for ni =1 and t*=1 is 
[θif(2)(1+S) + σiI, θif(2)(1+S) + pσH, θif(2) + pσH] for ni =1 and t*=0 is [θif(2)(1+S) + 
σiI, θif(2) + pσH, θi(W2, σH)f(1) + pσH].  QED 
 
Claim 3.2.2:  The outcome of the auction in Period 3 for workers with, ni =0 is W3 = 
θif(2) + pσH if t*=0 and θif(2)(1+S) + pσiI  if t*=1. 
Proof:  For workers with ni =0 all three firms have perfect information regarding θi. 
The equilibrium strategy triplet is simply each firm playing its valuation: [θif(2)(1+S) 
+ σiI, θif(2) + pσH, θif(2) + pσH] for t*=0 and [θif(2)(1+S) + σiI, θif(2)(1+S) + pσH, 
θif(2) + pσH] for t*=1.  QED 
 
I now consider the ascending auction in Period 2 given the above wages in Period 3.  I 
consider first the case of ni =0: 
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Claim  3.2.3:  In any proper equilibrium the inside firm is willing to stay in the auction 
until RI* = θif(1)(1+S) + Sθif(2) + 2σiI - pσH. 
Proof:  The logic is the same as Claim 3.1.3.  Given the period 3 wages above the firm 
is now willing to pay θif(1)(1+S) + Sθif(2) + 2σiI - pσH to keep a worker.   QED 
 
Claim 3.2.4:  In the unique proper equilibrium (RI’, RO1, RO2) = (θif(1)(1+S) + Sθif(2) 
+ 2σiI - pσH, θLf(1) + pσH + (1-p)pσH, θLf(1) + pσH + (1-p)pσH). 
Proof: The logic is same as Claim 3.1.4.  The outside firms know that the inside firm 
will make mistakes on θL workers.  Thus, it is optimal to choose a reservation in 
period 2 that exhausts the value of a θL worker, given the period 3 wages above.  A θL 
worker is worth θLf(1) + pσH + p[(1+S)θLf(2) + σH].  The outside firms’ expected 
wage in period 3 is p[(1+S)θLf(2) + pσH].  Thus, it is willing to pay θLf(1) + pσH + (1-
p)pσH. QED 
 
Claim 3.2.5: In the unique proper equilibrium, the inside firm will win all workers 
with ni =0 in Period 2 at a wage W2 = θLf(1) + Sθif(2) + pσH. 
Proof: The logic is the same as claim 3.1.5.  Given that max[RO1, RO2]  = θLf(1) + pσH 
+ (1-p)pσH, the inside firm knows that a worker who decides to turnover expects to 
earn θLf(1) + pσH + (1-p)pσH + θif(2)(1+S) + ppσH  = θLf(1) + 2pσH + θif(2)(1+S).  
Given the Period 3 wage of θif(1) + pσH, the firm must pay W2 = θLf(1) + Sθif(2) + 
pσH to ensure the worker stays.  QED 
 
Claim 3.2.6:  The period 2 wage in the unique proper equilibrium must be perfectly 
revealing. 
Proof:  This case is identical to Claim 3.2.6.  The separating equilibrium always yields 
higher profits for the firm.  QED 
 
I now consider wages in period 2 for workers with ni =1: 
 
Claim 3.2.7:  For workers with ni =1 and σiI = 0 and σiO =σH, in the unique proper 
equilibrium, in period 2 the networked firm wins the worker at W2 = θif(1)(1+S) - 
pσH. 
Proof:   The total value of the worker for periods 2 and 3 if he chooses the outside firm 
is θif(1) + (1+S)θif(2) + 2σH which, by assumption, is greater than the total value at 
the inside firm (1+S)θif(1) + (1+S)θif(2).  The worker chooses the period 2 wage that 
generates the most lifetime income.   As such, the outside firm will drop out of the 
auction at a period 2 wage that generates lifetime income just equal to the worker’s 
value at the inside firm and the worker will turn over.  Such a period 2 wage, W2, 
solves (1+S)θif(1) + (1+S)θif(2) = W2  + (1+S)θif(2) + pσH.  Algebra yields W2 = 
θif(1)(1+S) - pσH.  Lastly, because both strategies are weakly dominant, they are 
proper.  Further because all other strategies are weakly dominated, they can not be 
proper.  QED 
 
Claim 3.2.8:  For workers with ni =1 and t*=0, in the unique equilibrium, the inside 
firm will offer a wage of θif(1) + Sθif(2) + 2σiO - pσH in period 2.     
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Proof:  Because this is a standard ascending value auction, it is weakly dominant for 
both firms to choose reservation wages in period 2 that exhaust the workers’ total 
value, given the period 3 wages defined above. The total value at the inside firm 
(1+S)θif(1) + (1+S)θif(2) + 2σH is greater than the total value at the outside firm θif(1) 
+ (1+S)θif(2) + 2σiO.  Thus the inside firm will win all such workers.  The optimal 
period 2 wage offer will be such that the worker is just indifferent between staying and 
leaving. Such a period 2 wage, W2, solves θif(1) + (1+S)θif(2) + 2σiO = W2  + θif(2) + 
pσH.  Algebra yields W2 = θif(1) + Sθif(2) + 2σiO - pσH.  
 
Lastly, because both strategies are weakly dominant, they are proper.  Further because 
all other strategies are weakly dominated, they can not be proper.  QED 
 
Finally, given the above payoffs, I consider the worker’s networking decision in Stage 
(1).  There will be different cut-offs depending on σiI.  
 
Claim 3.2.9:  All workers with σiI = σH and θi ≥ θN(σH)= θL + C/f(1), and all workers 
with σiI = 0 and θi ≥ θN(0)=θL + C/f(1) + K choose ni =1 where K = p(2σH - 
SθN(0)f(1))/f(1) > 0.  
Proof:  When σiI = σH, if a worker networks he receives E(θif(1) - pσH + 2σiO + 
θif(2)(1+S) + pσH – C)= θif(1) + pσH + θif(2)(1+S) + pσH – C.  If he does not network 
he receives θLf(1) + pσH + θif(2)(1+S) + pσH.  Thus, all worker with σiI = σH and θi ≥ 
θN(σH)= θL + C/f(1) will network.   
 
When σiI = 0, if a worker networks he receives θif(1)(1+pS) - pσH + θif(2)(1+S) + pσH 
– C.  If he does not network he receives θLf(1) + pσH + θif(2)(1+S) + pσH.  Thus, all 
worker with σiI = σH and θi ≥ θN(0)= θL/(1+pS) + (2pσH + C)/f(1)(1+pS) will network.  
θN(0) can be re-written in terms of θN(σH) as follows: θN(0) = θN(σH) + K where K = 
p(2σH - SθN(0)f(1))/f(1) because the second term is always positive by assumption.  
QED 
  
In summary, in equilibrium: 
(1) All workers with θi ≥ θN(σiI) will choose ni =1.  If σiO=σH and σiI = 0, they 
turnover and [W2, W3]= [θif(1)(1+S) - pσH, θif(2)(1+S) + pσH].  Otherwise 
they stay with the inside firm and earn [W2, W3]= [θif(1) + Sθif(2) + 2σiO - 
pσH, θif(2) + pσH].   
(2) All other workers choose ni =0 and earn [W2, W3]= [θLf(1) + Sθif(2) + pσH, 
θif(2) + pσH]. 
 
 
IV. Proof of Proposition 4.1:  
 
The logic of the model analyzed is identical to that from Proposition 3.3 with the 
addition of an extra job level.  When the subscript j is used in the proof it is assumed 
to represent the optimal job assignment j from the employing firm’s perspective.  
Formally j argmax{a2 + b2θif(t), a1 + b1θif(t)}.  
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Claim 4.1.1:  The outcome of the auction in period 3 for workers with ni =1 is W3 = (aj 
+ bjθif(2))(1+S) + pσiO if t*=1 and W3 = aj + bjθif(2) + pσH if t*=0. 
Proof:  The logic is analogous Claim 3.2.1.  For workers with ni =1 and t*=0, W2 = aj 
+ bjθif(1) + 2σiO + S(aj + bjθif(2)) - pσH does not perfectly reveal θi for the third firm.  
For such workers in a given job level j, the third firm will choose a reservation wage 
of aj + bjθi(W2, σH) + pσH  where θi(W2, σH)  = (W2 – (2σH - pσH ) - (1+S)aj)/(bjf(1) + 
bjSf(2)) is the inferred ability given W2 and σiO=σH.  As in claim 3.2.1, the third firm 
chooses this strategy to ensure it does not win workers on which the other two firms 
make mistakes.  
 
For workers with t*=1, W2 = (aj + bjθif(1))(1+S) - pσH perfectly reveals θi for the third 
firm.  Thus it simply plays its valuation for period 3, aj + bjθif(2) + pσH.  
 
Thus, the equilibrium strategy triplet for workers in job j is [(aj + bjθif(2))(1+S) + σiI, 
(aj + bjθif(2))(1+S) + pσH, (aj + bjθif(2)) + pσH] if t*=1 and [(aj + bjθif(2))(1+S) + σiI, 
aj + bjθif(2) + pσH, aj + bjθi(W2, σH) + pσH] if t*=0.  QED 
 
Claim 4.1.2:  The outcome of the auction in Period 3 for workers with, ni =0 the 
outcome is W3 = (aj + bjθif(2))(1+S) + pσiO if t*=1 and W3 = aj + bjθif(2) + pσH if 
t*=0. 
Proof:  The logic is the same as Claim 3.1.2, but now outside there are two jobs.  The 
equilibrium strategy triplet for workers in job j is [(aj + bjθif(2))(1+S) + σiI, aj + 
bjθif(2) + pσH, aj + bjθif(2) + pσH] if t*=0 and [(aj + bjθif(2))(1+S) + σiI, (aj + 
bjθif(2))(1+S) + pσH, aj + bjθif(2) + pσH] if t*=1.  QED 
 
Given the period 3 wages, I now consider the firm’s optimal job assignment.  The firm 
will promote all workers for which the marginal benefit is greater than the marginal 
cost.   
 
Claim 4.1.3: For all workers in Period 3 the optimal promotion cut-off is η’/f(2).  
Proof:  For workers with t*=0 I have: 
 
MB = (1+S)(a2 + b2θif(2) - a1 - b1θif(2))  
MC = max2{a2 + b2θif(2), a1 + b1θif(2)} - max{a2 + b2θif(2), a1 + b1θif(2)} 
 
MC = 0 for all θi.  The MB =0 only when θif(2) = η’ and is greater than 0 for θi 
greater than θif(2) = η’  I conclude that workers θi> η’/f(2) with t*=0 are promoted. 
 
For workers with t*=1 I have: 
 
MB = (1+S)(a2 + b2θif(2) - a1 - b1θif(2))  
MC = (1+S)max2{a2 + b2θif(2), a1 + b1θif(2)} - max{a2 + b2θif(2), a1 + b1θif(2)} 
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MC = 0 for all θi.  The MB =0 only when θif(2) = η’ and is greater than 0 for θi 
greater than θif(2) = η’.  I conclude that workers θi> η’/f(2) with t*=0 are promoted.  
QED 
 
I now consider the ascending auction in Period 2 given the above wages in Period 3.  I 
consider first the case of ni =0: 
 
Claim  4.1.4:  In any proper equilibrium the inside firm is willing to stay in the auction 
until RI* = (aj + bjθif(1))(1+S) + S(aj + bjθif(2)) + 2σiI. 
Proof:  The logic is the same as Claim 3.1.3.  Given the period 3 wages above the firm 
is now willing to pay (aj + bjθif(1))(1+S) + S(aj + bjθif(1)) + 2σiI - pσH to keep a 
worker.  QED 
 
Claim 4.1.5:  In the unique proper equilibrium (RI’, RO1, RO2) = (a1 + b1θif(1))(1+S) + 
S(a1 + b1θif(2)) + 2σiI, a1 + b1θLf(1) + pσH + (1-p)pσH, a1 + b1θLf(1) + pσH + (1-
p)pσH) for workers in job 1 and (RI’, RO1, RO2) = (a2 + b2θif(1))(1+S) + S(a2 + 
b2θif(2)) + 2σiI, a2 + b2θ*f(1) + pσH + (1-p)pσH, a2 + b2θ*f(1) + pσH + (1-p)pσH) for 
workers in job 2. 
Proof:  The logic is same as Claim 3.1.4.  The outside firms know that the inside firm 
will make mistakes on the lowest type workers in a given job level.  Thus, they will 
choose a reservation wage in period 2 that exhausts the value of a θL worker, given the 
period 3 wages above.  It is willing to pay θLf(1) + pσH + (1-p)pσH. For job 1 this 
reservation wage is (a1 + b1θLf(1)) + pσH + (1-p)pσH.  For job 2 it is (a2 + b2θ*f(1)) + 
pσH + (1-p)pσH.  QED 
 
Claim 4.1.6: In the unique proper equilibrium the inside firm will win all workers with 
ni =0 in Period 2 in Job 1 at a wage W2 = a1 + b1θLf(1) + S(aj + bjθif(2)) + pσH, and 
workers in Job 2 at a wage W2 = a2 + b2θ*f(1) + S(aj + bjθif(2)) + pσH. 
Proof: The logic is the same as claim 3.1.5.  Given Claim 4.1.6, the inside firm knows 
that a worker who decides to turnover from Job 1 expects to earn W2 + W3 = a1 + 
b1θLf(1) + (aj + bjθif(2))(1+S) + 2pσH.  Given the Period 3 wage of aj + bjθif(2) + pσH, 
the firm find its optimal to offer W2 = (a1 + b1θLf(1)) + S(aj + bjθif(2)) + pσH to ensure 
the workers stay.  By similar reasoning, the inside firm will find it optimal to offer a 
worker in Job 2 W2 = (a2 + b2θ*f(1)) + S(aj + bjθif(2)) + pσH.  QED 
 
Claim 4.1.7:  The period 2 wage in the unique proper equilibrium must be perfectly 
revealing. 
Proof:  The logic is the same as Claim 3.1.6.  I proceed by contradiction.  Consider a 
worker in job 2 and suppose there is an equilibrium that is not perfectly revealing.  
Then there will be workers i and k such that θi ≠ θk (WLOG assume θi < θk) and 
period 2 wages W2(θi) = W2(θk).  In turn, the outside wage offer in Period 3, W3O, will 
be the same for θi and θk.  We know that in order to maximize profits the firm must 
offer each worker a period 2 wage a2 + b2θ*f(1) + S(aj + bjθif(2)) + pσH - W3O.  But 
doing this implies W2(θi) ≠ W2(θk).  This is a contradiction. The same logic holds for 
workers in Job 1. QED.  
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I now consider workers with ni =1: 
 
Claim 4.1.8:  For workers in Job j with ni =1 and σiI = 0 and σiO =σH, in the unique 
proper equilibrium, the networked firm wins at W2 = (aj + bjθif(1))(1+S) - pσH. 
Proof:  The total value of the worker for periods 2 and 3 if he chooses the outside firm 
is aj + bjθif(1) + (1+S)(aj + bjθif(1)) + 2σH which, by assumption, is greater than the 
total value at the inside firm (1+S)(aj + bjθif(1)) + (1+S)(aj + bjθif(1)).  Because this is 
a standard ascending value auction, it is weakly dominant for both firms to choose 
reservation wages in period 2 that exhaust the workers total value, given the period 3 
wages defined above.  The worker then chooses the period 2 wage that generates the 
most lifetime income.   As such, the outside will win all such workers with a period 2 
wage that generates lifetime income just equal to the worker’s value at the inside firm.  
Such a period 2 wage, W2, solves (1+S)(aj + bjθif(1)) + (1+S)(aj + bjθif(1)) = W2  + 
(1+S)(aj + bjθif(1)) + pσH.  Re-arranging yields W2 = (aj + bjθif(1))(1+S) - pσH.  Lastly, 
because both strategies are weakly dominant, they are proper.  Further because all 
other strategies are weakly dominant, they can not be proper.  QED 
 
Claim 4.1.9:  For workers in Job j with t*=0 in the unique proper equilibrium, the 
inside firm will offer a wage of W2 = aj + bjθif(1) + 2σiO + S(aj + bjθif(2)) - pσH.    
Proof:  Because this is a standard ascending value auction, it is weakly dominant for 
both firms to choose reservation wages in period 2 that exhaust the workers total 
value, given the period 3 wages defined above. The total value at the inside firm 
(1+S)(aj + bjθif(2)) + (1+S)(aj + bjθif(2)) + 2σH is greater than the total value at the 
outside firm aj + bjθif(2) + (1+S)(aj + bjθif(2)) + 2σiO.  Thus the inside firm will win all 
such workers.  The optimal period 2 wage offer will be such that the worker is just 
indifferent between staying and leaving. Such a period 2 wage, W2, solves aj + bjθif(2) 
+ (1+S)(aj + bjθif(2))  + 2σiO = W2  + aj + bjθif(2) + pσH.  Algebra yields W2 = aj + 
bjθif(2) + S(aj + bjθif(2)) + 2σiO - pσH.  QED    
 
Given the above payoffs in Period 2, I now consider the inside firm’s optimal 
promotion rule.  The firm will promote all workers for which the marginal benefit is 
greater than the marginal cost:   
 
Claim 4.1.10: For all workers with ni =1 the optimal promotion cut-off is η’/f(1).  For 
all workers with ni = 0, the optimal promotion, θ*, is greater than η’/f(1).  
Proof:  For workers with ni =1 and t*=0, the MB and MC of promotion of the 
marginal worker is: 
 
MB = (1+S)(a2 + b2θif(1) - a1 - b1θif(1))  
MC = max2{a2 + b2θif(1), a1 + b1θif(1)} - max{a2 + b2θif(1), a1 + b1θif(1)}+  
S[max3{a2+ b2θif(2), a1 + b1θif(2)}- max{a2+ b2θif(2), a1 + b1θif(2)}] 
 
The RHS = 0 for all θi.  The LHS =0 only when θif(1) = η’ and is strictly > 0 above.  I 
conclude η’/f(1) is the optimal promotion cut-off.  
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I now consider workers with ni =1 who are new to the firm. 
 
MB = (a2 + b2θif(1) - a1 - b1θif(1))  
MC = (1+S)[max2{a2 + b2θif(1), a1 + b1θif(1)} - max{a2 + b2θif(1), a1 + b1θif(1)}] +  
S[max3{a2+ b2θif(2), a1 + b1θif(2)}- max{a2+ b2θif(2), a1 + b1θif(2)}] 
  
I first that note that maxt{} resolves the maximum of the two argument given the 
optimal promotion decision in period t.  As above the RHS = 0 for all θi and the 
LHS=0 only when θif(1) = η’ and is strictly > 0 above.  I conclude that η’/f(1) is the 
optimal promotion cut-off. 
 
I now consider workers with ni =0.  I define θ* as their promotion level: 
 
MB = (1+S)(a2 + b2θif(1) - a1 - b1θif(1))  
MC = max2{a2 + b2θ*f(1), a1 + b1θ*f(1)} - a1 + b1θLf(1) +  
S[max3{a2+ b2θif(2), a1 + b1θif(2)}- max{a2+ b2θif(2), a1 + b1θif(2)}] 
 
The second term in MC goes to 0, but the first term is always positive.  MB is only 
positive when θi is such that θif(1) > η’.  I conclude there exists a θ* > η’/f(1) such 
that MB > MC for all workers with θi > θ*.  QED 
 
Finally, given the above payoffs and promotion rules, I consider the worker’s 
networking decision in Stage (1).  There will be different cut-offs depending on σiI.  
 
Claim 4.1.11:  All workers who would be assigned to Job 1 if ni =0, σiI = σH and θi ≥ 
θN1(σH)= θL + C/f(1)b1.  All workers who would be assigned to Job 1 if ni =0, σiI = 0 
and θi ≥ θN1(0) = θL/(1+pS) + [C + p((2-p)σH -Sa1)]/(1+pS)f(1)b1 choose ni =1.  For 
Job 2 I have θN2(σH)= θL + C/f(1)b2 and θN2(0)= θL/(1+pS) + [C + p((2-p)σH –
Sa2)]/(1+pS)f(1)b2.  
Proof:  In Job 1 when σiI = σH, if a worker networks he receives a1 + b1θN1(σH)f(1) + 
2E(σiO) - pσH (1+S)max{(a1 + b1θN1(σH)f(2), a2 + b2θN1(σH)f(2)} + pσH – C.  If he 
does not network he receives a1 + b1θLf(1) + pσH + (1+S)max{(a1 + b1θN1(σH)f(2), a2 + 
b2θN1(σH)f(2)} + pσH.  Thus, all workers in Job 1 with σiI = σH and θi ≥ θN(σH)= θL + 
C/f(1)b1 will network.   
 
In Job 1 when σiI = 0, if a worker networks he receives (1+pS)(a1 + b1θN1(0)f(1)) + 
(1+S)max{(a1 + b1θN1(0)f(2), a2 +b2θN1(0)f(2)} – C.  If he does not network he 
receives a1 + b1θLf(1) + (1+S)max{(a1 + b1θN1(0)f(2), a2 + b2θN1(0)f(2)} + 2pσH.   
Thus, all workers in Job 1 with σiI = σH and θi ≥ θN1(0) = θL/(1+pS) +[C+2pσH-Sa1)] 
/(1+pS)f(1)b1 will network.  θN(0) can be re-written in terms of θN(σH), as follows: 
θN(0) = θN(σH) + p(2σH – S(aj + bjθN1(0)f(1))/f(1)bj > θN(σH) because the second term 
is always positive by assumption. 
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Similar logic for Job 2 yields θN2(σH)= θ* + C/f(1)b2 and θN2(0)= θ*/(1+pS) + 
[C+2pσH-Sa2)] /(1+pS)f(1)b2..  QED 
 
In summary, in equilibrium: 
(1) All workers assigned to Job j in Period 2 with θi ≥ θNj(σiI) will choose ni =1.  If 
σiO=σH and σiI = 0, they turnover and receive [W2, W3]= [(1+S)(aj + bjθif(1), 
(1+S)max{a1 + b1θif(2), a2 + b2θif(2)} + pσH].  Otherwise they stay with the 
inside firm and earn [W2, W3]= [aj + bjθif(1) + Sθif(2) + 2σiO- pσH, max{a1 + 
b1θif(2), a2 + b2θif(2)} + pσH].   
(2) All other workers choose ni =0 and stay with the inside firm and earn [W2, W3] 
= [aj + bjθminf(1) + Sθif(2) + pσH, max{a1 + b1θif(2), a2 + b2θif(2)} + pσH]. 
 
V. Proofs of Corollaries 
As noted in the text, high ability turnover and two-sided turnover hold only for certain 
parameterizations of the model.  High ability turn over holds if:   
 
  (B.1) 0 < C < max[(θ’ - θL)f(1)b1, (θH - θ*)f(1)b2]. 
 
Two-sided turnover holds if:       
 
  (B.2) θ* < (θH + θ’)/2 < θ
N2(σH)   which implies 
  (B.3) 0 < (θH + θ’)/2 - θ*)f(1)b2 < C.  
 
(B.1) ensures that high ability networking occurs at both job levels.  (B.3) ensures that 
the two-sided networking that occurs in Job 2 is such that the average ability worker in 
Job 2 is a worker who does not network.  This assumption imposes a symmetry 
property on the two-sided turnover.  Together they imply that C must be in the 
following range: 
 
  (B.4) (θH + θ’)/2 - θ*)f(1)b2 < C < max[(θ’ - θL)f(1)b1, (θH - θ*)f(1)b2] 
 
We assume (B.1) and (B.3) hold in what follows. 
 
 
V1. Proof of Corollary 4.1: 
  I define the wage premium upon promotion at their current firm as the wage 
increase if promoted minus the wage increase if not promoted.  Formally the premium 
for Period t is: 
 
∆Wt(P*) = ((Wt | P*=1) – Wt-1) – ((Wt | P*=0) – Wt-1) = (Wt | P*=1) – (Wt | P*=0). 
 
For workers with ni =1, I note that symmetric competition forces the firm to pay them 
their outside option regardless of job assignment: 
 
  
  58 
  If t*=0 then we have: 
  Wt=2 = max{y2(θif(1)), y1(θif(1)} + Smax{y2(θif(2)), y1(θif(2)} + 2σiO –pσH.
   
  Wt=3 = max{y2(θif(2)), y1(θif(2)} + pσH. 
   
If t*=1 then we have: 
  Wt=2 = (1+S)max{y2(θi(1)), y1(θif(1)} – pσH.  
  Wt=3 = (1+S)max{y2(θif(2)), y1(θif(2)} + pσH. 
 
As a consequence, the inside firm will have to pay all workers with ni =1 the above 
wage whether they are promoted or not.  Thus ∆W2(P*) = ∆W3(P*) = 0 for workers 
with ni =1. 
  Workers with ni =0 in Period 3, like workers with ni =1, are in a situation of 
symmetric information.  Thus ∆W3(P*) = 0.  In Period 2 however we have: 
 
  ∆W2(P*) = y2(θ*f(1))-y1(θLf(1). 
 
Thus, if we denote q as the probability a worker networks, we have: 
  ∆W2(P*) = (1-q)(y2(θ*f(1))-y1(θLf(1)) > 0 = ∆W3(P*).  QED. 
   
Note on testing Corollary 4.1: When testing Corollary 4.1, I use the sample of workers 
who are not promoted to predict the wage change for workers who are promoted if 
they were not promoted, and then use this counterfactual prediction to construct the 
theoretical variable ∆Wt(P*).  Because the wage increase depends on ability, using 
such workers to predict the wage increase is biased.  I control for this problem by 
transforming wages to logs in my empirical tests.  Assume a1 =0.  If we consider the 
empirical assumption that “period 2” consists of several worker years in the data, then 
for small S and p the wage change in year t+1 for a worker in “period 2” who is not 
promoted is b1θif(t+1) - b1θif(t) if ni =1 and b1θLf(t+1) - b1θLf(t) if ni =0.  The wage 
change at the log level is then ln[f(t+1)] – ln[f(t)] which does not depend on θi.  The 
wage change for workers with ni =0 who are promoted if they were not promoted is 
b1θLf(t+1) - b1θLf(t).  At the log level this change is exactly ln[f(t+1)] – ln[f(t)], the 
wage change of workers not promoted, and there is no bias in the prediction.  For 
workers with ni =1 who are promoted the wage change if they were not promoted is 
b1θif(t+1) - b1θif(t), which is exactly ln[f(t+1)] – ln[f(t)], the wage change of workers 
not promoted, and there is no bias in the prediction.  
 
 
VII. Proof of Corollary 4.2:  From Proposition 4.1 I can deduce that the percent of 
workers promoted to Job 2 in Period 3.  Because all workers are promoted efficiently 
in job 3, a worker is promoted to Job 2 in Period 3 if and only if: 
 
  θ
P1 = η’/f(1) > θi ≥ η’/f(2) = θ
P2. 
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Thus I have: 
 
  P(promotion in Period 3| t*=1) = P(θi ≥ θ
P2 | θi < θ
P1, t*=1).  
 
By Bayes rule I have: 
  = P(θi ≥ θ
P2 and  t*=1| θ
P1 < θi)/P(t*=1| θi < θ
P1) 
  = min{Q* P(θ
P1 > θi ≥ θ
P2)/[Q*(P(θ
P1 > θi ≥ θ
N1(0))],1} 
  = min{(P(θ
P1 > θi ≥ θ
P2)/P[θ
P1 > θi ≥ θ
N1(0)],1} 
  where Q=(1-p)p. 
 
By Bayes rule I also have: 
  P(promotion in Period 3 | t*=0, θi < θ
P1)  
= P(θi ≥ θ
P2 and  t*=0| θi < θ
P1) / P(t*=0| θi < θ
P1) 
  =(1-Q)* P(θ
P1> θi ≥ θ
P2)/[(1-Q)*P(θ
P1 > θi ≥ θ
N1(0)) + P(θi < θ
N1(0))] 
  = P(θ
P1 > θi ≥ θ
P2)/[P(θ
P1> θi ≥ θ
N1(0)) + P(θi < θ
N1(0))/(1-Q)] 
  < (P(θ
P1 >θi ≥ θ
P2)/[P(θ
P1 >θi ≥ θ
N1(0))] 
  ≤ min{(P(θ
P1 >θi ≥ θ
P2)/[P(θ
P1 >θi ≥ θ
N1(0))], 1} 
  = P(promotion in Period 3| t*=1). 
QED 
 
 
VIII. Proof of Corollary 4.3: 
 
First note that the wage distribution in Job 2 can be broken into the following 4 
sections.  Further, note that turnover (t*=1) occurs only in sections (1) and (4). 
 
(1) For θi such that η’< θi < θ*: 
W2 = (1+S)(a2 + b2θif(1)) - pσH if t*=1    
  W2 = a2 + b2θif(1) + S(a2 + b2θif(2)) + 2σiO - pσH if t*=0.  
(2) For θi such that θ* < θi < θN2(σH): 
W2 = a2 + b2θ*f(1) + S(a2 + b2θif(2)) + pσH.    
(3) For θi such that θN2(σH) < θi < θN2(0): 
W2 = a2 + b2θif(1) + S(a2 + b2θif(2)) + 2σiO - pσH     
W2 = a2 + b2θ*(1) + S(a2 + b2θif(2)) + pσH    if σiI = 0.  
(4) For θi such that θN2(0) < θi:  
W2 = (1+S)(a2 + b2θif(1)) - pσH if t*=1 
  W2 = a2 + b2θif(1) + S(a2 + b2θif(2)) + 2σiO - pσH if t*=0. 
 
I want to show that there is a range around the median wage in job 2, (W
M-ε ,W
M+ε), 
where turnover does not occur.  To do this I show that at least .5 + ε of the mass of the 
distribution is above the workers who enter in section (1) and at least .5 + ε mass of 
the distribution is below workers who enter in section (4).   
I first consider section (1). By the assumption above that θ* < (θH + θ’)/2 < 
θ
N2(σH), it follows that at least .5 + ε mass of the distribution is in section (2) –(4).   
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Further all the wages in (2)-(4) are strictly greater than the highest wage of a worker 
who enters in section (1).  I conclude that at least .5 + ε mass of the distribution is 
above workers who enter in section (1).   
Now I consider workers who enter in Section (4) of the distribution.  Again, by 
the assumption above that θ* < (θH + θ’)/2 < θ
N2(σH), it follows that at least .5 + ε 
mass of the distribution is in section (1) –(2).  If (a2 + b2θN2(0)f(1)) - a2 + b2θ*f(1)) > 
Sb2θN2(0)(f(2) - f(1)) + 2pσH then all the wages in (1)-(2) are strictly less than the 
lowest wage of a worker who enters in section (4).  From Proposition 4.1 we know 
that b2θN2(0)f(1)) - b2θ*f(1) > C, which then implies that all the wages in (1)-(2) are 
strictly less than the lowest wage of a worker who enters in section (4) if C > 
Sb2θN2(0)(f(2) - f(1)) + 2pσH  As p goes to zero, this clearly holds for small enough S. 
    
 
IX. Proof of Corollary 4.4: 
Define θ2M = (θH + η’/f(1))/2, the overall mean of innate ability on Job 2.  
Define θ
’ =η
’/f(1).  Then we have: 
(B.8) E((θi- θ2M)
2 | t*=1, j=2)= ) 2 j t* ( f ((
*
'
i
2
m 2 i ∫
θ
θ
  =   1, =   | θ   ) θ   − θ ) 
+ ) 2 j t* ( f ((
H
N2
i
2
m 2 i ∫
θ
θ
  =   1, =   | θ   ) θ   − θ . 
Define the analogous measure for incumbents as:  
(B.9) E((θi- θ2M)
2 | t*=0, j=2)= ) 2 j 0 t* ( f ((
*
'
i
2
m 2 i ∫
θ
θ
  =   , =   | θ   ) θ   − θ ) 
+ ) 2 j 0 t* ( f ((
2 N
*
i
2
m 2 i ∫
θ
θ
  =   , =   | θ   ) θ   − θ  + )) 2 j 0 t* ( f ((
H
N2
i
2
m 2 i ∫
θ
θ
  =   , =   | θ   ) θ   − θ . 
Because θi is uniform over all relevant ranges for both t*=1 and t*=0, (B.8) and (B.9) 
reduce to (B.10) and (B.11) respectively: 
 
(B.10) E((θi- θ2M)
2 | t*=1, j=2) = zA  + (1-z)D 
where  z = [(θ
*-η
’/f(1)/ (θ
*-η
’/f(1) + θH - θN2(0))]. 
    A = E((θi- θ2M)
2 | θ
’ < θi < θ
*),  
D = E((θi- θ2M)
2 | θ
N2(0) < θi ≤ θH). 
 
(B.11) E((θi- θ2M)
2 | t*=0, j=2) = qA  + rB  + (1-q-r)D 
where  q = [(θ
*-η
’/f(1))/ (θH -η
’/f(1))]  
r = [(θ
N2(0) - θ
*)/ (θH -η
’/f(1))]   
    B = E((θi- θ2M)
2 | θ
* ≤ θi ≤ θ
N2(0)). 
 
By assumption (B.2), θ* < (θH + η’/f(1))/2 < θ
N2(σH), we know that A > D and B > D.  
Further we note that z/(1-z) = q/(1-q-r).  It then follows that zA + (1-z)D >  qA + rB + 
(1-q-r)D.  Or, E((θi- θ2M)
2 | t*=1, j=2) > E((θi- θ2M)
2 | t*=0, j=2) .  QED  
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X. Data Issues 
In this section I address further issues that arise in interpreting the theoretical model 
empirically.  Ideally, to test the model I would observe new hires at their previous 
employer.  Because the dataset does not contain this information, I assume that 
workers who enter the firm in the data are coming from a competing firm in the same 
industry/occupation with a similar production environment.  Given that management 
is a high-skilled, high wage profession, I this is a reasonable assumption.  
 
Entry and Exit Dynamics at Higher Levels 
In this subsection I look at entry and exit at higher levels of the firm.  BGH find that 
97% of employees are in levels 1-4, and that few people are promoted above level 4.  
Thus, it is possible that the promotion and entry/exit dynamics are quite different at 
higher levels.  In Table A1.1 I examine these issues.
 28  You will see that the 
promotion rates and exit rates remain fairly constant across all levels.   
 
Table A1.1: Promotion, Entry, and Exit Rates by Level 
Rate  L 1  L 2  L 3  L 4  L 5  L 6  L 7  L 8 
Promotion  N/A  .2177  .1766  .1281  .1533  .2314  .1404  .0952 
Entry  .4237  .1150  .0985  .0624  .0423  .0566  .0526  .0476 
Exit  .1352  .1447  .1583  .1704  .1164  .2225  .1754  .1429 
 
However, entry rates tend to decline a bit at higher levels.  These numbers suggest that 
the patterns may indeed be a bit different at higher levels.  Further, because there are 
so few workers at higher levels of the firm, the absolute numbers of new hires, leavers, 
and incumbents at Levels 5-8 are very small.  Given the noise inherent in such small 
numbers, and that promotion may be different in Levels 5-8, I only use Levels 1-4 in 
the analysis in the paper.   
 
Entry Rates Over Time by Education Categories 
As noted in the text, in choosing my “window” for period 2 I examined entry rates 
over time as a measure of turnover activity.  Figures A1.1 – A1.4 plot entry rates by 
potential experience for workers with a high school diploma, a bachelor’s, a master’s 
and a PhD respectively.  The key pattern in each plot is that the entry rates are high 
early in a worker’s career and flatten out over time.  In particular, note that entry rates 
flatten out at roughly 25 years for workers with a high school diploma, roughly 18 
years for workers with a bachelor’s degree, roughly 15 years for workers with a 
master’s degree, and roughly 10 years for workers with a PhD. 
                                                 
28 The exit rates in Table 5 do not include workers 65 and older, as these workers have very high exit 
rates.  We assume this is due to retirement, and do not want to include such exit in our analysis.  
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Figure A1.1: Entry Rate by Potential Experience, High School Diploma 
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Figure A1.2: Entry Rate by Potential Experience, Bachelor’s Degree  
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Figure A1.3: Entry Rate by Potential Experience, Master’s Degree 
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Figure A1.4: Entry Rate by Potential Experience, PhD 
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Semi-Parametric estimation of Two-Sided Entry, Level 2 and 4 
  Below I present the semi-parametric analysis for levels 2 and 4.  They are 
qualitatively the same as the analysis for level 3.  The effect in level 4, though, is 
significantly more noisy.  This is because the “period 2” sample restrictions slightly 
under-sample level 4. 
 
 
 
  
Figure A1.5: Estimated Non-Parametric Relationship Between 
Entry and Starting Wage: Level 2 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1.6: Estimated Non-Parametric Relationship Between 
Entry and Starting Wage: Level 4  
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Limiting the Sample and Observations With Missing Values for Education or Salary 
  Table A1.2 shows how the sample progresses as I impose the restrictions 
described in the text. 
 
 
Table A1.2: Effect of Sample Restrictions on Distribution of Job Level 
Notes: The “Period 2” No Missing column includes only observation with neither missing education 
nor missing salary information. 
 
    Basic  Period 2  "Period 2", 
Level  Full Sample   Restrictions   Sample   No Missing 
1  20.02  21.59  8.62  10.83 
2  24.8  26.25  35.21  36.68 
3  27.1  27.66  33.03  32.43 
4  24.76  24.50  23.13  20.43 
5  2.40  -     
6  0.77  -     
7  0.12  -     
8  0.04  -  0  0 
Obs  46,930  38,296  20,633  16,037 
 
 
Turning attention to Table A1.3, I now briefly discuss the “missing” sample in 
more detail.  I compare the distributions of common variables across the missing 
sample and non-missing sample.  I argue that the missing sample looks reasonably  
 
Table A1.3: Comparison of Missing and Non-Missing Period 2 Sample 
 
Panel 1 
  Level      Tenure  Age 
Level 
No 
Missing  Missing       
No 
Missing  Missing 
No 
Missing  Missing 
1  10.83  .91    Mean  4.73  4.25  35.2  40.0 
2  36.68  30.07    Std Dev  3.03  3.22  4.8  9.1 
3  32.05  36.37    Min  1  1  23  24 
4  20.43  32.55     Max  17  17  48  71 
Obs  16,037  4,596      16,037  3,736  16,035  4,477 
                 
Panel 2 
Variable  Percent of missing obs from a whole record     
Salary  99.23             
Education  88.78              
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similar to the non-missing sample, and thus there is little concern that the removal of 
the missing sample biases the analyses.  Panel 1 indicates that the distributions look 
broadly similar.  Panel 2 shows that almost all of the missing observations come from 
missing records.  As such, there is very little “within” person information that could be 
used to impute the missings.  As such, imputing the missing would be complex and 
noisy.  As such I chose to simply drop them from my analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  67 
REFERENCES 
 
Acosta, P., “Promotion Dynamics and Intra-Firm Mobility: Incumbents Vs. New  
Hires,” Working Paper, 2006. 
 
Akerlof, G., “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market  
Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 1970, pp. 488-500. 
 
Baker, G., M. Gibbs and B. Holmstrom, “The Internal Economics of the Firm:  
Evidence from the Personnel Data,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109,  
1994a, 921-955. 
 
Baker, G., M. Gibbs, and B Holmstrom, “The Wage Policy of a Firm,” Quarterly  
Journal of Economics, 109, 1994b, 881-919. 
 
Baker, G., M. Gibbs and B. Holmstrom, “The Internal Economics of the Firm:  
Evidence from the Personnel Data,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109,  
1994b, 921-955. 
 
Banerjee, D. and Gaston, N., “Labour Market Signalling and Job Turnover Revisited,”  
Labour Economics, 11, 2004, 599-622. 
 
Bernhardt, D., “Strategic Promotion and Compensation,” Review of Economic Studies,  
62, 1995, 315-339. 
 
Bernhardt, D. and D. Scoones, “Promotion, Turnover, and Preemptive Wage Offers,”  
The American Economic Review, 83, 1993, 771-791. 
 
Burdett, K., “A Theory of Emplyee Job Search and Quit Rates,” American Economic  
Review, 68, 1978, 212-220. 
 
Chan, W., “External Recruitment Versus Internal Promotion,” Journal of Labor  
Economics, 14, 1996, 555-570.  
 
Coupe, T., V. Smeets and F. Warzynski, “Incentives, Sorting and Productivity along  
the Career: Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists,” Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, 22, 2006, 137-167. 
  
  68 
DeVaro, J. and M. Waldman, “The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and  
Empirical Evidence,” Working Paper, 2006. 
 
Doeringer, P. and M. Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis,  
Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971. 
 
Farber, H. and R. Gibbons, “Learning and Wage Dynamics,” Quarterly Journal of  
Economics, 111, 1996, 1007-1047. 
 
Gibbons, R. and L. Katz, “Layoffs and Lemons,” Journal of Labor Economics, 9,  
1991, 351-380. 
 
Gibbons, R. and M. Waldman, “A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside  
Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 1999, 1321-1358. 
 
Gibbons, R. and M. Waldman, “Enriching A Theory of Wage and Promotion  
Dynamics Inside Firms,” Journal of Labor Economics, 24, 2006, 59-107. 
 
Gibbs, M. and W. Hendricks, “Do Formal Salary Systems Really Matter?,”Industrial  
and Labor Relations Review, 58, 2004, 71-93. 
 
Greenwald, B., “Adverse Selection in the Labour Market, Review of Economic  
Studies, 53, 1986, 324-347. 
 
Harris, M. and B. Holmstrom, “A Theory of Wage Dynamics,” Review of Economic  
Studies, 49, 1982, 315-333. 
 
Jagdish, V., “A Signaling Theory of Managerial Turnover,” Working Paper, 2006. 
 
Johnson, J. and M. Waldman, “Leasing, Lemons and Buybacks,” Rand Journal of  
Economics, 34, 2003, 247-265.  
 
Jin, G. and P. Leslie, “The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from  
Restaurant Hygiene Report Cards,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 
2003, 409-451. 
 
Lazear, E., “Raids and Offer Matching,” in Research in Labor Economics, Vol. 8, R.  
Ehrenberg, ed., JAI Press: Greenwich, CT, 1986, 141-165.  
  69 
Lazear, E., “Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions,” Journal of  
Labor Economics, 17, 1999, 199-236. 
 
Lazear, E. and S. Rosen, “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,”  
Journal of Political Economy, 89, 1981, 841-864. 
 
Milgrom, P. and S. Oster, “Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility  
Hypothesis,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 1987, 453-476. 
 
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, “Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality,”  
Journal of Political Economy, 94, 1986, 796-821. 
 
Mortensen, D., Wage Disperson: Why are Similar People Paid Differently.   
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003. 
 
Myerson, R., “Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept,” International Journal  
of Game Theory, 7, 1978, 73-80. 
 
Nelson, P., “Information and Consumer Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy, 78,  
1970, 311-29. 
 
Nelson, P., “Advertising as Information,” Journal of Political Economy, 81, 1974,  
729-54. 
 
Nelson, P., “Advertising as Information Once More,” in Issues in Advertising: The  
Economics of Persuasion, D. Tuereck, ed., American Enterprise Institute, 
Washington, 1978, 729-54. 
 
Oyer, P., “Initial Labor Market Conditions and Long-Term Outcomes for  
Economists,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20, 2006, 143-60. 
 
Pitchik, C., “Self-Promoting Investments,” Working Paper, 2006. 
 
Pinkston, J., “A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable  
Implications,” Bureau of Labor Statistics Working Paper, 390, 2006. 
 
Ricart i Costa, J., “Managerial Task Assignment and Promotion,” Econometrica, 56,  
1988, 449-466.  
  70 
 
Saxenian, A., “Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and  
Route 128,” Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994. 
 
Shih, J., “Project Time in Silicon Valley,” Qualitative Sociology, 27, 2004, 223-245. 
 
Treble, J., E. Gameren, S. Bridges, and T. Barmby, “The Internal Economics of the  
Firm: Further Evidence from Personnel Data,” Labour Economics, 8, 2001, 
531-52. 
 
Waldman, M., “Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency,” Rand Journal of  
Economics, 15, 1984a, 255-67. 
 
Waldman, M., “Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Optimal Promotion Rules: The Case of  
Internal Promotion,” Economic Inquiry, 41, 2003, 27-41. 
 
Yatchew, A., “Nonparametric Regression Techniques in Economics,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, 36, 1998, 669-721. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  71 
CHAPTER 2: 
PIECE-RATES, SALARY, PERFORMANCE AND JOB LEVEL 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Many employer/employee relationships are characterized by a classic agency 
problem: the employee can take actions that directly affect profits but are unobserved 
by the employer.  When the employer can precisely measure the worker’s output the 
solution to this problem is straightforward; the firm simply contracts directly on the 
worker’s output to properly align his incentives (Lazear (1986)).  When output is 
imperfectly measured, the employer is forced to use other means to motivate the 
worker such as the threat of firing (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)).
29  The goal of this 
paper is to use this simple agency framework to explore why bonuses are a larger 
component of compensation at higher job levels and salaries a larger component of 
compensation at lower job levels.   
The motivation for applying the agency framework to bonus, salary and job 
level comes from two literatures.  The literature on hierarchy and monitoring predicts 
that the cost of monitoring output should increase at lower levels of the firm (Rosen 
(1982), Qian (1994)), while the literature on pay-for-performance predicts that 
variation in the cost of monitoring should invoke variation in use of salary and piece-
rates: “When it is costly to measure output, it is sometimes argued, workers are paid 
salaries.  When monitoring costs are low, piece-rate payments is appropriate (Lazear 
(1986)).”
 30  These two predictions taken together suggest that piece-rates, or bonuses, 
should be more common at higher levels of the firm because monitoring output is less 
costly.  Further, previous empirical work finds evidence that bonuses are in fact larger 
                                                 
29 Baker (1992) considers contracts which use performance measures that are imperfectly correlated 
with the firm’s objective (profits).  He shows that the stronger the correlation, the more effective the 
contract.  
30 Pendleton (2006) notes that the importance of monitoring costs is also widely recognized in the 
literature on profit-sharing and employee incentive plans.  
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and more common at higher levels of the firm (Gibbs (1995), Lambert et al. (1993), 
Lin (2005) Smeets and Warzynksi (2006)).  The goal of this paper is to build a formal 
model that captures this prediction and test its implications using personnel records.  
The key assumption of the theoretical model is that the proportion of a 
worker’s output that the firm can observe decreases at lower levels of the hierarchy.  
Further, the firm can only probabilistically monitor the unobserved proportion of 
output.  By the logic discussed above, then, the firm will offer a wage contract that has 
a larger salary component at lower levels (efficiency wage solution), and a larger 
piece-rate, or bonus, component at higher levels.  This variation in the use of bonus 
across job level gives rise to four testable implications: 1) measured performance 
should increase at higher job levels, 2) the probability of receiving a bonus should 
increase with performance 3) the absolute size of the bonus and the ratio of bonus to 
total compensation should increase at higher job levels and 4) the frequency of firing 
should decrease at higher job levels.     
To test these implications I analyze personnel records from the management 
hierarchy of a firm in the US financial services industry (the same data analyzed by 
Baker et. al (1994)).  The analysis examines variation in bonus and performance 
across job level both in the cross-section and within-person over time.  The strength of 
the analysis is that it controls for both observable and unobservable worker skills, 
thereby ruling out many alternative explanations that rely on positive sorting on ability 
across job level (tournament models, learning models).  I find that the data is 
consistent with the implications of the model.  
My paper is not unique in its exploration of the determinants and effects of 
piece-rates.  There is a significant amount of empirical work exploring such matters in 
the pay-for-performance literature.  Two papers closely related to mine are Gibbons 
and Murphy (1992) and Lazear (2000).  Gibbons and Murphy (1992) examine how  
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variation in long-term incentives over the course of a worker’s career affects the firm’s 
decision to use piece-rates.  In particular, they argue that explicit incentives (i.e. “pay-
for-performance” or piece-rates) should be less important early in a worker’s career 
because “career concerns” serve as a sufficient implicit discipline device.  The 
empirical implication is that pay-for-performance should vary systematically with 
experience.  In a dataset that tracks CEO pay and firm performance, they find that 
CEO’s closer to retirement are explicitly rewarded more for high-performance (extra 
return realized by shareholders) than CEO’s early in their career.
31  My methodology 
is similar to Gibbons and Murphy with the main exception that I use job level rather 
than age to identify variation in the use of piece-rates.  Unlike Gibbons and Murphy, 
Lazear (2000), focuses exclusively on the effects of piece-rates rather than the 
determinants.  Using a unique dataset that tracks the personnel records of a firm over 
time that switches from salaries to piece-rate, Lazear is able to use a natural 
experiment framework to identify the effect of piece-rates.
32  He finds that piece-rates 
significantly increase the output and the ability of workers.   
Four other empirical papers relevant for my work are Gibbs (1995), Lambert et 
al. (1993), Lin (2005), and Smeets and Warzynski (2006).  Gibbs uses the same data 
as I do to investigate similar issues: performance, pay-raise, bonus and promotion.  
The focus of Gibbs’ work, however, is within job-level incentives and promotion-
based incentives, while the focus of my work is how incentives vary across job level 
(under the assumption that level is a proxy for monitoring cost).  As such there is no 
overlap in our statistical models or results.  Lambert et al. analyze data similar to mine 
(they have information on bonus, salary and level of rank) but asks different questions.  
                                                 
31 Beyond these two papers, there is a broad empirical literature on CEO compensation and incentives 
that addresses issues of pay-for-performance.  For a full review of literature on executive compensation 
see Kevin Murphy’s Chapter in the Handbook of Labor Economics (1999).   
32 In terms of empirical design, Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003) is another paper similar to 
Lazear (2000).  However, they are more interested in team incentives.  
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The authors are predominantly interested in the broader implications of standard 
models of performance and promotion (tournament, managerial power, moral hazard) 
and do not explore the issue of performance and bonuses across level in depth.  They 
do offer some simple descriptive statistics (consistent with my findings), but focus on 
other issues in their formal statistical tests.  Lin’s paper is closest to mine in terms of 
empirical methodology.  Lin runs formal regressions, controlling for worker skills and 
performance, to identify the effect of job level on bonus.  Consistent with my results, 
he finds that bonuses are larger at higher job levels.  My paper is distinguished from 
Lin’s in that it has a theoretical framework guiding its predictions.  As such, it 
includes a set of secondary predictions about performance and job level that his does 
not.  Further, my analysis examines bonus as a percent of total compensation, while 
his focuses solely on raw bonus size.  Finally Smeets and Warzynski, using a unique 
data set, explore the relationship between span of control and compensation.  In 
regression analysis that controls for worker characteristics and span, they find that 
bonuses are positively correlated with job level.  Like Lin, they do not have a formal 
theoretical model guiding there predictions.  Further they do not use a fixed-effect 
specification.  
On the theoretical side of the pay-for-performance literature, Lazear (1986) is 
the paper most relevant to my work.  Lazear tackles the salary vs. piece-rate dilemma 
in depth, walking through a series of different factors that may drive the decision of 
whether to implement a salary or a piece-rate.  In particular he shows that as the cost 
of monitoring increases salaries become preferred to piece-rates.  My model is 
formally different than his, but is in the same spirit.  In my model, as monitoring 
becomes more difficult the firm shifts to salary.  The interpretation of salary in my 
model, however, comes from the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) efficiency wage model.  
Shapiro and Stiglitz show that when effort is observed probabilistically, an optimal  
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response of the firm is to offer a salary and use the threat of firing.  In my model, at 
lower levels of the firm a higher proportion of a worker’s output is observed 
probabilistically (rather than perfectly).  As such the efficiency wage salary a la 
Shapiro and Stiglitz becomes a bigger component of total compensation.  Outside of 
these two key papers that contribute directly to ideas in my model, there is a large 
theoretical literature exploring moral hazard and wage contracts more generally.
33   
  Finally, the central assumption of the paper that monitoring becomes more 
difficult at lower levels of the firm comes from the literature on monitoring in 
organizations.  Rosen (1982) shows that managers at lower levels will be of lower 
ability.  Further, Qian (1994), in an extension of Rosen’s work, shows that (1) at lower 
levels of the hierarchy there will be more “loss of control” and (2) as the span of 
control gets larger (the number of workers that a manager monitors) the monitoring 
problem becomes more difficult.  All of these results are consistent with the idea that 
monitoring will be more difficult at lower levels of hierarchies.
34   
  The paper proceeds as follows:  In section 2.2 I consider two basic models of 
moral hazard.  In the first I assume output is observable and show that a bonus pay 
scheme induces efficient effort.  In the second model I assume that output is not 
observable, but can be monitored probabilistically.  I show that a salary scheme with 
the threat of firing is optimal.  In section 2.3, I build a model of a multi-level firm in 
which monitoring output is more difficult at lower levels of the firm.  The wage of the 
worker is a combination of the wage from the two models presented in section 2.2.  
This model yields testable implications for the data.  In Section 2.4 I discuss the data, 
my empirical strategy, and show the results.  Section 2.5 concludes. 
  
                                                 
33 A few classic papers from this literature include Holmstrom (1979), Lazear and Rosen (1981), Fama 
(1991), Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) and Baker (1992). 
34 The literature on moral hazard and teams suggests that monitoring is harder in teams (Holmstrom 
(1982)). If team production is more prevalent at lower job levels (something that has not been 
empirically examined), then this could be a second reason why the cost of monitoring is higher.   
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2.2. Perfect and Imperfect Monitoring 
In this section I consider two simple models of pay and performance.  The first 
assumes output is observable, and shows that a piece-rate wage is optimal.  The 
second assumes that output is unobservable and shows that an efficiency wage 
solution similar to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1986) does better than a piece-rate.   I use the 
definitions of piece-rate and salary presented by Lazear (1986).  A piece-rate is a wage 
contract that depends on output.  A salary is a wage contract that is independent of 
output.  In terms of timing, a piece-rate wage has a component that is paid ex-post, and 
a salary does not.  To be consistent with the data, I use the term “bonus” and piece-rate 
interchangeably.  The main result of the section is that when monitoring is sufficiently 
difficult the efficiency wage induces lower effort in equilibrium than a piece-rate.  
This arises because the costly nature of monitoring in the unobservable case makes the 
return to effort lower.  This result will be integral in deriving the testable predictions 
in Section III. 
 
A) Perfectly Observable Output: Piece-Rate Contract (Performance Bonus)
35 
Assume a worker’s output is equal to Yi = biei where ei is a worker’s effort (the 
harder he works, the more he produces) and bi is a worker’s return to effort.  Assume 
production is separable across workers and a worker has an outside option of R.  
Effort is continuous on the range [eL, eH].  I set eL = 0 and assume the cost of effort is 
C(e) where C(0)=0, C’(e) and C’’(e) >0.  Assume bi is not known to the firm and, for 
simplicity, has a two point distribution; it equals bL with probability 1-p and bH with 
probability p, where bH > bL ≥ 1.  A simple interpretation of bi is that it is the worker’s 
intrinsic motivation.  Some people have a stronger taste for effort than others.  Assume 
                                                 
35 There are other payment schemes that depend on observing output and induce efficient effort (e.g. 
tournament models).  For the sake of this paper I am concentrating only on piece-rate/bonus payment 
schemes.  
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workers are risk neutral and look to maximize wage less cost of effort.  Finally, note 
that the efficient effort level in this environment, denoted ei*, is the effort level where 
the marginal benefit of effort equals its marginal cost.  Formally ei* solves: bi = 
C’(ei*).  Note that eH* > eL*.  That is, workers with more motivation have a higher 
level of efficient effort.   
When output is perfectly observable a piece-rate contract equal to W = Yi – P 
will induce efficient effort, as it forces the worker to choose the effort level where the 
marginal return of his effort equals the marginal cost of his effort, which is precisely 
ei*.  Such a piece-rate contract is optimal from the firm’s perspective because, by 
inducing efficient effort, it maximizes the surplus between the worker and the firm.  P 
is the amount of surplus the firm takes for itself and will be chosen such that R= Yi –P, 
i.e. to ensure the participation constraint holds.  Thus the contract allows the firm to 
make as much surplus as possible without losing the worker.  We define this contract 
as a piece rate because W depends on Y.   
An important point to note is that W = Yi –P is not the only contract that 
induces efficient effort.  Because the firm knows that all workers will choose at least 
eL*, it can offer the following contract, W = bLeL* + (Yi – bLeL*), where bLeL* is a 
salary paid upfront (as it does not depend on Yi), and (Yi – bLeL*) is a “bonus” paid to 
workers who choose eH*.  To ensure against shirking, the firm will fire all workers 
who choose any effort ei < eL*.  Such workers receive their outside option.  This 
contract induces the same outcome as W = Yi –P, but is more consistent with the data 
in that not every worker receives a bonus.
36 
 
 
                                                 
36 In the empirical section it is shown that not every worker receives a bonus in the data.  Thus, this 
second contract is more consistent with the data.  
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B) Imperfectly Observable Output: Efficiency Wage 
Now suppose that production is identical to the observable case, but that output 
is unobservable.  Assume that there exists a (costless) monitoring technology that 
allows the firm to observe output with probability q, and that such output is not 
publicly verifiable.
37  As such, the firm can not implement a piece-rate wage.  Further, 
it can not use the wage to induce higher-motivated workers to work hard.  However 
there still exists an incentive to induce higher effort amongst all workers because 
effort creates surplus.   
I consider a simple example of the efficiency wage solution proposed by 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) in which the firm uses the threat of firing combined with a 
fixed salary to induce the worker to choose a higher effort.
38  Assume the firm offers a 
salary S and commits to firing the worker if he is caught shirking, i.e. he is caught 
expending effort less than a specified level in the contract, e’.  Like Shapiro and 
Stiglitz, I assume that the worker can not pay a “bond” or “entrance fee” to the firm.  
It is this assumption that constrains the equilibrium to be inefficient.  Shapiro and 
Stiglitz justify the assumption by arguing bonds (or entrance fees) would be too 
expensive, and by the fact that we do not see them in the real world.  Carmichael 
(1990) offers an in depth discussion of the issue.    
Under these assumptions, the worker’s effort choice is as follows.  If he 
chooses not to shirk, e ≥ e’, he will receive S – C(e’).  That is, he will receive the 
salary, S, with certainty but he will suffer the disutility of his effort.  If he chooses e < 
e’ he will expect to receive (1-q)S – c(e).  That is, by shirking the worker only receives 
the salary, S, with probability (1-q) but in return he suffers a lower disutility of effort.  
                                                 
37 Standard efficiency wage models assume effort is observed with probability q rather than output.  To 
be consistent with the observable case, I assume the firm observes output rather than effort.  Given that 
effort perfectly determines output in my model this is a matter of semantics. 
38 Shapiro and Stiglitz assume effort is discrete.  I assume effort is continuous.  This enrichment buys 
the result that the effort level induced by the efficiency wage is less than the efficient level of effort.  
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Thus to induce e = e’ the lowest salary the firm can offer the worker and still retain his 
services equates these two quantities, S – C(e’) = (1-q)S.
 39  Re-arranging terms yields 
S(e’) = C(e’)/q.  Thus, if the firm wants to induce a given effort level e’ it simply 
offers a salary of S(e’) and threatens to fire if it observes e < e’.  The question now 
becomes which e’ maximizes profits (surplus).  Under this contract the firms’ profits 
are expressed as: π = E(bi)e- S(e) = E(bi)e - C(e)/q.  That is, profits are the expected 
output of the effort induced by the contract, E(bi)e, minus the cost of inducing that 
output, S(e) = C(e)/q.  Differentiating π by e and setting it equal to 0 implies the 
following first order condition characterized the profit-maximizing effort, e’: qE(bi) = 
C’(e’).  In order to eliminate trivial cases I assume E(bi)e’ > S(e’) = C(e’)/q > R.  This 
ensures the firm and worker both find the contract better than no contract.    
The key result of this section is the following:  If monitoring is sufficiently 
difficult (q ≤ (bL/E(bi))), then the output induced by the efficient wage contract, bie’, 
will be lower than the output induced by the piece-rate contract discussed above, biei*.  
For intuition of this result consider the first order conditions that define e’ and ei* 
respectively: qE(bi) = C’(e’) and bi = C’(ei*).  The economic interpretation of these 
two first order conditions is that the firm sets the marginal return of effort equal to the 
marginal cost of inducing that effort in the optimal contract.  When monitoring is 
sufficiently difficult the marginal return to effort for the efficiency wage becomes 
strictly less than the marginal return to effort in the piece-rate scheme, which implies 
e’ < ei* for all i.  The intuition is that the imperfect nature of monitoring output erodes 
the return to effort.  As such, inducing the efficient effort level ceases to be optimal.   
In summary, because the firm can not observe output it is forced to pay a 
salary and use the threat of firing to motivate workers.  This contract induces higher 
                                                 
39  I assume the worker decides to not shirk if he is indifferent between shirking and not shirking.  Also, 
this relies on the fact that the worker choose e=0 if he shirk  
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effort than a flat salary with no threat of firing, but still does not induce the efficient 
level of effort that a contract contingent on performance does.  This result will be 
central in the testable predictions derived in Section 2.3. 
 
2.3. Monitoring and Hierarchy 
In this section I construct a model that combines the two simple models 
presented above.  The model considers a j level hierarchy in which each worker in job 
j will be monitored by a worker in job j+1.  Like previous models of hierarchy and 
monitoring (Rosen (1982), Qian (1994)), a worker’s output is a function of the 
monitoring above him and his effort, eit, which he chooses.  The key feature of the 
model is that monitoring output becomes harder at lower levels of the firm.  As such, 
at lower job levels salaries will become more important, bonuses less frequent, and 
output lower.  
 
A) Environment 
I start with a multi-level firm that consists of J levels.  I assume each worker 
engages in multi-task production as presented in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).  
That is, each worker in job j faces a set of T tasks each of which is monitored by his 
manager in job j+1.  The worker chooses an effort level eit for each task t which 
generates output yit = bieit, where ei and yi will represent the T-dimensional vectors of 
effort and output.  As above, I assume bi is observed only by the worker and has a 
simple two-point distribution.  Further I assume that the proportion of workers with bi 
= bH in level j is pj.   I assume that the manager at level j+1 can only observe the 
output for aj < T of a worker’s tasks in level j.
40  The output of the other T - aj tasks is 
                                                 
40 Previous papers that consider hierarchical production and monitoring (Rosen (1982), Qian (1994)) 
have assumed that the monitoring technology is discrete; each worker is either monitored fully or not at 
all.  Time constraints then imply that only a proportion of workers will be monitored.  In my model the  
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observed imperfectly with probability q.  The idea is that due to time constraints the 
manager will only be able to monitor the most important tasks.  The other tasks he will 
be able to monitor occasionally.  For simplicity, I assume that the output at each task 
is separable.  Formally, the output of a worker is Yi= ∑t yit = ∑t bieit.  To ensure that at 
least a minimal amount of output is observable at each level I assume that T(eL* - e’)/ 
(eH*-e’) < aj for all j.  Finally, for simplicity I abstract away from dynamic promotion 
concerns.  Although I am careful to address the issue in my empirical work 
There are two key assumptions that will drive the results of the model.  The 
first is that aj decreases at lower levels.  That is, managers are able to monitor fewer 
tasks at lower levels of the firm.  This has several possible theoretical interpretations.  
As noted above, it could be due to lower ability managers at lower levels (Rosen 
(1982)), “loss of control” in monitoring, larger spans at lower levels (Qian (1994)), or 
even more team production at lower levels.  Because the focus of the paper is not 
theoretical, I abstract away from the exact mechanics and simply assert that aj 
decreases at lower levels.  A direct consequence of this assumption is that total output 
for a given worker, Yi, can be written as the sum of two components, output generated 
at observable tasks, biaje
o
i, and output generated at unobservable tasks, bi(T-aj)e
u
i: Yi = 
bi[aje
o
i + (T-aj)e
u
i].
41 
The second main assumption is that the costs of effort for different tasks are 
separable.  Formally, C(ei) = ∑t C(eit).  In a more general information environment in 
which the worker is risk averse and the contract is linear, Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991) analyze multi-task production when C(ei) is both separable and non-separable.  
The separable case simplifies the analysis significantly.  The non-separable case (i.e 
                                                                                                                                              
monitoring of tasks is discrete.  Each task is either monitored or not, and each worker faces some 
monitored and some un-monitored tasks. 
41 As will be shown, because the return to effort is the same across tasks, the worker will choose the 
same level of effort on all observable tasks and the same level of effort on all unobservable tasks in 
equilibrium.  
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assuming that tasks are either substitutes or compliments in the cost function) can lead 
to a wide set of implications depending on the observability of the tasks and the 
strength of compliment/substitute effect.  To keep the analysis tractable and to focus 
on the intuition of the baseline models outlined in the previous section, I assume 
separable costs of effort across tasks.  This assumption, along with the assumption that 
output at each task is separable, then implies that the worker’s choices of eij and eik for 
any two tasks j and k are completely independent.  To be consistent with the above 
notation on Yi I will henceforth write C(ei) as the sum of the cost of total effort exerted 
on observable and unobservable tasks weighted by aj, C(ei) = [ajC(e
o
i)+ (T-aj)C(e
u
i)].   
Given the assumptions above, the model is reduced to a simple, separable, 
two-dimensional choice problem: the worker must choose how hard to work on tasks 
with observable output and how hard to work on tasks with unobservable output.  To 
help build intuition for the model, consider the following simple example: a worker 
faces two tasks, writing reports in the privacy of his office and presenting reports 
publicly to his superiors in a weekly meeting.  The second task is observable while the 
first task is not.  The assumption of separable costs of effort in this example implies 
that the skills/effort the worker uses to complete his writing task are different than the 
skills/effort he uses to complete his presentations.  Thus if he decides to exert more 
effort writing he does not have to exert less effort on his presentations, nor should the 
extra time writing make the marginal cost of his effort on presentations higher.  The 
other key assumption of the model, aj increases at higher levels, is captured by the 
following scenario: suppose the worker is promoted to a higher level job where he 
must still write and present.  But suppose that at this higher job level his writing is 
more highly scrutinized by his manager.  Such a change would obviously affect the 
worker’s effort choice on writing, but there is no obvious reason why it would affect 
his effort on presentations.  It is this “comparative static” exercise that is the central  
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question of the paper.  What happens when more of a worker’s tasks become 
observable?  
 
B) Equilibrium 
As noted above, the key to the model is that the choices of e
u
i and e
o
i are 
completely separable.  This implies that the basic analysis from Section 2.2 applies to 
the observable and unobservable cases respectively; it will be optimal for the firm to 
contract directly on output for tasks in which it is observable, while it will be optimal 
to use an efficiency wage for tasks in which it is not.  As such the optimal contract 
will be of the form S + ajbLeL* + aj(Y
o
i – bLeL*) where the first component, S, is the 
salary for unobserved output (with a minimum level of effort, e’, tied to it) and the 
second component, ajbLeL* + aj(Y
o
i – bLeL*), is the bonus payment for observed 
output.   
I start with the worker’s choice of effort on tasks with observable output.  
Because the firm offers a piece rate, and because the cost of observable effort, ajC(e
o
i), 
is separable from unobservable effort, we know that just as in Section 2.2 the worker 
will choose ei* that solves, ajbi = ajC’(ei*).  Workers with bi = bH will choose e
o
i = eH* 
while workers with bi = bL will choose e
o
i = eL*, where eH* > eL*.  That is, more 
motivated workers will work harder on the observable dimensions.   
Given the worker’s optimal choice of effort on tasks with observable output, 
the firm will then use an efficiency wage approach to motivate workers on tasks with 
unobservable output.  As in Section 2.2, the firm will choose a salary S(e
u
i) and a 
minimal amount of acceptable effort, e
u
i, to ensure workers do not shirk.  Using logic 
similar to Section 2.2, this salary is exactly S(e
u
i) = [(T-aj)C(e
u
i)/q - ajbLeL*].
42  The 
                                                 
42 An important difference from the simple case in Section II, is that S(e
u
i) depends on ajbiei*.  
However, because the firm can not distinguish high and low type workers, it can not offer two different 
salaries to the two different groups.  Thus it will need to offer the higher of the two salaries, S(e
u
i) = (T- 
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equilibrium salary will then be the salary that maximizes profits.  In this case, profits 
for a given S(e
u
i) are (T-aj)E(bi)e
u
i – S(e
u
i).  That is, profits are the expected output 
induced by the salary minus the cost of the salary.  The profit maximizing effort, e’, 
then solves the following first order condition qE(bi) = C’(e’), the same first order 
condition from Section 2.2.  Further, just as in Section 2.2 for sufficiently small q we 
have e’ < eL* < eH*.  That is, workers do not exert as much effort on unobserved 
dimensions as they do on observed dimensions because the costly nature of 
monitoring output on unobservable dimensions reduces its return.
43  Finally, for ease 
of notation I will refer to the equilibrium salary as S’ rather than S(e’). 
Putting together the optimal contracts on observable and unobservable 
dimensions, the equilibrium wage in job j will be Wij = Sj’ + aj(bieH* – bLeL*) for high 
output workers and Wij = Sj’ for low output workers, where Sj’ = [(T-aj)C(e’)/q - 
ajbLeL*].  All workers will choose e
u
i = e’, bH workers will choose e
o
i = eH*, and bL 
workers will choose e
o
i = eL*.     
 
C) Testable Implications for the Data 
The above model builds a framework within which to think about piece-rates, 
salary, job level and performance (output).  In this section I formalize four testable 
predictions of the model; performance should be better, bonuses should be larger and 
firings should be less frequent at higher levels of the firm.  Further better performance 
should predict receipt of bonus and frequency of bonus receipt at a given level should 
serve as a proxy for prevalence of high-ability workers at a given level.   
Job level and salary have direct constructs in the data.  Piece-rate and output do 
not.  In what follows I will use the variable “bonus” as the data representative of 
                                                                                                                                              
aj)C(e
u
i)/q - ajbLeL*, to ensure all workers do not shirk.  Under the parameterization (T-aj)E(bi)e’ > S(e’) 
= (T-aj)C(e’)/q - ajbLeL* > 0 such a salary is optimal.  It is this case that is considered in the text.  
43 This result is similar in spirit to Baker (1992) which shows workers will work harder on measurable 
dimensions.     
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piece-rate, and the variable “performance rating” as the data representative of 
measured output.  I define measured output as the output produced on perfectly 
monitored tasks plus output produced on the imperfectly monitored tasks when 
monitoring is successful.  To be consistent with the fact that the performance measure 
in the data is one-dimensional, I will use a worker’s measured output per task as the 
theoretical analogue of “performance rating”.  If we let y
m
i be worker i’s measured 
output per task, then formally y
m
i = bi[(T- aj)e’ + ajei*]/T for a worker who is 
monitored successfully and y
m
i = biei* for a worker who is not.  I now move on to the 
testable implications.  
 
Implication 1:  Consider a randomly chosen worker from job level j and one from job 
level j+1, where j+1 is higher in the hierarchy.  The expectation of y
m
i will be larger 
for the worker in level j+1 than the worker in level j. 
Proof:  First note that a worker who is monitored successfully will have a measured 
output per task of bieij = bi[(T- aj)e’ + ajei*]/T.  A worker who is not monitored will 
have a measured output of bieij = biei*.  Thus expected measured output at level j is:  
bieij   = bi(q/T)[(T- aj)e’ + ajE(ei*)] + bi(1-q)E(ei*)  
= bi(q/T)(T- aj)e’ + bi((q/T)aj + 1-q) E(ei*).  
We note that dbieij/daj = bi(q/T)(E(ei*) - e’) > 0. That is expected measured output per 
task is increasing in aj.  Because aj is larger at level j+1 than level j, it then follows that 
expected measured output per task is higher at level j +1.      
QED 
 
Implication 1 states that the measured output will be higher at higher levels.   
This result arises for two reasons.  First a larger proportion of a worker’s output is 
observed at higher levels.  Second, as shown in the previous sub-section, when output  
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is observed and a piece-rate wage is used workers will work harder than when output 
is unobservable and rewarded via an efficiency wage.  Combining these two ideas, we 
see that workers at higher levels of the firm have a larger incentive to work harder 
because more of their output is observable and fully rewarded.  In terms of the data, if 
we assume that a performance rating is a proxy for measured output then the testable 
interpretation of implication 1 is that performance ratings should be higher at higher 
job levels.  
The second implication tells us that performance and bonus should be linked. 
 
Implication 2:  The probability that a given worker i receives a bonus is (weakly) 
increasing in measured output per task, y
m
i. 
Proof:  In the model above there are only 4 possible outcomes for y
m
i:  
bi[(T- aj)e’ + ajeL*]/T, bieL*, bi[(T- aj)e’ + ajeH*]/T, bieH*,  
where [(T- aj)e’ + ajeL*]/T < eL* < [(T- aj)e’ + ajeH*]/T < eH*.   
The probability of a receiving a bonus for each level of measured output is 0, 0, 1, 1 
respectively.  We conclude that the probability of bonus is weakly increasing in 
measured performance. 
QED 
 
Implication 2 tells us that the workers who produce more output are more likely to 
receive bonuses.  This result comes directly out of the equilibrium of the model; only 
workers who produce the highest output will be rewarded with a bonus.  Thus the 
probability of a bonus is increasing in output.   Again, if we assume a performance 
rating is a proxy for measured output then implication 2 tells us that better 
performance ratings increase the likelihood of a bonus.   
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Implication 3:  Consider a randomly chosen worker from job level j who has received 
a bonus and one from job level j+1 who has received a bonus, where j+1 is higher in 
the hierarchy.  The absolute size of the bonus and the ratio of the bonus to total 
compensation (salary + bonus) will be larger for the worker in level j+1. 
Proof:  As shown above the wage for a worker in job j will be Wij = Sj + aj(bieH* – 
bLeL*).  The first part of the statement is thus trivial.  As j increases so does the bonus, 
aj(bieH* – bLeL*). 
  The second part of the implication is non-trivial.  The ratio of bonus to bonus 
plus salary for those receiving a bonus, BP, is thus: aj(bieH* – bLeL*)/[(T- aj)C(e’)/q + 
aj(bieH* – bLeL*)].  Differentiating BP by aj using the quotient rule, yields that the sign 
of the ∂BP/∂aj will be the sign of the numerator, as the denominator is positive.  The 
numerator is: 
(bieH* – bLeL*)[(T- aj)C(e’)/q + aj(bieH* – bLeL*)] - (bieH* – bLeL*)aj(-C(e’)/q + 
(bieH* – bLeL*))   
= (bieH* – bLeL*) [C(e’)/q]  
> 0   
Thus the ratio is increasing in aj and thus j and we conclude that the ratio of bonus to 
salary at level j+1 is greater than at j. 
QED 
 
Implication 3 tells us that bonuses should increase in size at higher job levels.  
The first part of the implication follows immediately from the model.  It states that 
bonuses will be larger in absolute terms at higher levels of the firm.  This comes out of 
the fact that a larger proportion of output is observable at higher levels of the firm.  
The second part of the implication makes a slightly richer prediction regarding 
bonuses.  It tells us that the ratio of the bonus relative to total compensation (salary  
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plus bonus) will be larger at higher levels.  This captures the fact that bonuses are a 
bigger component of compensation at higher levels of the firm.  In terms of the data, 
this is a stronger prediction than the first half of the implication because it rules out the 
possibility that larger bonuses at higher levels could simply be driven by higher 
overall compensation at higher levels.
44  
Implication 4 tells us how the frequency of bonus should vary across level. 
 
Implication 4:  Consider a randomly chosen worker from job level j and one from 
level job j+1, where j+1 is higher in the hierarchy.  The probability he receives a 
bonus is pj. 
Proof:  The proof is straightforward.  In the equilibrium of the model only bH workers 
receive a bonus.  Thus the likelihood of a random worker in job j receiving a bonus is 
exactly pj, the probability that bi = bH. 
QED 
 
Implication 4 states that the frequency of receiving a bonus in a given job level is 
determined by the distribution of bH workers in that level.  As such, the frequency of 
receiving a bonus in a given level can be seen as a proxy for the concentration of high 
ability workers in a given level.  As I will discuss in detail in Section 2.4, an important 
part of my empirical methodology is controlling for positive sorting on ability across 
job level.  Implication 4 will, thus, be an important part of this methodology because it 
helps identify the prevalence of positive sorting; more frequent bonuses at higher 
levels will be evidence of positive sorting.  I will discuss this issue in more detail in 
the empirical results section. 
 
                                                 
44 There is a strong correlation between level and overall compensation in the data.  
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Finally, despite the fact that the theory does not include firings in equilibrium, 
an intuitive idea from the model presented above (and an easy formal extension) is 
that firing should be more prevalent when output is harder to observe because it serves 
as an incentive mechanism in such circumstances. On the other hand, firing should be 
less prevalent when output is easy to observe because pay-for-performance 
compensation schemes (bonuses) rather than firing serve as the incentive mechanism.  
In the context of a multi-level firm where output is more difficult to observe at lower 
levels, it then follows that firing should be more prevalent at lower levels.  As such, 
along with the three formal implications derived above, I also will explore this fourth 
more suggestive prediction in the empirical section. 
In summary, in this section I derived four testable implications and one 
suggestive implication of the simple model built above.  The model predicts that 
workers at higher levels should have higher measured performance, should receive 
larger bonuses in absolute and relative terms, and should be fired less often.  All of 
these predictions are driven by the assumption that a larger proportion of worker’s 
output is observable at higher levels of the firm.  Further, it tells us that frequency of 
bonus serves as a proxy for the proportion of highly-motivated workers in a given job 
level.  In the next section I explore these predictions using personnel records from a 
firm in the US financial services industry. The methodology I use is careful to 
distinguish the predictions of the model from alternative explanations that rely on 
positive sorting on ability across job levels.   
 
2.4. Empirical Strategy and Results 
In this section I explore the relationships between bonus, performance, firing 
and job level using personnel records from a firm in the US financial services industry.  
The focus of the section is on distinguishing the model from potential alternative  
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explanations that rely on positive sorting on ability across job level.  Almost all 
models of hierarchy (Rosen (1982), Waldman (1984) for example) have the 
equilibrium feature that more talented, or able, workers sort to higher levels of the 
firm.  As I discuss below, such models could in principle explain al of the implications 
outlined in the previous section without relying on variation in costs of monitoring.  
To separate my model from such explanations I first conduct a cross-sectional analysis 
that tests the implications of the theory while controlling for observable skills.  I then 
conduct a longitudinal analysis which allows me to control for fixed unobserved skills 
as well as observable skills.  Taken together the results suggest that there is significant 
variation in bonuses and performances across level that is independent of variation in 
ability, evidence consistent with the predictions of my model. 
 
A) The Data: Key Variables and Sample Restrictions   
  The data I use in my analysis is the sample of white, male employees from the 
same dataset analyzed in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b) (BGH hereafter).  
The data include yearly personnel records from 1969 to 1988 for all such managerial 
employees of a US firm in the financial services industry.  The original sample 
analyzed by BGH included females and nonwhite males, for a total of 68,437  
employee-years of data.  The sample of white males has 50,556 employee-years.  The 
dataset was originally constructed using raw data from the firm’s personnel records.   
The key feature of the data is that it allows researchers to identify the 
hierarchical structure of the firm and observe how workers move through it over time.  
The 8-level hierarchy was constructed by BGH by analyzing transitions between job 
titles.  Figure 2.1 captures the organization structure of the firm.
45  The upward arrows 
capture promotion routes through the firm, and the size of the bubbles capture the size 
                                                 
45  This figure is taken from Baker, et al. (1994a).  
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Figure 2.1: Organizational Structure of the Firm 
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of the job level.  As BGH note, this structure is extremely stable over time.  An 
important point for the analysis below is that levels 5 and higher have a distinctly 
different structure than levels 4 and lower.  There are much fewer workers in the top 5 
levels (roughly 96% of workers are in the first 4 levels) and the linkages across levels 
are more direct.  The lower levels, on the other hand, are larger and have more 
complex linkages across job levels, suggesting supervision may be more difficult.   
The key variables in my analysis are salary, bonus, performance, “fired”, job 
level, education and potential labor market experience.  Salary is measured in 1988 
dollars, deflated by the CPI.  Information on bonuses is only available for 1981 to 
1988.   This fact will limit all analyses involving bonus to the eight-year window.  
Below I discuss in detail the implications of these restrictions for the sample.  
Performance is measured in the data using a relative performance rating.  Each year 
each worker receives a rating of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 where 1 is the highest rating, 5 the 
lowest. The “fired” variable is constructed as I can not distinguish whether a worker’s 
exit was a voluntary quit, a fire, or a retirement.  To keep things simple, in what 
follows I will define a fire as an exit that follows a period of relatively bad 
performance.  More precisely, if a worker receives a performance rating of 3 or higher 
in period t and then exits the firm in period t +1, he is said to have been “fired”.  As 
you will see below, a performance rating of 3 or higher is relatively poor performance, 
as a performance rating of 2 is the median of the overall performance distribution.  
Education categories are constructed from an underlying “years of education” 
variable.  Specifically, I construct dummy variables for high school graduate, 
bachelors, masters, and Ph.D.
46  Finally, following BGH, I construct potential labor 
market experience as: experience = age – education years – 6.   
                                                 
46  A high school graduate is defined as a worker with 12-15 years of education, a bachelor’s, 16-17 
years of education., an MBA or other master’s degree holder, 18-19 years of education, a Ph.D., 20 or 
more years of education.    
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Because performance and bonus are the key variables in my analysis and they 
have not been widely analyzed in previous work using this dataset, Table 2.1 presents 
basic summary statistics.  As is clear, bonuses occur relatively frequently.  Over 25% 
of worker-periods involve bonus.  The average size of bonuses 
 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Bonus and Performance 
 
Variable  Mean  Std Error  Min  Max  Obs 
           
Size of Bonus  10,049  16,438  141  296,128  5.441 
Bonus, Percent of Comp  12.80  11.20  .22  194.00  5,441 
Bonus Awarded  0.263  0.4403  0  1  20,679 
           
Performance Rating  2.00  0.873  5  1  28,699 
Rating of 1  0.293  0.4552  0  1  28,699 
Ratng of 2  0.481  0.4996  0  1  28,699 
Rating of 3,4 or 5  0.226  0.4181  0  1  28,699 
 
 (conditional on receiving one) is economically significant, at over $10,000 in raw 
terms and 12.80 percent in relative terms.  The frequency of the performance rating 
variable is harder to interpret because it is potentially relative.  The important thing to 
note is that a rating of 2 is both the mode and the average.  A rating of 1 is thus 
interpreted as high performance, while a rating of 3, 4, or 5 is low performance.  In the 
regression analysis below I will continue to use this interpretation of the performance 
rating.   
Finally, before moving onto the analysis I discuss concerns of bias that could 
arise when analyzing the sub-sample of the data that includes only non-missing bonus 
and performance information.  Table A2.1 in the appendix shows the distributions for 
three samples of the data: the “Full Sample,” which includes all records in Levels 1-8 
for the full sample window, 1969-1988, the “Bonus Sample,” which includes all  
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records from the window 1981-1988 with non-missing bonus information, and the 
“Bonus, Performance Sample,” which includes all records in the “Bonus Sample” with 
non-missing performance information.  Table A2.1 makes clear that the distributions 
of level, performance, education and age (the key variables used in my analysis) are 
very similar across the three samples.  That is, the restricted sample needed to analyze 
bonuses does not appear to bias the distributions of the key variables in any obvious 
way.   
 
B) Methodology: Controlling for Sorting on Ability Across Job Level 
  In this section I present the basic methodology of the tests.  The main goal of 
the methodology is to help distinguish the model from potential alternative 
explanations that rely on positive sorting on ability across level.  At the end of the 
section I discuss briefly how I define the job levels for the empirical tests.   
The literature on promotion dynamics offers two well-studied reasons why 
higher-ability workers should sort to higher job levels: skill is more valuable at higher 
job levels (Rosen (1982), Waldman (1984)) and promotion tournaments (Lazear and 
Rosen (1981)) should select the best workers upwards as “winners”.  It is quite 
possible, then, that better performance, larger bonuses and less frequent firings at 
higher levels are driven by sorting on ability rather than variation in cost of 
monitoring.  To properly test my model, then, it is essential that I control for such 
sorting on ability across job level.  To do so I conduct both a cross-sectional analysis 
in which I control for observable worker characteristics and a longitudinal analysis in 
which I control for observable and fixed, unobservable worker characteristics.   
I start with a discussion of the cross-sectional analysis.  The key controls I use 
are worker’s education, total labor market experience, and on-the-job tenure (number 
of years at a given job level).  Education and labor market experience are standard  
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proxies for worker skill.
47  On-the-job tenure is included because standard models of 
dynamic promotion (Gibbons and Waldman (1999, 2006)) suggest that it should be an 
important determinant of a worker’s relative standing at his job.
48  Further, previous 
cross-sectional work from the empirical literature on the Peter Principle (Peter and 
Hull (1969)) finds that on-the-job tenure is a significant determinant of worker’s 
outcomes.
49  Formally, for the outcome of interest for worker i at job j in year t, Yijt, I 
estimate the following equation: 
 
(1) Yijt = β1Xit + β2TENijt + β3TEN
2
ijt + Lj + Ai + eijt. 
where Xit is a vector of observable skills, TENijt is tenure at job j, Lj is a fixed 
effect of level j, and Ai is the fixed effect of worker i. 
  
The object of interest in equation (1) is Lj; the effect of Level j on the outcome of 
interest, Y (in my case performance, bonus and firing).  The cross-sectional analysis 
offers an unbiased estimate of Lj only under the assumption that Ai is orthogonal to Lj.  
That is, the cross-sectional estimates are only accurate if a worker’s fixed, unobserved 
skills are uncorrelated with job level.  If such skills are in fact positively correlated 
with job level then the estimates of Lj in the cross-sectional analysis will be biased 
upwards.  Such a correlation could arise if the promotion process selects workers with 
better unobservable skills (for example, intrinsic motivation) upwards, which, as noted 
above, is theoretically plausible.   
                                                 
47  The control for experience can also be seen as a control for different work incentives for older 
workers as found in Gibbons and Murphy (1992). 
48 Gibbons and Waldman (1999, 2006) show that high-ability workers will be promoted more quickly 
than low-ability workers.  As such, in the cross-section, on-the-job tenure should be negatively 
correlated with performance, as it is a proxy for “failure at promotion.”  When task specific capital is 
added to the Gibbons and Waldman framework, on-the-job tenure will also serve as a proxy for the 
accumulation of such capital.   
49 Medoff and Abraham (1980) find that subjective performance falls with tenure on the job, Lazear 
(1992) and Baker, et al. (1994a) find that wage falls with tenure, and Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) find 
that bonuses fall with tenure.    
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To address this possibility I also conduct a longitudinal analysis.  The 
longitudinal analysis allows me to control for fixed unobserved skills, as well as 
observable skills and on-the-job-tenure, by looking at how bonus and performance 
differ across job level for the same worker.  I implement the analysis by differencing 
the data on the dimension of job when on-the-job tenure is the same.
50  Formally, I 
estimate the following equation: 
 
(2) Yij+1t - Yijt-r = β1(Xi+1t - Xit) +  (Lj+1 - Lj) + (eij+1t.- eijt-r) 
where r is the number of years spent at level j-1. 
 
The dependent variable in equation (2) is the difference in the outcome of interest, Y, 
for worker i at job level j+1 and at job level j when Tij+1 = Tij.  That is, I compare 
outcomes only when on-the-job tenure is the same.
51   The important thing to note 
about equation (2) is that the fixed unobserved skills, Ai, drop out, thereby eliminating 
the concerns of bias present in the cross-sectional analysis.   As such, even if Ai and 
eijt are not orthogonal (i.e. there is positive sorting on unobserved skills across job 
level) estimating (2) by OLS will yield an unbiased estimate of Lj+1 - Lj.  Another 
important thing to note is that on-the-job tenure also drops out of equation (2).  This 
happens because Y is differenced on the dimension of level controlling for tenure at 
the job level.  That is, the analysis examines differences in the outcome of interest 
across job level in the same year of tenure.  As noted above, this is important because 
                                                 
50 The use of a first-difference estimator follows the traditional approach from the inter-sector wage 
differential literature (Krueger and Summers (1988), Katz and Gibbons (1992)) where first-difference 
estimators were used to estimate the effect of industry on wage while controlling for unobserved worker 
skills.  It should also be noted that similar identification strategies are used in more complicated fixed-
effect models, such as Abowd et al. (1999), in which identification of firm effects depends on 
movement of workers between firms.  
51 When the total number of years of tenure at adjacent job levels are unequal, observations for the high 
tenure years are dropped.  For example, if worker i spends 5 years at job j and 4 years at job j-1, the 
dependent variables is only calculated for years 1-4 of tenure.    
  97 
on-the-job tenure is a significant determinant of performance, particularly as workers 
move between job levels. 
It is important to note that the longitudinal analysis itself is potentially biased 
because it relies exclusively on promoted workers.  As Gibbons and Katz (1992) and 
Gibbons, et al. (2006) point out in their work on inter-sector wage differentials, first-
difference estimators are biased if the movement of workers between sectors is 
endogenous to the variable of interest.  Formally this could be captured in equation (2) 
if the worker effect is not fixed across job level, but rather interacts with job level.  In 
such a world the estimates of Lj would be biased upward as they do not account for the 
interaction with ability.  In my data, given that the performance measures are relative 
to job level, I believe the effect of such a dynamic is mitigated, but I can not rule out 
the possibility that the results are driven by such an endogenous sorting dynamic.   
  Finally, before moving onto the results, I discuss an important data point.  In 
all of the analyses below I collapse the top 4 levels of the hierarchy (levels 5 and 
higher) into one category.  I do this for two reasons.  First, as noted above the sample 
sizes are very thin at the highest levels.  As such, collapsing the cells gives the tests 
more strength.  Second, if you remember from Figure 2.1 in subsection A, levels 5 and 
higher of the hierarchy have a distinctly different organizational structure than levels 
1-4 (again, see Figure 2.1); there are much fewer workers and the chain of command is 
more direct.  As such, the basic premise of the theory that supervision is easier at the 
top seems particularly plausible at levels 5 and higher.  Thus collapsing them into one 
category, and interpreting that category as “top management” makes sense from a 
theoretical perspective.  Note that I ran all of the analyses without collapsing the job 
levels and the qualitative results are the same.     
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C) Cross Sectional Analysis: Controlling for Observable Skills 
The theoretical section predicts that the size of the bonus and worker 
performance should increase and firings should decrease at higher levels of the firm.  
Further high performance should predict bonus receipt.  In this section I explore the 
empirical support of these predictions in the cross-section.  As noted above, I control 
for sorting on ability across job level by controlling for on-the-job tenure, education 
and general experience.   
For each test, I report estimates from two specifications of equation (1) above.  
The first specification includes a full set of level dummies (where levels 5 and higher 
are collapsed into a single “level” as described above).  The second specification 
includes only a dummy for levels 5 and higher.  From a technical point of view, the 
second specification tests for a different pattern of statistical significance than the 
specification with the full set of job level dummies.  In the full specification, the 
coefficients taken together inform us of the general trend in bonuses and performances 
at higher levels, but do not formally test if the highest levels are different than the 
lowest levels (the tests are only relative to job level 1, the excluded level).  The second 
regression, with the dummy for levels 5 and higher, achieves exactly this by 
comparing the average bonus at levels 5 and up to that of levels 1-4.  Finally, note that 
all tests include the controls described above although I do not present the coefficients 
in the tables for ease of exposition.  At the end of the section, however, I briefly 
discuss their effects and how they relate to previous work that investigated similar 
relationships.   
Before moving onto the regression analysis, I first present the averages of 
bonus, performance, and firing by job level with no controls.  As you can see from 
Table 2.2 the average size of bonuses and the average worker performance increase 
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Table 2.2: Average Bonuses, Performance Ratings, and Firings  
Across Job Level, No Controls 
 
Var  L 1  L 2  L 3  L 4  L 5  L 6  L 7  L 8 
                 
Raw Bonus  3,065  3,943  4,960  12,049  37,352  67,262  141,190  210,692 
% Percent  8.17  9.236  9.47  14.98  28.90  35.77  39.14  38.00 
Bonus Freq   0.112  0.164  0.281  0.401  0.364  0.247  0.467  0.5 
Obs  3,427  4,655  5,896  5,906  542  215  30  8 
                 
Perf Rating  2.31  2.19  1.93  1.66  1.62  1.58  1  . 
Rating = 1   0.241  0.186  0.275  0.443  0.46  0.609  1  . 
Fired  .0579  .0548  .0422  .0267  .0078  .0451  0   
Obs  5,876  7,102  7,876  7,195  515  133  2  0 
 
while the frequency of firings decrease at higher levels of the firm.  It is this pattern 
that is the subject of the theory.  It is interesting to note that the frequency of bonus 
receipt is larger at higher levels along with the size of bonuses.  In the context of the 
theory above, the higher frequency of bonus at higher levels implies positive sorting 
on bi.  In the regression analysis that follows I attempt to control for such sorting to 
formally test whether the patterns on bonus, performance and firing are significant. 
I start with the tests of Implications 1 and 2.  Table 2.3 explores two basic 
questions: How does performance vary across job level?  And does performance 
predict receipt of bonus?  The second and third columns address the first question.  
Sub-column (1) of the “Performance Rating” column shows that the average 
performance rating is incrementally lower (i.e. performance is better) as we move up 
the hierarchy.  Sub-column (2) shows that the average performance rating at the 
highest levels of the hierarchy is significantly lower than at the middle levels.  That is, 
performance is significantly higher at the higher job levels.  The third column presents 
a second way to look at performance.  Rather than treating the performance rating 
measure as “continuous” (as the first two specifications implicitly do), it estimates a  
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linear probability model for the highest performance rating (rating=1).  From sub-
column (1) we see that the frequency of the highest rating increases at higher job 
levels.  Sub-column (2) shows that the frequency of the highest rating is  
 
Table 2.3: Level Effects on Performance and the Effect of Performance  
on Bonus Received, Controlling for Observable Skills and Tenure
52 
 
DepVar  Perf Rating  Perf Rating = 1  DepVar  Received Bonus 
  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)    (1)  (2) 
Level 2  -.058 *** 
(.019)   
-.030 ** 
(.012)   
Perf  -.12 *** 
(.006)   
Level 3  -.345 *** 
(.019)   
.102 *** 
(.012)   
Perf = 1 
 
.254 *** 
(.012) 
Level 4  -.707 *** 
(.020)   
.310 *** 
(.013)   
Perf = 2 
 
.131 *** 
(.001) 
Level 5 +  -.766 *** 
(.045) 
-.320 *** 
(.044) 
.379 *** 
(.029) 
.207 *** 
(.028)       
Obs  12,621  12,621  12,621  12,621  Obs  12,621  12,621 
 
significantly higher at the elite levels of management compared to the lower levels of 
management.  Taken together, all four of the specifications present strong evidence 
that workers at higher levels of the firm have better performance.  In the context of the 
theory, this behavior is driven by the fact that performance is easier to measure at the 
top levels, and thus more easily rewarded. 
In the right-hand panel of Table 2.3, the “Received Bonus” column explores 
implication 2: does high performance predict receipt of bonus?  Sub-column (1) treats 
performance rating in a “continuous” fashion and confirms that workers with higher 
performance (lower performance ratings) are more likely to receive a bonus.  Sub 
column (2) treats performance rating in a discrete fashion and shows that workers with 
a rating =1 or a rating = 2 (relatively high performance) are more likely than workers 
                                                 
52 Note that because of small sample sizes and missing values in the performance rating, I do not have 
observations in levels 7 and 8.    
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with a rating of 3, 4 or 5 (relatively low performance) to receive a bonus.  The effect 
of a rating=1 is particularly strong.  These results show a strong relationship between 
performance and receipt of bonus, behavior consistent with the theoretical idea that 
bonuses are incentive devices. 
I now move onto the results on bonuses presented in Table 2.4.  The column 
entitled “Bonus” presents results from the regressions in which the raw size of bonus 
is the dependent variable.  Sub-column (1) shows that the raw size of the bonus, 
controlling for observable skills, increases monotonically at higher levels of the firm.  
At the top levels bonuses are over $45,000 more than at level 1.  The coefficient on 
“Levels 5 +” in sub-column (2) tells us that not only does the bonus increase 
incrementally at each level, but it is significantly larger on average at elite levels of 
management compared to middle levels.  Taken together, these coefficients make it 
clear that bonuses at higher levels are significantly larger than lower levels.   
 
Table 2.4: Level Effects on Bonus, Percent Bonus, and Receipt of Bonus,  
Controlling for Observable Skill and Tenure 
 
DepVar  Bonus  Percent Bonus  Receipt of Bonus 
  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Level 2  799 
(824)   
1.31 ** 
(.65)   
.071 *** 
(.0010)   
Level 3  1,606 ** 
(758)   
1.46 *** 
(.60)   
.204 *** 
(.0097)   
Level 4  8,150 *** 
(775)   
6.81 *** 
(.61)   
.348 *** 
(.0103)   
Level 5 +  45,716 *** 
(1,119) 
40,010 *** 
(879) 
23.72 *** 
(.88) 
18.87 *** 
(.69) 
.308 *** 
(.0185) 
.081 *** 
(.0173) 
Obs  5,052  5,052  5,052  5,052  20,699  20,699 
   
The “Percent Bonus” column in Table 2.4 conducts the same analysis with the 
size of a bonus as a percent of total compensation (bonus plus salary) as the dependent 
variable.  This analysis is a stronger test than the raw bonus analysis because percent  
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bonus controls for the strong upward trend in wages across levels present at the firm.  
The results in sub-column (1) show that the percentage of bonus relative to total 
compensation increases strongly as we move up levels, with bonuses at the highest 4 
levels over 23 percentage points higher than in level 1.  The results in sub-column (2) 
confirm that, like raw bonus, the percentage of bonus relative to total compensation is 
higher at elite levels of management than the middle levels.  Again this test confirms 
that the upward pattern from sub-column (1) is significant. 
The last column of Table 2.4 explores how the likelihood of bonus varies 
across level, while controlling for observable skills.  As noted above, in the context of 
the theoretical model the frequency of bonus at a given level can be interpreted as a 
proxy for ability at that level.   As such, more frequent bonuses at higher levels would 
suggest that more motivated workers are sorting to higher levels over time.  Moving 
down sub-columns (1) and (2) this is exactly what occurs in the data.  The frequency 
of receiving a bonus gets higher at higher levels.   Thus, even after controlling for 
observable skills, there is strong evidence that sorting on ability is still prevalent.  In 
the next section, I attempt to control for this using a first-difference analysis which 
controls for fixed, unobserved by the econometrician, worker skill.  
The final cross-section regressions are presented in Table 2.5, which explores 
the frequency of firing across level.  As noted in Section 2.3, the model suggests that 
firing should be more prevalent when output is harder to observe because it serves as 
an incentive mechanism in such circumstances.   As such, because output is harder to 
observe at lower levels, firings should be more prevalent.   Table 2.5 presents results 
of a linear probability model that estimates the effect of job level on two measures of 
“fired”.  The first measure was discussed above in sub-section A).  It defines a “fire” 
as an exit after a period of poor performance relative to the overall distribution.  One 
potential problem with this measure is that, because bad performance is rarer at higher  
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levels of the firm, it builds in a bias against firing at higher levels.  To protect against 
this bias I also use a second measure of “fired.”  This measure defines a “fire” as an 
exit after a period of poor performance relative to the performance distribution of the 
worker’s most recent job level.
53   As you can in Table 2.5, the frequency of firing 
decreases significantly at higher levels, with workers at the top levels of management 
being almost 10 percentage points less likely to be fired for both measures.  Such 
evidence is consistent with the suggestive prediction of the model.  
 
Table 2.5: Level Effects on Fired, Controlling for Observable Skills and Tenure 
54 
 
Dep Var  Fired (Measure 1)  Fired (Measure 2) 
  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Level 2  -.0177 *** 
(.0069)   
-.0177 *** 
(.0070)   
Level 3  -.0545 *** 
(.0067)   
-.0544 *** 
(.0067)   
Level 4  -.0862 *** 
(.0071)   
-.0860 *** 
(.0071)   
Level 5 +  -.0998 *** 
(.0158) 
-.0430 *** 
(.015) 
-.0882 *** 
(.0159) 
-.0314 *** 
(.015) 
Obs  12,469  12,469  12,469  12,469 
   
Finally, as noted above, for the sake of presentation I did not report the 
coefficients of the covariates in the Tables 2.2 – Tables 2.5.  I offer a brief summary of 
the results here.  The coefficients for on-the-job tenure are perfectly consistent with 
the previous literature on the Peter Principle; worker’s performance, receipt of bonus, 
and size of bonus all decrease the longer they stay in a job.  The coefficients on 
education and experience, however, were a bit anomalous.  More educated and more 
experienced workers consistently had worse performance, bonus, and receipt of bonus 
                                                 
53 In both cases “poor” performance is performance below the median level of the relevant distribution. 
54 Note that Levels 7 and 8 do not have estimates because all observations in those levels have missing 
performance information, and the “Fired” variable relies on performance information to be constructed.  
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outcomes controlling for tenure at the job.  These results, though, may be consistent 
with the signaling model of Devaro and Waldman (2006) in which the critical level of 
ability required for promotion decreases with education.  In such a world it would not 
be surprising for performance and bonus outcomes to also get worse with education. 
In summary, in this section I have conducted a cross-sectional analysis that 
explores the implications of the theory presented in Section 2.3.  I find evidence 
consistent with the theory.  In particular, the compensation structure at higher levels is 
significantly different than at lower levels of the hierarchy.  Workers at higher levels 
of the firm are more likely to receive higher performance ratings, receive larger 
bonuses and are less likely to get fired.   Further there is evidence that the bonuses 
indeed play the role of an incentive mechanism.  Workers who perform “better” are 
significantly more likely to receive bonuses.  The analysis, however, can not rule out 
the possibility that the results are driven by positive sorting on an unobserved 
dimension, a possibility supported by the fact that bonus receipt is more likely at 
higher levels even after controlling for observable skills.  In the next section I conduct 
a first-difference analysis to address this concern. 
 
D) Longitudinal Analysis: Controlling for Unobserved Skills 
  In this section I report the results of a longitudinal analysis that explores how 
bonuses and performance vary across levels within a single worker’s career.  As noted 
earlier the strength of the analysis is that, along with controlling for observable skills, 
it also controls for fixed unobserved worker skills.  As such, it allows me to further 
distinguish my model form the sorting explanation discussed above.    
Following the literature on inter-sector wage differentials, I conduct a first-
difference analysis to estimate the effect of level on bonus and performance while 
controlling for fixed, unobserved skills (Krueger and Summers (1988), Katz and  
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Gibbons (1992)).  Unlike the cross-sectional analysis, I do not include firings in the 
analysis because there is no usable variation within a person across level in the 
frequency of firing (i.e. no one is fired twice from different levels). Formally, I 
estimate equation (2) from sub-section B) for the following 5 measures: absolute size 
of bonus, percentage of bonus, frequency of bonus, performance, and frequency of 
high performance (performance rating =1).   
Table 2.6 presents the results for bonus and performance.  As you can see, the 
results on size of bonus and performance are consistent with the theory.  As workers 
move up the promotion ladder their relative performance rating improves, they are 
more likely to achieve the highest performance rating, and they receive larger bonuses, 
controlling for number of years spent in the job level.  In other words, the same 
identical worker in, say, his 3
rd year at level 3 performs better and receives a larger 
bonus than he did in his 3
rd year at level 2.  This is quite strong evidence that workers 
perform better at higher levels of the firm as it controls for all fixed worker skills and 
tenure on the job.  The one result in Table 2.6 inconsistent with the theory is that the 
frequency of bonus actually decreases at higher levels.  This result is tension with the 
result from the cross-section analysis that bonuses are more frequent at higher levels. 
 
Table 2.6: Regression Results by Level for First-Difference Analysis,  
Controlling for Tenure at Job Level and Years to Promotion  
 
Dep Var  Bonus 
Percent 
Bonus 
Received 
Bonus 
Perform 
Rating 
Perform 
Rating=1 
           
Level 3 – Level 2  265 
(528) 
.051 
(.590) 
.075 ** 
(.038) 
-.261 *** 
(.062) 
.190 *** 
(.047) 
Level 4 – Level 3  1,602 *** 
(566) 
.693  
(.633) 
-.144 *** 
(.039) 
-.270 *** 
(.065) 
.195 *** 
(.049) 
Level 5 + – Level 4  9,122 *** 
(1,378) 
3.881 *** 
(1.539) 
-.558 *** 
(.076) 
-.674 * 
(.378) 
.367 * 
(.287) 
Obs  1,300  1,300  2,237  1,076  1,076 
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One potential explanation of the result that is consistent with an enriched 
version of the model is that bonuses are rewarded for outstanding performance relative 
to workers in the same level.  The theoretical model presented in Section 2.3 assumes 
bonuses are given for absolute performance, but one could imagine a simple extension 
in which bonuses are given for performance relative to the job level.  That is, as 
workers get promoted they perform better in an absolute sense, but perform “worse” 
relative to the higher performance standards at the higher job level (Gibbons and 
Waldman (1999) discuss a related model).  In such a world, when a given worker 
receive a bonus at a higher level it will still be larger but it is possible he will be less 
likely to receive that bonus.      
  In summary, the longitudinal evidence is broadly consistent with the 
predictions of the theory and the evidence found in the cross-sectional analysis: it 
suggests that workers perform better and receive larger bonuses at higher levels.  
Taken together, the two analyses offer strong evidence that better performance and 
larger bonuses at higher levels are driven by something other than positive sorting on 
ability.  The potential explanation offered here is that monitoring of output is more 
difficult at lower job levels, making piece-rate/bonus payment schemes more difficult 
to implement.  As such performance suffers, bonuses are smaller, and firings are 
needed to ensure minimal amount of output.    
 
2.5. Conclusion 
  In this paper I consider a new way to explore a classic question.  Insights from 
the literature on hierarchies as monitoring devices suggest that monitoring should be 
more difficult at lower levels of the hierarchy.  Coupled with the understanding from 
the pay-for-performance literature that piece-rates should be less effective when 
monitoring is costly, this insight tells us that compensation schemes should rely less  
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on bonuses and more on salaries at low level jobs.  As a direct consequence, 
performance should be better at higher levels and firing should be less frequent.  On 
the other hand, classic theories of promotion that imply positive sorting on ability 
across job level (human capital and learning, and tournament models) could also 
generate such empirical patterns.  To distinguish my model from such competing 
theories I conduct two empirical analyses using personnel records of management of a 
firm in the US financial services industry.  First, in a cross-sectional analysis I control 
for observable workers skills, worker experience, and tenure at the job level.  I find the 
data is consistent with the implications of the model.  Second, in a longitudinal 
analysis I control for fixed, unobserved skills as well as observable skills and on-the-
job tenure, and find that most of the implications of the model continue to hold.  I 
conclude that there is significant variation in bonus, performance and firing across job 
level that is independent of sorting on ability, and argue that variation in the cost of 
monitoring is likely the source of this variation.   
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Table A2.1: Distributions of Key Variables after Sample Restrictions  
 
Level  L 1  L 2  L 3  L 4  L 5  L 6  L 7  L 8 
                          
Full  20.02  24.82  27.08  24.76  2.40  0.77  0.12  0.04 
Bonus Sample  16.57  22.51  28.51  28.56  2.62  1.04  0.15  0.04 
Bonus, Perf 
Sample  15.25  23.43  29.80  29.45  1.48  0.60  .  . 
                 
Performance  Rate=1  Rate=2  Rate=3  Rate=4  Rate=5       
Full  29.32  48.11  18.15  2.21  2.21      . 
Bonus Sample  28.15  49.16  21.29  1.29  0.01      . 
Bonus, Perf 
Sample  28.15  49.16  21.29  1.39  0.01      . 
                 
Education  HS  Bach   Masters   PHD         
Full  35.28  39.67  21.72  3.34        . 
Bonus Sample  34.74  39.11  22.42  3.73        . 
Bonus, Perf 
Sample  36.52  39.54  20.56  3.38        . 
                 
Age  Mean  Std Dev  Min  Max         
Full  40.65  9.65  22  71        . 
Bonus Sample  40.64  9.45  22  71        . 
Bonus, Perf 
Sample  40.92  9.48  22  69        . 
                 
Sample Size  Obs               
Full  46,930               
Bonus Sample  20,679               
Bonus, Perf 
Sample  13,421               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  109 
REFERENCES 
 
Abowd, J., F. Kramarz and B. Margolis, “High Wage Workers and High Wage  
Firms,” Econometrica, 67, 1999, 251-333. 
 
Baker, G., “Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement,” Journal of Political  
Economy, 100, 1992, 598-614. 
 
Baker, G., M. Gibbs, and B. Holmstrom, “The Internal Economics of the Firm:  
Evidence from the Personnel Data,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 
1994a, 881-919. 
 
Baker, G., M. Gibbs and B. Holmstrom, “The Wage Policy of the Firm,” Quarterly  
Journal of Economics, 109, 1994b, 921-955. 
 
Baker, G., M. Jensen and K. Murphy, “Compensation and Incentives: Practice and  
Theory,” Journal of Finance, 43, 1988, 593-616. 
 
Carmichael, L., “Efficiency Wage Model of Unemployment – One View,” Economic  
Inquiry, 28, 1990, 269-295. 
 
Devaro, J. and M. Waldman, “The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and  
Empirical Evidence,” Cornell University Working Paper, 2006. 
 
Fama, E., “Time, Salary and Incentive Payoffs in Labor Contracts,” Journal of Labor  
Economics, 9, 1991, 25-44 
 
Gibbons, R. and L. Katz, “Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage  
Differences,” Review of Economic Studies, 59, 1992, 515-535. 
 
Gibbons, R. and K. Murphy, “Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career  
Concerns: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Political Economy, 100, 1992, 
468-505. 
 
Gibbons, R. and M. Waldman, “A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside  
Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 1999, 1321-1358 
  
  110 
Gibbons, R. and M. Waldman, “Enriching A Theory of Wage and Promotion  
Dynamics Inside Firms,” Journal of Labor Economics, 24, 2006, 59-107. 
 
Gibbs, M., “Incentive Compensation in a Corporate Hierarchy,” Journal of  
Accounting and Economics, 19, 1995, 247-277. 
 
Gibbs, M. and W. Hendricks, “Do Formal Salary Systems Really Matter?,” Industrial  
and Labor Relations Review, 58, 2004, 71-94. 
 
Hamilton, B., J. Nickerson, and H. Owan, “Team Incentives and Worker  
Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity  
and Participation,” Journal of Political Economy, 111, 2003, 465-498. 
 
Holmstrom, B., “Moral Hazard and Observability,” The Bell Journal of Economics,  
10, 1979, 74-91. 
 
Holmstrom, B. “Moral Hazard in Teams,” The Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 1982,  
324-340. 
 
Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom, “Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive  
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design,” Journal of Law, Economics,  
and Organization, 7, 1991, 24-52. 
 
Krueger, A. and L. Summers, “Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage  
Structure,” Econometrica, 56, 1988, 259-294. 
 
Lambert, R., D. Larcker and K. Weigelt, “The Structure of Organizational  
Incentives,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 1993, 438-461. 
 
Lazear, E., “Salaries and Piece Rates,” Journal of Business, 59, 1986, 405-432. 
 
Lazear, E., “Performance Pay and Productivity,” The American Economic Review, 90,  
2000, 1346-1362   
 
Lazear, E., “The Job as A Concept,” in Performance Measurement, Evaluation and  
  Incentives, W. J. Bruns, ed., Harvard Bus. School Press, Boston, 1992. 
  
  111 
Lazear, E. and S. Rosen, “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,”  
Journal of Political Economy, 89, 1981, 841-864. 
 
Lin, M., “Opening the Black Box: The Internal Labor Markets of Firm X,” Industrial  
  Relations, 44, 2005, 659-707.  
   
Medoff, J. and K. Abraham, “Experience, Performance, and Earnings,” Quarterly  
Journal of Economics, 94, 1980, 703-736. 
 
Murphy, K., “Executive Compensation,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol 3b,  
eds. O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, Elsevier Science, North Holland,1999, 2485-
2563. 
 
Pendleton, A., “Incentives, Monitoring, and Employee Stock Ownership Plans: New  
Evidence and Interpretations,” Industrial Relations, 45, 2006, 753-777. 
 
Peter, L.J. and R. Hull, The Peter Principle: Why Things Always Go Wrong. New  
York: Morrow, 1969. 
 
Qian, Y., “Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy,” Review of  
Economic Studies, 61, 1994, 527-544. 
 
Rosen, S., “Authority, Control and the Distribution of Earnings,” Bell Journal of  
Economics, 13, 1982, 311-323. 
 
Shapiro, C. and J. Stiglitz, “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline  
Device,” American Economic Review, 74, 1984, 433-444. 
 
Smeets, V. and F. Warzynski, “Testing Models of Hierarchy: Span of Control,  
Compensation and Career Dynamics,” Working Paper, 2006. 
 
Waldman, M., “Worker Allocation, Hierarchies, and the Wage Distribution,” Review  
of Economic Studies, 51, 1984b, 95-109 
 
 
 
  
  112 
CHAPTER 3:  
RISK OF DISCLOSURE IN SYNTEHTIC DATA:  
RE-IDENTIFICATION EXPERIMENTS USING THE SIPP-PUF 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Any agency that releases public data must protect the privacy of the 
individuals in the data from users with malicious intent (“intruders”, hereafter).  
Privacy and confidentiality can be compromised when intruders link a public database 
with sensitive information to an external file which identifies the individuals in the 
public file; an activity known in the literature as record linking or re-identification.  To 
protect their data, agencies typically use techniques known as “masking”, which 
distort the underlying data in a manner sufficient to ensure re-identification is unlikely 
but not sufficient enough to destroy the analytic validity of the underlying data (Fuller 
(1993)).  A problem with such masking techniques is that they demand that users of 
the data implement non-standard analytical techniques that are difficult to use in 
standard statistical software.  Further, there is a fundamental tradeoff: the more data 
released the higher the risk of disclosing confidential data, however the higher the 
utility of the data for the public (Duncan, Stokes, Keller-Mcnulty (2003)).  
The focus of this paper is the ability of a new masking technique, synthetic 
data, to eliminate the threat of re-identification, or record-linking.  Synthetic data was 
originally proposed by Rubin (1993).  His idea was that by using Bayesian methods to 
estimate the posterior predictive distribution of a data set, it is theoretically possible to 
create a synthetic data set that has the same properties as the original data set.  The 
theory is a broader application of the technique of multiple imputation used in the 
completion of missing data (Rubin (1987)).  The promise of the theory is threefold: it 
can maintain the analytical utility of the data, it does not demand special knowledge of 
non-standard statistical techniques from users, and it can mitigate confidentiality  
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concerns because it is completely synthetic.  At this point, however, these benefits of 
synthetic data are still un-quantified.   
As such, the goal of this paper is to quantify the risk of disclosure in synthetic 
data by conducting re-identification experiments on a uniquely rich synthetic data set: 
SIPP/SSA/IRD Public Use Beta File Version 4.1 (hereafter known as the SIPP 
synthetic beta file).  In a long-standing research project joint with SSA and IRD, a 
group of economists at the US Census Bureau have been working on synthesizing an 
enriched version of the SIPP that contains both administrative earnings and benefit 
records provided by SSA and the IRS.
55  In terms of synthetic data projects, this is by 
far the most ambitious project attempted in the literature.  The SIPP synthetic beta file 
file attempts to maintain the univariate and bivariate relationships of hundreds of 
variables, both continuous and categorical, with unique and complex interdependent 
relationships.  If synthetic data are to become a widespread, feasible method for 
protecting large-scale, public, micro-data, learning as much as we can about the SIPP 
project is important.   
In addition to exploring the risk of disclosure in the SIPP synthetic beta file, a 
secondary goal of the paper is to compare the effectiveness of different re-
identification techniques, in particular distance-based and probabilistic re-
identification.  Although there has not been sufficient research exploring which re-
identification measures are most effective, the comparison between distance-based re-
identification and probabilistic based record-linkage has been considered.
56  The 
literature has found that the two methods achieve similar results, with one anomalous 
experiment suggesting that mahalanobis-based distance linking is superior to 
probabilistic linking.  In this paper I contribute to this work by comparing the results 
                                                 
55 Abowd, Stinson, and Benedetto (2006) 
56 Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001, 2002, 2003), Domingo-Ferrer, Abowd and Torra (2006), and 
Domingo-Ferrer, Torra, Sanz and Sebe (2006).  
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of mahalanobis distance and probabilistic linking.  Unlike previous work, I find that 
probabilistic methods achieve better results.  That is, they are more effective from the 
intruder’s point of view.  One difference between my study and previous experiments 
is the number of matching variables.  Most experiments typically use a handful of 
variables (less than 20), while my experiments use 171 matching variables.  In a set of 
experiments where I vary the number of matching variables, I find evidence that 
probabilistic-linking benefits more from extra matching variables than distance 
linking.  When less than 20 matching variables were used some distance metrics 
outperform the probabilistic method, but as I add variables the probabilistic method 
becomes superior.
57   
Along with having direct implications for statistical agencies like the Census 
Bureau, the paper fits into a growing literature on record linking and confidentiality.  
As Feinberg (2006) discusses, with the expansion of the internet the threat against 
privacy and confidentiality is as important as ever.  A sophisticated intruder can now 
use linking methods to gather huge amounts of private data about an individual.  One 
particularly strong example of this possibility was noted by Feinberg: “41 graduate 
students in a computer security course at Johns Hopkins University…  working with a 
strict requirement to use only legal, public sources of information… set out to vacuum 
up not just tidbits on citizens of Baltimore, but whole databases: death records, 
property tax information, campaign donations, occupational license registries. They 
then cleaned and linked the databases they had collected… .  Each group could spend 
no more than $50…. Several groups managed to gather well over a million records, 
with hundreds of thousands of individuals represented in each database.”
58  As such, 
continued understanding of re-identification is increasingly important.   
                                                 
57 Tendrick (1992) discusses how the probability of re-identification varies with the number of matching 
attributes, but within the context of different re-identification methods than explored here.  He shows 
that as the number of matching variables gets large, re-identification should become exact. 
58 From “Personal Data for the Taking,” by Tom Zeller Jr., The New York Times, May 18, 2005.  
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The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 3.2 outlines the disclosure framework, 
describing the “intruder’s” behavior.  Section 3.3 outlines the two re-identification 
methods used in the paper.  Section 3.4 discusses the data I use in my experiments, 
how I implement the experiments, and the results.  Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2. Disclosure Model 
  In this section I formalize the disclosure framework.  I follow the framework 
proposed by Domingo-Ferrer, Abowd and Torra (2006) and the notation originally 
used in Felligi and Sunter (1969).  Consider a publicly released micro data file F.  The 
file has a set of variables, or attributes, which can be separated into the following four 
(non-mutually exclusive) groups: identifiers, quasi-identifiers, confidential attributes, 
and non-confidential attributes.  Identifiers are variables that uniquely identify each 
record.   This could be a SSN (social security number), for example.  Quasi-identifiers 
are variables that can jointly identify some of the records uniquely.  Age, sex and 
location could act in such a way if, for example, there is only one 99 year old male 
who lives in Ithaca, NY on the file.  Confidential attributes are things like income, 
health, political affiliation, etc….  Finally, non-confidential attributes are things like 
sex and age.  Note, that typically quasi-identifiers are non-confidential attributes. 
  In what follows, I assume that there exists an intruder who has access to an 
external file denoted, A, which is a sample of N records from some population P.  
Further, I assume he has access to a publicly released sample B, which consists of the 
same N records from P but has been “masked” by the agency which released it and 
contains some extra confidential variables not on A.  It is these extra attributes that the 
intruder is interested in linking to the sample members in his A file.   
I assume that A has a unique ID variable and a set of unmasked attributes 
(possibly non-confidential or confidential).  I assume the agency has removed the ID  
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variable from B, but that it has a set of shared attributes that overlap with A, some of 
which have been masked.  We will call the shared attributes Y if they are unmasked 
and Y’ if masked, and assume there are L unmasked attributes and K masked 
attributes.  As noted above, the risk of disclosure comes from the fact that B also 
contains some confidential attributes not on A.  We call these attributes X.  Thus, the 
goal of the intruder is to correctly match the common attributes from A to B so that he 
can learn X for the records in his file.
59   
In what follows I consider two ways in which he can do this: probabilistic re-
identification on the shared attributes, and distance re-identification on the shared 
attributes.  An important point to note in what follows is that the intruder knows there 
is exactly one correct match on B for every record on A.  Thus, the intruder’s goal is 
to select the single record he thinks is most likely to match.  
 
3.3. Re-Identification Framework 
In this section I consider two matching techniques: probabilistic and distance 
matching. Before presenting the formal definitions of the two re-identification 
techniques, I discuss the measure of disclosure risk I use in my experiments.  I argue 
that the probability that the closest or best-scoring record is a true match is the most 
relevant measure of disclosure risk for the disclosure framework discussed in Section 
3.2.  In what follows, I will continue with the notation introduced in Section 3.2.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 Pass (1988), Yancey, Winkler and Creecy (2002), and Reiter (2005) all discuss similar frameworks in 
which risk of disclosure is estimated by modeling the behavior of an intruder who wants to link records 
from an external file to the file to be protected.  
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A) Measure of Disclosure Risk 
The probabilistic record linking framework is outlined in the seminal work by 
Felligi and Sunter (1969).
60  In short, probabilistic matching starts by defining a 
comparison vector for each set of potentially matched records.  The comparison vector 
captures the agreement pattern across all common attributes Y for two given records in 
the A and B file.  The inference framework for declaring a match then treats the 
comparison vector as a random variable and relies on the conditional probability of 
two records being (or not being) a match given their comparison vector.  If this 
conditional probability is high enough, then the record is declared a match, if it is low 
enough then the record is declared a non-match, and if it is in the “middle” then the 
decision is left to human judgment (clerical decision).
61  In practice, the comparison 
vector is mapped into a “matchscore.”  Each attribute is given an agreement and 
disagreement weight depending on how well it distinguishes matches from non-
matches.  Under the assumption of conditional independence, these weights are then 
summed across all attributes to get the matchscore.  The optimal decision rule is then 
expressed in terms of two thresholds for the matchscore.  If the matchscore is above 
the upper threshold a match is declared, if below a non-match is declared, if in the 
middle it is left in the clerical region.      
Distance matching has a slightly simpler framework.  First, the user defines a 
metric that measures distance on a vector space (Euclidean distance for example).  
Then for each record in the A file, the distance between it and all potential matches in 
the B file are computed, treating each record as a vector.  The closest record is then 
declared the match.   
                                                 
60 See Winkler (1995) and Winkler (2004) for a review of the record linkage literature and Jaro (1989) 
or Abowd and Vilhuber (2005) for applications. 
61 The key result from Felligi and Sunter is that the optimal decision rule is the one that “minimizes the 
probability of failing to make a positive disposition.”  That is, the optimal rule minimizes the clerical 
region.    
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As such, the decision rules for the two methods are quite different.  The 
distance matching yields a single “best” candidate for a match, while probabilistic 
matching yields a set of records that are highly likely to be matches and a set that are 
highly likely to be non-matches.  Given the disclosure framework described above, in 
which the intruder knows that there is exactly one match for every record, the 
threshold decision rule used in probabilistic matching is not very natural.  If the 
intruder must ultimately choose one record as a match, he will want to choose the 
single record with the highest probability of being a match, rather than a set of records 
that cross a probabilistic threshold of being a match.   
In what follows, then, I treat the matchscore generated by the probabilistic 
method as analogous to a distance metric.  That is, instead of implementing a 
threshold decision rule as advised by Felligi and Sunter’s work, I simply declare the 
record with the highest matchscore a match.  Along with being more consistent with 
the intruder’s objective, this decision rule also makes the comparison between the 
probabilistic matching and the distance matching straightforward.  For both methods I 
compute the same measure of risk of disclosure:  the probability that the “closest” 
record (or the record with the highest matchscore) is the true match.   
 
B) Re-Identification Methods 
I now formalize the measures used in the re-identification experiments.  Before 
formally defining Mahalanobis distance, I first define some notation.  Let α be the K x 
1 vector of the common attributes Y’ that have been masked in the B file from an 
observation in the A file and let β be the analogue for the B file.  These K attributes 
will be known as the matching attributes hereafter.  Given this notation, we define a 
pair of potentially matched records as (α, β) in the comparison space Γ.  The 
Mahalanobis distance for the pair of records (α, β) is defined as follows:  
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I consider 3 specific cases of the general Mahalanobis distance.  In the first case we 
assume that the intruder can properly calculate the Cov(A, B).  We denote this 
distance MAHA1.   In the second case we assume that the Cov(A, B) = 0.  This is 
equivalent to assuming that we do not know how to link the observations across the 
file.  We denote this distance MAHA2.  Lastly we transform all of the matching 
variables in the A and B files to N(0,1) variables.  Call the transformed file A’ and B’.  
We then calculate the Euclidean distance (Cov(A, B) = I) between A’ and B’.  We 
denote this metric NORM EUCL.   
An important point to note is that each of the methods standardizes the 
distance in some way to ensure that distances across different attributes are 
comparable.  The first two metrics use the inverse covariance matrix, and the last one 
transforms all attributes to the same scale of standard normal.  Given these 3 
definitions, the distance based re-identification proceeds simply by calculating the 
distance to every point in the A file for a given point in the B file, and declaring the 
closest a match. 
I now formally define the matchscore from the probabilistic framework.  The 
matchscore is a function of two things: the agreement pattern across the matching 
attributes of two records and the M and U probabilities for the matching attributes.   
First, I define the agreement rule for each matching attribute.  Then I define the M and 
U probabilities.   
Consider a pair of records (α, β).  The agreement vector for the K matching 
attributes of a pair of records (α, β), γ(α, β), is a K x 1 vector of 0’s and 1’s.  If α and 
β “agree” on attribute k then the agreement vector has a value of 1 in the k
th  
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dimension.  If α and β “disagree” on attribute k then the agreement vector has a value 
of 0 in the k
th dimension.  I define “agreement” as follows: 
 
Categorical Attribute: Consider a categorical attribute k for two records α and 
β.   Let αk be the value of attribute k for record α.  Let βk be the value of 
attribute k for record β.  If αk= βk then records α and β are said to “agree” on 
attribute k.  Otherwise they “disagree.”    
 
Continuous Variables:  Consider a continuous attribute k and two records α 
and β.   Let αk be the value of attribute k for record α.  Let βk be the value of 
attribute k for record β.  If (αk - βk) / αk ≤ p in (0,1) then records α and β are 
said to “agree” on attribute k.  Otherwise they “disagree.”    
 
For categorical attributes agreement requires that the values of the attributes in the two 
files agree exactly.  For continuous variables agreement demands that the values of the 
attributes in the two files are within p percent of each other (Jaro (1989)).    
I now turn to the M and U probabilities.  First, note that all possible matches in 
the A file and B file can be split into two groups: M and U.  If a pair of records (α, β) 
is a match then they are in the set M.  If they are not a match then they are in the set U.  
Because all pairs of records (α, β) are either a match or a non-match, sets M and U are 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive.   Given these definitions we define the M and U 
probabilities for attribute k as follows: 
 
Mk = P(γk(α, β) =1| (α, β) in M)   
Uk = P(γk(α, β) = 1| (α, β) in U) 
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In words, Mk is the probability that a pair of records (α, β) agree on attribute k, given 
that the pair is a match.  Uk is the probability that a pair of records (α, β) agree on 
attribute k, given that the pair is not a match. 
The matchscore, MS, is a function of the agreement vector and the agreement 
and disagreement weights (formally, ln[Mk/Uk] and [ln(1-Mk)/(1-Uk)]) which 
determine the distinguishing power of each attribute.  Formally we have: 
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In words, if the pair (α, β) agree on an attribute then the matchscore increases by the 
agreement weight.  If the pair (α, β) disagree on an attribute then the matchscore 
increases by the disagreement weight.   Because the agreement weight is typically 
positive (Mk > Uk) and the disagreement weight is typically negative, agreement on an 
attribute increases the matchscore while disagreement decreases the matchscore.  
Further, variables that have more distinguishing power contribute more to the 
matchscore.  In what follows, I will have to first compute Mk and Uk and the compute 
the matchscore for all possible pairs (α, β). 
 
3.4. Data, Implementation and Results 
  In this section I discuss the data, the implementation of the experiments in 
SAS, and the results of the experiments.  My experiments link 4 different synthetic 
data sets to the original, unperturbed data.  I briefly discuss the methods used to 
generate the synthetic data, before discussing the results.   
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A) Data 
In my re-identification experiments I link 4 synthetic implicates back to the 
original underlying data file from which the synthetic files were generated.  The 
original file is the “Gold Standard” SIPP file (Survey of Income and Program 
Participation).  The Gold Standard file consists of all individuals who responded to the 
1990-1993 and 1996 SIPP panels who would have been at least 18 years old as of 
January 1
st 2000.  The file includes standard SIPP demographic, economic, and public 
assistance information.  The SIPP information was then linked to 4 data sources 
provided by Social Security Administration (SSA): SSA’s summary earnings record 
(SER), SSA’s detailed earning record (DER), SSA’s master beneficiary record 
(MBR), and the Cenus Numident.
62  The SER and DER provide longitudinal data on 
wage and salary, the MBR provides a longitudinal history of the type and amount of 
SSA benefits, and the Numident provides administrative birth and death dates.  An 
individual was eligible to be included in the Gold Standard file if they met one major 
criterion.  The individual must have been at least 15 years old at the time of the second 
wave of their SIPP survey.  The Gold Standard file came into existence as part of a 
joint Census/SSA/IRS project aimed at improving the quality of the SIPP public use 
data file by linking administrative earnings and benefits information from SSA to 
SIPP variables.   
The four synthetic implicates that I link to the Gold Standard file are a subset 
of 16 synthetic implicates that were created as a potential public use file and are now 
studied as SIPP synthetic beta file.  The synthetic implicates attempt to replicate all 
univariate, bivariate and some multivariate relationships in the Gold Standard file, 
while masking all variables so that privacy is maintained.  As noted in the 
                                                 
62 It should be noted that although SSA provided the Census Bureau with the earning records, IRS is 
technically the custodian of the data.  
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introduction, synthetic data is an application of the multiple imputation framework 
originally proposed by Rubin, and is created by estimating the posterior predictive 
distribution (PPD) of the original data, and taking draws from that distribution.  The 
technique used to estimate the PPD of the SIPP and create the 16 synthetic implicates 
is known as sequential regression.  The method proceeds as follows:  First the data is 
broken into groups based on key demographic and economics variables referred to as 
by-variables.  Within each group, for each variable Yi that is masked, we estimate the 
PPD from a Bayesian linear regression model with Yi as the dependent variable and X 
and all other Yj, j≠i, as independent variables.  To introduce variation across the 
implicates, four different sets of by-variables were used, yielding 4 different 
“specifications” of the PPD.  The first two sets of by-variables consist predominantly 
of demographic variables, while the second two consist predominantly of economic 
variables.  For each of the specifications there were then 4 implicates generated for a 
total of 16 implicates.
63  Given that there is not that much variation across implicates 
within a specification and that the re-identification experiments are computationally 
expensive, in my experiments I link the Gold-Standard file to only 1 implicate from 
each specification, for a total of 4 implicates.   
Finally, it is important to note that the experiments are not purely academic: 
they capture a real world risk of disclosure.  Because the Gold Standard SIPP file is 
already in the public domain, once the SIPP synthetic beta file is released there exists 
the real possibility that an intruder could link it back to the Gold Standard and re-
identify its source records.  Further, because the SIPP synthetic beta file includes 
variables not previously available for the SIPP sample (the SSA/IRS administrative 
benefit and earnings data) there is a significant amount of new information exposed to 
intruders.  Confirming that the risk of disclosure is small is thus very important.     
                                                 
63  See Abowd, Stinson, and Benedetto (2006) for further discussion of the synthetic implicates.  
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B) Implementation 
Using the notation above, the Gold Standard file plays the role of the A file, 
while the implicates of the SIPP synthetic beta file play the role of the B files in the re-
identification tests.  I use 173 common attributes across the two files (See Appendix 3 
for list) in my experiments.  Two variables are unmasked and thus identical across the 
two files: marital status and sex.  I use these unmasked variables as blocking variables 
in my analysis.
64  The other 171 variables are used as matching variables.  Relative to 
previous re-identification experiments in the literature, this is a large number.    
The calculation of the re-identification rates proceeds in two main steps.  First, 
I split the data into smaller, manageable blocks, and then calculate distances and 
probabilistic matchscore within the blocks.  This is a standard procedure used in the 
literature to ease the computation burden (Jaro (1989), Abowd and Vilhuber (2005)) of 
the problem.  The blocking is done as follows.  I assume that the intruder will only 
consider possible matches amongst record pairs that share identical values on the 
blocking variables, marital status and sex, as he knows these variables are un-masked.  
This generates 8 blocking groups.  Only records within the same blocking are 
compared.   
The 8 blocking groups, however, are still relatively large (some have more 
than 70,000 observations).  As such, to further ease the computation burden, I split the 
blocking groups into even smaller groups based on actual birth date.  Because I use 
actual rather than synthetic birth date, this process forces the true match to be in the 
new, smaller blocking group.  Formally, define the 8 blocking groups generated by 
interacting marital status and sex as G1-G8, and let them have NG1, …, NG8 
observations respectively.   To split them into smaller groups, I first sort them by 
                                                 
64 Two other variables on the synthetic implicates were also left un-masked: “type of benefit at time of 
initial benefit receipt” and “type of benefit in April 2000.”  They were not used in the experiments 
because they are not on the Gold Standard file, and thus not available to a potential intruder.  
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actual birth date (one of the strongest matching variables).  If a group Gi has more 
than NC observations it is then split into J = ceiling(NGi/ NC) smaller groups of size 
NC, starting with the first observation and continuing until all NG observations have 
been assigned to a group, with the last group containing the remaining NGi – (J-1)NC 
observations.   
The calculation of the distance metrics and the probabilistic matchscore are 
then implemented in SAS within the blocking groups.  The calculation of the distance 
metrics is straightforward.  All of the elements in equation (1) have direct matrix 
representations in SAS.  Thus equation (1) can be computed directly using PROC IML 
in SAS.  In order to calculate the matchscore I first must estimate the Mk and Uk for 
each matching attribute k.  Because I know the true matches across the datasets, I can 
separate all possible matches (α, β) into the sets M and U which exhaust the space of 
possible matches.  Once I have done this, the Mk for a given attribute is estimated as 
the frequency of agreement for that attribute across all records (α, β) in the set M, 
while the Uk for a given attribute is estimated as the frequency of agreement for that 
attribute across all records (α, β) in the set U.  With Mk and Uk estimated for all K 
matching variables I calculate the matchscore for all possible matches (α, β) in a SAS 
data step.  After the calculations are done I then search for the closest record in the 
case of the distance re-identification and the highest matchscore in the case of the 
probabilistic re-identification.  In the next section I present the results.  For a more 
detailed discussion of how the distance and probabilistic re-identification was 
implemented in SAS, see the appendix. 
It is important to note that the estimates of the rates of re-identification 
generated by this method are upper bounds for the real rates that an intruder would 
achieve.  Because the intruder would not have access to actual birth date, he would not 
be able to create the smaller blocking groups described above (he would only be able  
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to use the blocking groups based on marital status and sex).  As such, by creating 
smaller blocking groups based on actual birth date I am eliminating many potential 
non-match records that the intruder would not be able to eliminate.  This process will 
necessarily inflate my re-identification rates relative to the intruder’s.  Again, the only 
reason such a method is implemented is to decrease the computation time.  If 
computing power was unconstrained, such a method would not be implemented.   
Finally, because the parameter of interest is in fact the true rates of re-
identification that an intruder could achieve, in the results that follow I am careful to 
translate the upper bounds generated by the smaller blocking groups into the true 
rates.   To do this, I run several different experiments varying NC to get a sense of how 
sensitive the upper bounds are to the size of the groups, which, in turn allows me to 
make inferences about the true re-identification rates.   
 
C) Results 
I now present the results of the re-identification experiments.  The parameter of 
interest, as noted above, is the probability that the closest or best scoring record is a 
true match, as it captures the risk that an intruder would successfully re-identify a 
record.  In the experiments, it is estimated by the percent of closest or best scoring 
records that are a true match.  As discussed above, because of the methods used, the 
estimates presented below are upper bounds of the parameter of interest.  The 
discussion is careful to address this point.      
The first concern is the overall risk of re-identification.  As noted in the 
introduction, synthetic data is a relatively new masking technique.  Thus, quantifying 
its ability to protect the true data is important.  Table 3.1 presents the best estimates of 
the overall risk of re-identification using all 4 methods.  The second through fourth 
columns in Table 3.1 present results for the three distance-based methods using the  
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full set of 171 matching variables.  As you can see, using a maximum blocking group 
size of 10,500, the three distance-based methods have a very small probability of re-
identification: Normalized Euclidean distance successfully re-identifies only 1.77 
percent of records on average across implicates, while the first Mahalanobis metric re-
identifies 1.09 percent of records on average across implicates and the second 
Mahalanobis metric re-identifies only .66 percent of records on average across 
implicates.
65  I conclude that the distance-based re-identification poses little threat.  
We now turn to the probabilistic re-identification results.  Because the 
probabilistic re-identification is more computationally burdensome than the distance-
based re-identification, extending the maximum blocking group size to 10,500 while 
maintaining 171 matching variables would take an estimated 3 months of computation 
time.
66  As such, the last two columns of Table 3.1 present the re-identification rates 
when the maximum blocking group size is 1,050 and 2,100 respectively.  As you can 
see, with a maximum blocking group size of 2,100 only 11.38 percent of the records 
were re-identified in implicate 1, while with a maximum blocking group size of 1,050 
15.48 percent of records were identified (15.18 on average across implicates).  
Although these results are significantly larger than the results from the distance re-
identification, they are very sensitive to maximum blocking group size.  This 
sensitivity suggests that 11.38 and 15.48 are likely very “soft” upper bounds.  That is, if 
the group size were pushed to what an intruder would face (groups of over 70,000 
records for half of the data file), the rates of re-identification would fall dramatically.   
 
 
                                                 
65 Reiter (2003) shows that the proper point estimate for a parameter of interest in the case of multiple 
synthetic implicates is the average across implicates. 
66 This estimate is based on the following calculation: the computation time for the probabilistic re-
identification routine when the maximum blocking group size is 1,050 is approximately 22 hours.  Give 
that the computation time is quadratic in the maximum blocking group size, increasing the maximum 
blocking group size to 10,500 should increase the computation time by approximately 100 fold.   
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Table 3.1: Percent of Records Successfully Re-Identified  
and Sensitivity of Upper Bound 
Notes: The rows “Implicate 1” – “Implicate 4” present the results for the four implicates respectively.  
Each column reports the re-identification results for one of the 4 methods (three distance-based, and one 
probabilistic).  “Group Size” is the maximum blocking group size used in the experiment. 
 
  Maha1:  Maha 2:  Normalized  Probabilistic 
Implicate  Cov(A,B)≠0  Cov(A,B)=0  Eucl Dist  Matchscore 
  171 Matching Variables   
Implicate 1  1.00  3.02  0.63  1.88  1.68  5.24  11.38  15.48 
Implicate 2  1.13  3.39  0.67  2.00  1.81  5.43  .  14.87 
Implicate 3  1.07  3.21  0.65  1.95  1.83  5.49  .  14.98 
Implicate 4  1.14  3.42  0.67  2.01  1.77  5.31  .  15.37 
Average   1.09  3.26  0.66  1.96  1.77  5.37  .  15.18 
Group Size  10,050  1,050  10,050  1,050  10,050  1,050  2,100  1,050 
                 
  18 Matching Variables   
                 
Implicate 1  .    .    .    0.20  1.55 
Group Size  .    .    .    20,000  1,050 
   
To explore the sensitivity of the upper bound further, the second panel of Table 
3.1 presents results for the probabilistic re-identification with a limited set of matching 
variables (only 18), but with larger group sizes.  The key result to notice is that when 
the maximum blocking group size changes from 1,050 to 20,000 the re-identification 
rates are almost 8 times smaller.  If a similar relationship holds at 171 variables, an 
intruder would only be able to re-identify less than 2 percent of records.  A second 
estimate of the sensitivity of the upper bounds comes from the distance matching 
results presented in columns 2-4 of Table 3.1.   In particular, note that when the 
maximum blocking group size decreases from 10,500 to 1,050 the rates of re-
identification roughly triple.  If the same relationship holds for probabilistic matching 
then roughly only 5 percent of records would be successfully identified when the 
maximum blocking group size was pushed to 10,500.   
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  In conclusion, the overall risk of re-identification seems very small.  The 
synthetic implicates, while designed to maintain the statistical properties of the 
underlying data, appears to offer very little risk of re-identification (less than 2 percent 
for the distance based methods and less than 2-5 percent for the probabilistic 
methods).  That said, an interesting secondary pattern appears to emerge in Table 3.1; 
when the maximum blocking group size is held constant and all 171 matching 
variables are used, the probabilistic re-identification seems to outperform the distance-
based matching.  Table 3.2 explores this issue further. 
Table 3.2 presents the percent of records successfully re-identified for both 
distance-based and probabilistic methods when the maximum blocking group size is 
1,050 and the full set of 171 matching variables are used.  The “Ratio” column 
captures the magnitude difference in the success of the probabilistic matchscore  
 
Table 3.2: Percent of Records Successfully Re-Identified:  
Distance-Based vs. Probabilistic Re-Identification Methods 
Notes: The “Ratio” column presents the ratio of the percent of successfully re-identified records using 
the probabilistic matchscore and the percent of successfully re-identified records using the best 
performing distance metric.  “Group Size” is the maximum blocking group size used in the experiment. 
  
Maha:  Maha:   Normalized  Probabilistic   
Implicate  Cov(A,B)≠0  Cov(A,B)=0   Eucl Dist  Matchscore  Ratio 
Implicate 1  3.02  1.88  5.24  15.48  2.95 
Implicate 2  3.39  2.00  5.43  14.87  2.74 
Implicate 3  3.21  1.95  5.49  14.98  2.73 
Implicate 4  3.42  2.01  5.31  15.37  2.89 
Average   3.26  1.96  5.37  15.18  2.83 
Group Size  1,050  1,050  1,050  1,050   
 
relative to the best performing distance metric (Normalized Euclidean Distance in this 
case).  As is clear, the distance-metrics perform significantly worse.  On average, the 
probabilistic methods successfully re-identify almost 3 times (2.83) as many records.   
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In the context of previous re-identification experiments which have found that the 
mahalanobis distance and the probabilistic matching perform similarly (Domingo-
Ferrer and Torra (2001, 2002, 2003), Domingo-Ferrer, Abowd and Torra (2006), and 
Domingo-Ferrer, Torra, Sanz and Sebe (2006)), the results are quite striking.  One 
major difference between the experiments presented here and previous experiments in 
the literature is the number of matching variables; most previous studies have used 
less than 20, while the results here are based on 171.     
  To address this issue, Table 3.3 explores the possibility that the results in Table 
3.2 are driven by the number of matching variables, by presenting re-identification 
rates for each of the four methods for the cases of 10, 20, and 30 matching variables.  
Because there is minimal variation across implicates and computation is expensive, I 
conduct this experiment only on Implicate 1.  The limited set of matching variables 
are chosen based on agreement weight, ln(Mk/Uk).  I rank all 171 matching variables 
from largest to smallest agreement weight and then include the 10, 20, or 30 matching 
variables with the highest agreement weights.  As you can see from Table 3.3, an 
   
Table 3.3: Percent of Records Successfully Re-Identified  
for Limited Sets of Matching Variables 
Notes: The “Ratio” column presents the ratio of the percent of successfully re-identified records using 
the probabilistic matchscore and the percent of successfully re-identified records using the best 
performing distance metric.  “Group Size” is the maximum blocking group size used in the experiment. 
 
Implicate 
Maha: 
Cov(A,B)≠0 
Maha:  
Cov(A,B)=0 
Normalized 
 Eucl Dist 
Probabilistic 
Matchscore 
 
Ratio 
10 Match Vars  .68  .61  1.01  .40  .40 
20 Match Vars  1.91  1.82  3.43  3.13  .91 
30 Match Vars.  2.82  2.37  4.91  5.53  1.13 
Group Size  1,050  1,050  1,050  1,050  1,050 
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interesting pattern emerges.  When there are very few matching variables the distance 
metrics are much more competitive with the probabilistic matchscore.  In fact the 
normalized Euclidean distance actually outperforms the probabilistic matchscore when 
only 10 and 20 matching variables are included.  However, as more variables are 
added the probabilistic matchscore begins to perform better.  By the time we get to 
171 matching variables, as presented in Table 3.2, the probabilistic matchscore is 
almost 3 times as successful. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
  In summary, the results of my experiments show that, overall, the synthetic 
data technique does a good job protecting the data.  An intruder using the distance-
based methods would identify no more than 2 percent of records.  An intruder using 
probabilistic methods would identify less than 2-5 percent of the records.  The most 
interesting result is the disparity across the two methods.  When the maximum 
blocking group size is the same and 171 matching variables are used, the probabilistic 
matchscore successfully re-identifies almost 3 times as many as records as the 
distance-based methods, a result that goes against previous experiments that compare 
the two methods.  That said, I find that the discrepancy between probabilistic re-
identification and distance-based re-identification varies quite significantly with the 
number of matching variables used.  Specifically, when there are very few matching 
variables (less than 20) the methods achieve similar results, with the distance methods 
sometimes finding more success.  However, as I add more matching variables, the 
probabilistic method starts to dominate.  Given that previous studies comparing the 
two methods use fewer matching variables, these second set of results seem to 
reconcile my findings with the broader literature. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
In this appendix I discuss the software written in SAS used to do the 
probabilistic and distance-based re-identification.  I start with the probabilistic 
software.   
 
A) Probabilistic Re-Identification Software in SAS 
  Let A_FILE be the file to which the B_FILE is matched.  In my case the 
A_FILE is the SIPP Gold Standard file.  The B_FILE is one of the synthetic 
implicates.  These two files each have 263, 673 observations.  Following the notation 
in the text, let α be the K dimensional vector of matching variables for a single 
observation the A_FILE, and let β be the K dimensional vector of matching variables 
for a single observation the B_FILE. 
   Let BVARS be the set of blocking variables and MVARS be the set of K 
matching variables (MVARS_1-MVAR_K).  In my applications K varies depending 
on the experiment and BVARS= MARITALSTAT and BLACK.  As such the 
interaction of BVARS generates 8 blocks.   
  The software begins by splitting the A_FILE and the B_FILE into the 8 
smaller files associated with the 8 blocking groups.  Call the blocking groups from the 
A_FILE and B_FILE A_1-A_8 and B_1-B_8 respectively.  Let Ng be the number of 
observation in each blocking group.  Each pair of blocking groups (A_g, B_g) for g=1 
to 8 are then fed into the probabilistic re-identification routine (PRR, hereafter).   
  Depending on the size of the A_g and B_g, the PRR will then split A_g and 
B_g into smaller files (chunks) to speed up the processing.  In my application, if A_g 
and B_g have more than Ng > 1000 observations, then they will be split into J = 
ceiling(Ng/1000) smaller chunks of 1000, with the last chunk having the remainder Ng 
– (K-1)1000 observations.  Call these J files A_g_j and B_g_j for j=1 to J.  Before the 
files are split into smaller chunks, they are first sorted on IDVAR.  This ensures that 
each observation in B_g_j will have its true match in the corresponding chunk A_g_j, 
and that the selection of the k chunks is independent of the MVARS.   
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Next, for each chunk j, the following two files are created: M_AXB_g_j and 
U_AXB_g_j.  M_AXB_g_j contains all possible true matches between A_g_j and 
B_g_j (1000 observations) while M_AXB_g_j contains all possible non-match 
combinations between A_g_j and B_g_j (990,000 observations).   More precisely, 
each observation in M_AXB_g_j and U_AXB_g_j is a combination of a record from 
A_g_j and a record B_g_j.  Let IDVAR_B by the value of the IDVAR for the record 
from B_g_j and let IDVAR_A be the value of the IDVAR for the record from A_g_k.  
Each observation in M_AXB_g_j and U_AXB_g_j can then be written as the 
following vector: (IDVAR_A, α, IDVAR_B, β).  Agreement variables, AGR_1-
AGR_K, for each of the K matching variables are then created.  Consider a discrete 
matching variable, MVAR_D.   For each observation from M_AXB_j_k or 
M_AXB_j_k, if αD = βD then AGR_D =1, else AGR_D=0.  Consider a continuous 
matching variable, MVAR_C.   For each observation from M_AXB_j_k or 
M_AXB_j_k, if Abs[(αC - βC)/αC] ≤ .05  then AGR_C =1, else AGR_C=0.   
  Given the agreement variables, AGR_1-AGR_K, we now calculate the M and 
U probabilities.   The M-probability for MVAR_k for chunk j of block g is calculated 
as the frequency of AGR_k=1 in M_AXB_g_k.  The U-probability for MVAR_k for 
chunk j of block g is analogously calculated as the frequency of AGR_k =1 in 
U_AXB_g_j.  Note that the M and U probabilities are the exact probabilities for chunk 
j of block g.  The calculations are looped K-times to give us M and U probabilities for 
each of the K matching variables.  Call them M_PRB_k and U_PRB_k for k=1 to K. 
After calculating the M and U probabilities, they are merged onto M_AXB_g_j 
and U_AXB_g_j which are then stacked on top of each other to create the file 
AXB_g_j which contains 1,000,000 observations: each record β in B_g_j is matched 
to all 1,000 records in A_g_k.  In matrix notation we have: 
 
[IDVAR_B  β(1)  IDVAR_A  α(1)  M_PRB_1-M_PRB_k  U_PRB_1-U_PRB_k, 
 IDVAR_B  β(1)  IDVAR_A  α(2)  M_PRB_1-M_PRB_k  U_PRB_1-U_PRB_k, 
 … 
IDVAR_B  β(1)  IDVAR_A  α( Ng)  M_PRB_1-M_PRB_k  U_PRB_1-U_PRB_k, 
....  
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IDVAR_B  β(Ng)  IDVAR_A  α(Ng)  M_PRB_1-M_PRB_k  U_PRB_1-U_PRB_k] 
Where β(n) is the K-dimensional vector of matching variable for the n
th record in the 
B file and α(n) is the analogue for the A file. 
 
As is clear, the structure of AXB_g_j allows for the calculation of the matchscore for 
each potential match (α(n), β(m)) from A_g_j and B_g_j.  After calculating 
matchscores, I sort AXB_g_j by IDVAR_B and matchscore and output the records 
with the highest 3 matchscores for each observation β to the file FINAL_g_j.  An 
observation in FINAL_g_j has the following vector structure:  
 
(IDVAR_B,  IDVAR_A1- IDVAR_A3,  MATCHSCORE1- MATCHSCORE3) 
Where IDVAR_Ap is the ID of the record from the A_FILE that has the p
th highest 
matchscore out of all possible matches to the record IDVAR_B, and 
MATCHSCOREp is the corresponding p
th highest matchsore. 
 
This process loops through all J chunks for group g, generating J files, 
FINAL_g_1- FINAL_g_J, which are all stacked on top of each other to create the file 
FINAL_g.  FINAL_g has the same structure as FINAL_g_j, but contains Ng 
observations.  
The overall process then loops through all 8 blocks, creating FINAL, which 
has the same structure as FINAL_g_k but has all 263,673 observations in the original 
B_FILE.   FINAL can then be analyzed to estimate the probability of re-identification: 
the probability that the p
th highest matchscore is a true match. 
 
Following is a step by step picture of the looping algorithm: 
(1) Input A_FILE and B_FILE 
(2) A_FILE and B_FILE split in G blocking groups.  Submit block g to PRR.  g = 1: 
1g) A_g and B_g split into J chunks to reduce processing time.  j=1: 
1j) A_g_j and B_g_j joined together to create M_AXB_g_j and 
U_AXB_g_j. 
2j) Agreement definitions, M and U probabilities, and matchscores  
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calculated for all possible match combinations between A_g_j and 
B_g_j 
3j) Highest 3 matchscores and corresponding IDVAR’s to each record 
in B_g_j output to FINAL_g_j. 
4j) If j < J, iterate j forward: j=j+1 and return to step 1g).  If j = J then
  stop. 
2g) Stack FINAL_g_j for j=1 to J to create FINAL_g. 
3g) If g < G, iterate g forward: g=g+1 and return to step 2).  If g = G, then stop.  
3) Stack FINAL_g for g=1 to G to create FINAL, which contains the ID and 
matchscore for the records for A with the top 3 matchscores for a given record in B. 
 
B) Distance-Based Re-Identification Software in SAS 
  The A_FILE, the B_FILE, the BVARS and the MVARS are the same as the 
probabilistic case. Like the probabilistic software, the distance-based software begins 
by splitting the A_FILE and the B_FILE into the 8 smaller files associated with the 8 
blocking groups.  Call the blocking groups from the A_FILE and B_FILE A_1-A_8 
and B_1-B_8 respectively.  Let Ng be the number of observation in each blocking 
group.  Each pair of blocking groups (A_g, B_g) for g=1 to 8 are then fed into the 
distance-based re-identification routine (DRR, hereafter).   
  For the sake of processing time, A_g and B_g will then be split into smaller 
files (chunks).  In my application, if A_g and B_g have more than Ng > 10,500 
observations, then they will be split into J = ceiling(Ng/1000) smaller chunks of 
10,500, with the last chunk having the remainder Ng – (K-1)1000 observations.  Call 
these J files A_g_j and B_g_j for j=1 to J and let Ngj be the number of observations in 
A_g_j.  Before the files are split into smaller chunks, they are first sorted on IDVAR.  
This ensures that each observation in B_g_j will have its true match in the 
corresponding chunk A_g_j, and that the selection of the k chunks is independent of 
the MVARS.   
  Before inputing the chunks into the DBR, a few calculations are made.  The 
covariance matrix for all of the matching variables in both the A_FILE and B_FILE 
are calculated, and the covariance across the A_FILE and B_FILE is calculated using 
PROC CORR.  Also, a second set of matching variables, MVARS_STD are created.   
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For a given matching variable k,   MVARS_STD_k = (MVARS_STD_k – 
MEAN_k)/STDDEV_k.  That is,  MVARS_STD_k is simply a transformed version of 
MVARS_k.  These variables will be used to calculate the standardized Euclidean 
distance, while covariance matrices will be needed to calculate the various 
Mahalanobis distance metrics.    
  After the necessary calculations and the splitting of the files are completed, 
each pair of chunks, (A_g_j, B_g_j), are then iteratively input into the DBR.  Each 
pair (A_g_j, B_g_j) are first read into matrix form in PROC IML. Define MVARS_A 
as the Ngj x K matrix of the matching variables for all Ngj records in A_g_j, and 
MVARS_B as the same.  Three covariance matrices are also read into PROC IML: Let 
COV_A be the K x K covariance of the K matching variables in t he A_FILE.  Let 
COV_B be the analogue for the B_file.  Let COV_AB be the covariance between the 
A_FILE and the B_FILE.    
The program then loops through the B_g_j one record at a time, computing the 
distance between a given record and every record in A_g_j, and then keeping the 
closest 3.  More formally, define MVARS_Bi as the i
th row of MVARS_B.  Define 
N_MVARS_Bi as a Ngj x K matrix in which MVARS_Bi is stacked on itself Ngj times.  
Define K_1 as a K x 1 matrix of 1’s.  The distance between a given record i in B_g_j 
and every record in A_g_j is then computed as follows: 
 
D = (N_MVARS_Bi – MVARS_A)#INV_COV#(N_MVARS_Bi – MVARS_A)*K_1
 
where # is matrix element-wise multiplication operator and INV_COV = Ik for 
Euclidean Distance and  INV_COV= COV_A +COV_B and INV_COV= COV_A 
+COV_B – 2 COV_AB for the two mahalanobis distances respectively. 
 
D is a Ngj x 1 matrix which contains the distance between record i in B_g_j and every 
record in A_g_j.  The ID and the distance of the closest three records are then saved.  
The program then loops through these calculations Ngj times, once for each 
observation in B_g_j, outputting the 3 closest records.  As such for each chunk j of 
group g the final output file, FINAL_g_j, contains Ngj observations with the following 
vector structure: 
FINAL_g_j =(IDVAR_B, IDVAR_A1-IDVAR_A3, DISTANCE1-DISTANCE3)  
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After each chunk is processed through the DBR, the program then loops to the next 
chunk.  In the end we have G*J output files, FINAL_g_j, which are stacked on top of 
each other to create FINAL.  FINAL contains one record for each observation in the 
B_FILE, and the ID’s of the three closest records in the A_FILE  
 
Following is a step by step picture of the looping algorithm: 
(1) Input A_FILE and B_FILE 
(2) A_FILE and B_FILE split in C = G*J chunks.  Submit chunk c to PRR.  c = 1: 
1c) A_g_j and B_g_j are read into matrices in PROC IML. 
   1n) Loop through B_g_j one record, n,  at a time.  n=1. 
2n) Calculate the distance between record n in B_g_j and every record 
in A_g_j for all distance metrics.  Output the 3 closest records from 
A_g_j to FINAL_g_j.   
3n) If n < Ng iterate forward: n=n+1 and return to step 1n).  If n = Ng 
then stop. 
2c) If c < C, iterate c forward: c=c+1 and return to step 1g).  If c = C then stop. 
(3) Stack FINAL_g_j for g=1 to G and j=1 to J to create FINAL, which contains the 
ID and distance for the three closest records in A to a given record in B. 
 
C) List of Blocking Variables 
Marital Status 
Male 
 
D) List of Artificial Blocking Variables 
Actual Birth date 
 
E) List of Matching Variables 
Weeks with pay: 1990-1999 
Weeks worked part time: 1990-1999 
Total annual hours worked: 1990-1999 
Total family income: 1990-1999 
Total personal income: 1990-1999 
Total personal earnings: 1990-1999 
Family annual poverty threshold: 1990-1999 
Family total welfare benefit: 1990-1999  
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Family welfare participation: 1990-1999 
Public health assistance participation: 1990-1999 
Total benefit from health assistance: 1990-1999 
Health insurance coverage: 1990-1999 
Employer provided health insurance: 1990-1999. 
Total net worth 
Do you own home? 
Home equity 
Non-household wealth 
Marital history 
Marital history event 1 – Marital history event 7 
Age at marital history event 1 - Age at marital history event 7 
More than 3 marriages 
Number of kids under 18 
Survey Birth date 
Death date 
Death date non-missing 
Black 
Hispanic 
Five category education 
Eligible to be asked disability questions 
Disability limit work 
Disability prevents work 
Foreign born 
Time arrived in USA 
Occupation 
Valid occupation code 
Industry 
Valid industry code 
Eligibility for pension questions, age  
Eligibility for pension questions, employment 
Defined contribution plan 
Defined benefit plan 
Weight  
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